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Abstract 
 
The following thesis provides an account of what it means to approach epistemic 
concepts in a lived rather than abstract fashion. It argues that taking such a position 
naturally leads to an assessment of how the epistemic life might be lived virtuously, 
and it grounds this in experiences of being-with-worth. It then isolates and gives a 
thorough account of the key, childlike virtues found in the Golden Age of British 
children’s literature: playfulness, a capacity for wonder, and intellectual humility 
and open-mindedness. After exploring how this model of a virtuous epistemic life 
might re-orientate philosophical discussions of nostalgia and the epistemic worth 
of literature, the thesis finishes by cashing out what a virtuous education might look 
like. This final move includes an analysis of some of my own attempts to achieve a 
virtuous education whilst teaching.  
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Introduction: Knowledge Deserves a Story 
 
Over the years it has taken to write this thesis, I have taken on roles as university 
seminar tutor, module creator and convenor, workshop leader, peer and pastoral 
support worker and trainer, freelance philosophy specialist for children aged 5 to 
18, club and international women’s American football coach, and, for the past year, 
a full-time teacher of Philosophy and Theology at a private boys’ school in London. 
I would now class myself as, first and foremost, a teacher. As such, this thesis may 
have retained some of the more theoretical explorations into the nature of literature, 
knowledge and childhood which set it in motion, but it has transformed into a 
document which primarily seeks to narrate the ideas which led me to and continue 
to underpin my classroom practice and teaching philosophy. In this introduction 
and the first chapter I lay out what I take to be required for a holistic understanding 
of the nature and goals of epistemic concepts. In chapter two I turn to a study of the 
Golden Age of British children’s literature to help me derive an account of 
playfulness, a capacity for wonder, and humility and open-mindedness as key 
epistemic virtues. In the third chapter, I analyse how such an approach might help 
us reassess epistemic activity through two case studies: nostalgia and literature. The 
final chapter then articulates my teaching philosophy and analyses examples of my 
teaching practice in light of the epistemology and virtue account I have depicted. 
 
 
A threshold moment 
 
Once upon a time, in some out of the way corner of that universe 
which is dispersed into numberless twinkling solar systems, there 
was a star upon which clever beasts invented knowing. That was 
the most arrogant and mendacious minute of “world history,” but 
nevertheless, it was only a minute. After nature had drawn a few 
breaths, the star cooled and congealed, and the clever beasts had 
to die. 
 
I first came across these words in the first year of writing my thesis as part of a 
philosophy and literature workshop on Darwin and Nietzsche. Housed in a black-
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box studio, we students had been given this extract and tasked with creating a short 
dramatic rendition of the piece. No doubt fuelled by the opening four words and my 
research into Victorian children’s literature, my mind immediately jumped to 
images which still vividly accompany the passage whenever I read it:  
 
A mother is sat at her child’s bedside. The curtains are drawn 
to the cold, frosty night outside and a candle flickers against 
the walls of the small, plain bedroom as they read from a 
large, hardback picture book. Versed in what is to come, the 
parent lowers their tone, slows their pace, leans in a painfully 
slight amount and enunciates carefully as they reach the key, 
dramatic moment: “knowing”. Having only heard the word 
whispered when no adult was present, and without definition 
or example, its connotations are darkly mysterious and the 
child holds their covers all the tighter. The parent inwardly 
smiles as they continue to read, steadily resolving the panic 
and awe they have created, until, finally: “the clever beasts 
had to die.” The child’s fingers loosen and their stomach 
unclenches.  
 
Continuing to read Nietzsche’s ‘On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense’ reveals 
that this is a hypothesised fable, used to introduce a scathing, philosophical 
reflection on the arrogant and deceptive essence of the human intellect.  
 
One might invent such a fable, and yet he still would not have 
adequately illustrated how miserable, how shadowy and 
transient, how aimless and arbitrary the human intellect looks 
within nature. (2006, p. 114) 
 
There was no bedtime reading, no extended world to the story. In fact, it was barely 
a story at all. It was a few lines created to aesthetically and symbolically fail in the 
service of a critique of humanity. And so, I stop imagining and awaken those 
faculties more suited to understanding and analysing a philosophical argument. 
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However, I need only read a few paragraphs further into the essay, and be somewhat 
literate in allegory, before I can return to the fable with a defensible reading of 
Nietzsche as believing there to be a great deal of truth in those lines. The story, 
arguably, gestures towards the actual state and history of humanity as Nietzsche 
understands it. My imagination excitedly restarts – if it had ever really ceased – and 
begins calling forth living images of historical moments, everyday activity and a 
future apocalypse that support or refute the story as containing some truth.  
 
After all of this, I am prompted to ask: Was this opening paragraph literature or 
philosophy? Fact or fiction? Invitation to imagine or believe? Designed to entertain 
or convince? Childish or profound? Critical or aesthetic? All of these and more? 
 
It is with this final question that I came to see that Nietzsche, intentionally or not, 
had succinctly challenged a series of binaries which I had been taught to use to 
divide and categorise the world and experience. It is these binaries that this thesis 
will seek to explore and collapse more thoroughly, but not to the condemnation or 
destruction of knowledge, rather to a hopeful and shaky reconciliation with the 
clever beasts that invented it. Like a relationship which has been fraught with 
betrayal on either side, there may never be complete trust again, but there can be a 
recognition of what is beautiful and good in the other and a reminder of what made 
them an object worthy of love in the first place. 
 
Of course, very little of this thought process consciously registered when I first read 
Nietzsche’s opening paragraphs, and, had I not been engaged in creating this thesis, 
I may never have returned to reflect on the experience. It would have been even less 
likely that I would have tried to capture or express what had occurred. After all, our 
developed intellects – those apparently miserable, shadowy, transient, aimless and 
arbitrary things – negotiate such linguistic subtleties, and more, with apparent ease 
and without needing conscious attention. However, our projects cast a new light on 
the world that makes objects and ideas shimmer where once they were dull and give 
us cause to stop and reflect on what was previously unacknowledged.  
 
The project I was, and still am, engaged in – the one that shone a light on how I was 
reading and interacting with Nietzsche’s fable and lies at the core of this thesis – is 
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the resolution of an internal conflict between my analytical-disposition to 
epistemology and my deep love for and commitment to the power of imaginative 
stories. How could I reconcile my need to know about the world, and to be able to 
communicate and justify what I knew to those around me, with an ingrained but 
seemingly indefensible intuition that I learn from literature? How could I bring 
together knowing without articulable justification that the literary experiences I had 
as a child and those I was still having as an adult mattered to and constituted part 
of my knowledge of the world with a philosophical system which had 
unquestionably demonstrated to me the fact that a worthy, conjoined search for such 
truth rested upon articulable defences of such knowledge? It was passages like 
Nietzsche’s that said to me there was something wrong with my understanding of 
knowledge and stories alike.  
 
Throughout my life and education, I had learned that ‘knowledge’ was 
propositional and, as I came to study it, that it was a term with a definition. It had 
its necessary and sufficient conditions. I was worried, like many epistemologists, 
about what constituted the justification of my beliefs, but I was satisfied with the 
starting point and direction. The search was providing me with a sense of purpose 
and joy. Yet, there was also guilt. Epistemic and academic guilt that rippled from 
the tension between this term and my belief in the power of literature to convey 
knowledge. At first the guilt felt as though it stemmed from my infidelity to 
knowledge; I was knowing where I had promised not to know and betraying a 
system of thought which had given me so much. But the experience of reading 
Nietzsche’s fable pointed elsewhere. As I described in my imagining of the bedtime 
reading, knowledge is not just a word upon the parent’s lips; it is a dramatic 
moment. Knowledge is alive. It resonates. Its being and manifestation, the very 
experience of it, are bound up with the values and activities which cause it, which 
exist alongside it in its host, and it shapes in causal ways what happens after it. This 
realisation suggested instead that my guilt came from failing to acknowledge and 
repressing the lived, experiential side of knowledge for the sake of loyalty to its 
philosophical manifestation. 
 
Throughout my life, I had also learned that I could interpret stories. I could search 
for meaning in them. I could learn about their authors and make reasoned 
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conclusions about why they might have written what they did and why they might 
have written it in the way they did. Stories could also act as a training ground for 
literacy and certain cognitive and emotional capacities. But I had learned that, 
ultimately, stories had a dominant, aesthetic component which separated them from 
truth and the search for knowledge. They were to be experienced and not relied 
upon to know about the world. This made sense. Yet the stories, particularly their 
characters, made fun of me or shook their heads in disappointment as I built my 
epistemic fortress to protect my beliefs and actions from their influence. Then came 
Nietzsche’s fable and, confident and smug, they settled back and watched as it 
lowered the drawbridge and drained the moat. 
 
One – that disembodied, rational, supposed token of humanity – may well object at 
this point: what a self-indulgent opening to an academic thesis. Not only has the 
author presumed that their personal experience is worthy of such lengthy recount 
but also that it contains any insight that has not already been articulated elsewhere 
and in a much clearer and objective fashion. I can only say that I did not intend to 
convey either of these presumptions, I only wished the form of my writing to do 
justice to the central claims, epistemological philosophy, and educational outlook 
of this thesis: epistemological concepts are not dead and abstract, they are also a 
series of dramatic and lived moments. Knowledge, belief, truth, and justification 
are things we live through and live with and epistemology can be as playful and 
anarchic as it is surgical and analytic. Most importantly, our epistemic existence 
needs and deserves stories. 
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Once upon a time, in some out of the way corner of that universe which is 
dispersed into numberless twinkling solar systems, there was a star upon 
which clever beasts invented knowing. That was the most arrogant and 
mendacious minute of “world history,” but, nevertheless, it was beautiful. The 
clever beasts had created a thing so powerful that it could both enslave them 
to it and free them from an ever-present awareness of the silence emanating 
from the world around them and the inevitable cooling and congealing of their 
star.  
 
Some of the beasts would say their invention had eradicated the silence, others 
that it had revealed that there had always been sound behind the silence, and 
a few that they must destroy it and face the silence once more. Some stood and 
listened to the voices of their fellow beasts, some took up their messages and 
added their voice to the cacophony, a few tried to shut themselves away and 
find the silence again despite the din outside, and many simply ignored them 
and forgot there had ever been a silence before the voices. All the while, every 
one of those clever beasts carried their invention inside them. It grew within 
them until no one could tell where it began and where they ended. Whatever 
they made, their invention made with them. Whatever they felt, their invention 
felt with them. And, however they changed, their invention changed with them. 
 
Many of them continued to discuss the invention, of course, but whether it 
actually was an invention or not, whether it was with them or outside them, 
and whether any of that mattered, had long since been forgotten. And so they 
laughed, and they argued, and they cried, and they pondered, and they lived. 
And their invention lived with them. 
 
Until the minute was up.  
 
After nature had drawn a few breaths, the star cooled and congealed, and the 
clever beasts – and their invention – had to die. 
 
 
7 
 
Chapter 1: Experiencing Epistemic Concepts and Virtue Epistemology 
 
 
Traditional epistemology 
 
What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge? Is anyone ever in 
a position to rightfully say they know anything with certainty? When does one have 
good reason to believe? Is a belief justified when it meets internally or externally 
imposed criteria? Is there any knowledge or belief that does not rely on another 
belief for its justification? Does all knowledge reduce to propositional knowledge? 
Does all belief require language? 
 
These are just some of the interesting and important questions asked in the field of 
epistemology. Philosophers working in this area have traditionally approached 
them in a particular manner and with a specific methodology, namely, via analytic 
concept analysis and logically rigorous inductive and deductive reasoning. They 
have hoped to define knowledge, capture the nature of belief and discover the “truth 
of the matter” through abstract reasoning and pure intellect. They have specialised 
and focused to an almost sublime level of detail, particularly when it comes to 
inventing and tackling Gettier-style problems surrounding a justified, true belief 
model of knowledge.  
 
This traditional approach and its goals have been criticised by numerous schools of 
postanalytic, feminist, virtue, and postmodern philosophy, not to mention by 
evolutionary psychology, cognitive neuroscience and religious or spiritual 
practices. Traditional epistemology – or “epistemology ‘proper’” as some feminist 
literature has taken to scathingly calling it – has been accused of being the epitome 
of inaccessible, ivory tower thinking, ignoring the discoveries of psychology and 
cognitive neuroscience, failing to take into account everyday experience, not 
addressing its ethical dimensions and impact, allowing privileged and outdated 
hierarchies to dominate discourse, perpetuating the mythical existence of concepts 
such as objectivity, metanarratives or a stable sense of subjectivity, and more. Some 
of these critiques will return throughout the thesis, but the idea I wish to explore is 
that the traditional approach has, to use Coleridge’s image, become a Gorgon’s head 
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that looks death into everything (cited Scott, 1985, p. 15). What I mean by this is 
that traditional epistemology neglects the lived, experiential dimension of its central 
concepts and deems first-person, subjective experience as problematic to achieving 
its goals rather than being, as I maintain, vital for a complete, holistic understanding 
of them. However, I do not want to position this as a critique per se. Traditional 
approaches are not wrong to do this, they are only wrong insofar as they do not 
recognise they are wielding tools that help them achieve one kind of understanding 
rather than the singular and correct way of understanding the nature and “truth” of 
a concept. Ultimately, how we approach knowledge, belief, and other epistemic 
concepts, and whether we are seeking the nature of the world or a better 
understanding of our relationship to it and each other, can only be measured in 
relation to the projects we undertake and what we take to be the most valuable 
aspect of human life. 
 
In order to better understand what this might amount to I will briefly consider the 
concept of belief and how we can not only both reject the existence of beliefs and 
still have direct, lived experience of it, but that we must grapple with allowing both 
of these stances to co-exist in order to fully comprehend it. Intentional mental states 
such as belief may not exist in the way they are generally understood, but neither 
we nor concepts exist at a purely descriptive level, we are embodied and 
experiential and this must always be kept in mind. 
 
 
Abstracted belief 
 
We experience beliefs in many ways. The one that we standardly talk of is the 
concept of belief which we experience through its effects. This is the type of belief 
we try to communicate to each other when we explain or predict our own and 
other’s behaviours. Belief in this sense has several components. 
 
Firstly, these beliefs are commonly interpreted as having an attitudinal, 
propositional and intentional structure. “Intentional” is used here in the 
philosophical sense of the word as being aimed at, about or representing the world, 
rather than the everyday sense of being deliberate or motivated by an intention. As 
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such, believing is an attitude of accepting the truth of some proposition about a 
feature of an independently existing world. Beliefs thus fit the formula, “subject S 
holds attitude A towards proposition P, where proposition P is about or represents 
the world”. For example, “I believe that all grass is green”, which now simply 
means “I take the proposition “all grass is green” to be true of the world.” 
 
Secondly, most accounts of belief also add a necessary motivation or influence 
condition. A belief is the kind of thing that can motivate me to act or influence me 
to feel in some way. I cannot exist in a state where I believe P to be true and not 
have it factor into relevant decision-making, whether that is at the conscious or 
subconscious level. For example, if I have some odd disposition to eat all things 
which are green, I cannot believe that all grass is green without also being motivated 
to eat all grass and, unless there is some contravening belief or reason for not doing 
so, eating it. 
 
Next, it is generally taken as standard that beliefs can be changed consciously, and 
subconsciously, by myself and by others. Let us say that I came across an organism 
which for all intents and purposes was indistinguishable from all the grass I have 
previously come across except that this organism was brown. It was then explained 
to me by a trusted friend why this new organism still constituted grass despite being 
brown. From then on, I continue to eat green grass because of the above, unusual 
disposition, but I do not eat this new brown grass. However, I continue to call both 
organisms “grass” in conversation and in my own, internal language of thought. It 
would seem reasonable to say that I no longer believed that all grass is green, but 
that grass can be both green and brown. Beliefs can be highly resistant to this kind 
of change, particularly in situations where a change in belief would require an 
overhaul of one’s pre-existing narratives and understanding of the patterns of 
meaning which govern the world.1 Yet, despite this resistance, the fact that beliefs 
can change and be changed is a cornerstone of our everyday understanding of belief 
and human behaviour. Indeed, being able to subject our beliefs to scrutiny with an 
                                                          
1 See (Connors & Halligan, 2014) for a paper containing a list of references to studies done on the 
resistance of belief. 
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eye towards validating or changing them could be viewed as one of the most 
distinctly human activities we can engage in. 
 
On the above understanding, belief is a dichotomous, attitudinal, intentional, 
propositional, motivational, changeable state of being, and a belief is this state 
directed towards a particular proposition about the world. S believes P when they 
take P to be true of the world, do not doubt its truth and are motivated to act upon 
P in circumstances where a belief or non-belief in P is perceived to impact upon 
which action should be taken. However, we might ask of this account, in what sense 
do belief and these beliefs exist and do we experience them directly? If the above 
were the only way we could approach the nature of belief I would see myself as 
being closely aligned with the interpretationism (or instrumentalism, depending on 
how you are distinguishing your schools of thought) of Daniel Dennett. The type of 
beliefs so far described do not, in Dennett’s (1991) terms, “robustly” exist. In other 
words, they do not exist in the same way that this computer is perceived and read 
as having an existence in the world independently of me and other perceiving 
creatures. Instead, they exist in the same way that centres of gravity and equators 
exist. They represent, help explain and predict patterns and actions created by other 
robustly existing entities. In the case of belief, they exist insofar as they help us 
understand and predict an individual’s or group’s patterns of human behaviour. 
They may even take on a more impactful role insofar as once they have been created 
and incorporated into personal and social consciousness they can also shape future 
patterns of behaviour. As such, whilst they do not exist robustly, they are not 
entirely fictional or arbitrary. 
 
Take the example of me believing that this computer is in front of me. In what sense 
can you or I locate or experience that belief? You may say that you observe my 
actions and, given your understanding of human beings and that you also believe in 
the computer, you can state that I am acting in a way that is consistent with a belief 
in the existence of the computer. I can also do the same thing when examining 
myself. I can look at my own actions, ask why they manifested in such a way, and 
posit a belief as an explanation for my behaviour and even my feeling of motivation 
to do the action. The deduced belief also places me in a pattern which joins me with 
a general understanding of other human beings. It identifies that I am not an outlier 
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that needs explaining but rather another instance of action that is consistent with a 
previous theory of belief. We also see belief playing this explanatory role when we 
are trying to make sense of actions which do not fit with our understanding of 
ourselves or when we are trying to interpret the actions of another person. “But why 
did Kathy shun Jeet?” I might ask my friend. “She must believe those rumours!” 
says my friend. Similarly, Kathy may have gone home and said to herself, “That 
wasn’t like me at all, I must believe those rumours.” In both cases, the existence of 
belief, and a particular belief, are being posited in order to explain the observable 
patterns of behaviour. In fact, in the case of Kathy’s self-analysis, the existence of 
subconscious beliefs which one is not always aware of is also being deduced to 
explain her behaviour. 
 
What interpretationism identifies is that because we have come to be so familiar 
with the concept of belief we take it as given and existing to the point that if we 
cannot understand a person’s behaviour we feel it necessary to reinterpret what their 
beliefs must be. This is perfectly acceptable for now given that we have few better 
explanations for these patterns of behaviour, but belief itself has not been 
experienced or identified directly as part of this analysis. It has only been 
hypothesised or deduced because of the experience of, what are taken to be, its 
effects. 
 
Dennett’s work is serving here to illuminate how traditionally analytic explanations 
might give an excellent account of the role that the concept of belief is playing and 
define it in accordance with this. His account of belief appears so abstract, universal 
and reasoned that it is difficult to refute, even if it is moving towards understanding 
these intentional states as not “robustly” existing. If Dennett is correct – and while 
I agree with his account that is a big ‘if’ for epistemologists at large – there are 
many adjustments and debates still to be had over the exact conceptual role and 
structure of belief and there is also still much work to be done in cognitive 
neuroscience to understand the workings of belief and the brain in general. 
However, my contention does not exist at the level of fine-grained and focused 
qualifications or scientific description but at the macro level of what is required for 
a complete understanding of the concept of belief. Frameworks such as Dennett’s 
run the risk of being severely depleted in their deep understanding of epistemic 
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concepts insofar as they neglect lived and direct experiences in their attempt for 
abstracted universality. Just because there is no direct experience of such an abstract 
concept of belief does not mean there is no direct experience of any understanding 
of belief and, ultimately, a complete grasp of the concept of belief needs to wrestle 
with both the abstracted and lived dimensions of the concept. Indeed, I find it very 
telling that in his assertion that were eliminativists to find the scientific explanation 
required to completely overhaul how we conceive of belief, we would turn away 
from the ‘folk psychology’ he is discussing, “except, perhaps, in the rough-and-
tumble of daily life” (Dennett, 1991, p. 50). But everyday life is not an “except”, it 
is the norm, it matters, and how we directly live and experience these concepts 
during our rough-and-tumble is a huge part of understanding them holistically. 
 
 
Lived belief 
 
The following series of examples is presented as my attempt to work through a lived 
experience of belief. At least two objections may be raised about the process. 
Firstly, it is entirely possible that it will reveal much more about the limits of my 
imagination than any shared understanding or experience of belief. You may be 
able to identify a clear experience of belief long before I fully recount my own. 
However, this should not be a problem. The hope here is to lend credence to the 
idea that even though the type of belief involved in the hypothesising about human 
behaviour does not robustly exist, we can still identify a direct, rather than merely 
explanatory, experience of belief by reflecting on how we live the concept. As such, 
I encourage you to try and reflect on your own experiences of believing before, 
during and after reading my examples. 
 
Secondly, what I am doing here may well be arbitrary in selecting something to call 
belief. My own background, dispositions, biases, and so on, are likely pushing me 
towards calling the following experience ‘belief’ rather than another suitable 
candidate and it is a limitation of my conceptual system and network of meaning 
that stops me from attaching it to some other experience that you might wish to 
extend it to. However, I embrace that the below is what it is to live belief for me. 
The point is not to prove that the below type of experience is belief, or that we all 
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have the same experience, it is to gesture towards how I experience and what I 
identify as a lived experience of belief. My hope is that it will ring true with others, 
but, ultimately, as I have just stated, the invitation is to attempt a similar process as 
much as it is to agree with me. Why this is a valuable, reflective process, and why 
we might desire to share such potentially discrepant narratives, is discussed further 
on in this chapter. 
 
The immediate difficulty of trying to locate a more direct experience of belief 
appears to be in distinguishing it from the experience of existing and simply being. 
I take it as given that I can have the experiences this-computer, acting-on-a-
computer and my-foot. Just as you, right now, are having the experience reading-a-
thesis. The question now is whether there is a distinguishable part of those 
experiences that is identifiable as an experience of I-believe-the-computer-exists, I-
believe-I-am-reading-a-thesis, or I-believe-my-foot-exists or are the respective pairs 
entirely co-extensive? They certainly seem to be closely tied. Simply focusing on 
an experience of a limb or object appears to yield very little by way of separation. 
I do not experience any difference between my-foot and I-believe-my-foot-exists. 
Similarly, if I try to think about what I believe about an object or thought currently 
not with me then it feels as though I simply recall an experience of that thing in 
order to perceive the belief. For example, if I try to call to mind the experience I-
believe-Santa-is-real what comes to mind is a previous experience of when I 
believed in Santa. In other words, I bring to the forefront of my mind a memory of 
an experience rather than one diluted to the belief that existed in that scenario.  
 
The possibility of a direct account of belief, what it is for belief to be lived, is not 
to be found by concentrating on current or previous experience of belief but on 
trying to contrast the experiences being-without-doubt with being-with-doubt. 
Where being and belief are intertwined is in being-without-doubt, but where being 
and belief come apart is in certain instances of being-with-doubt. Perhaps this 
separation can help us to reflect on what it is like to experience belief first-hand. I 
say “perhaps” because it is not as straightforward as contrasting something which I 
currently doubt with something which I believe. For example, I might contrast I-
doubt-the-existence-of-aliens with I-believe-my-foot-exists. I am thus experiencing 
aliens-doubt and foot-belief at the same time. However, on further reflection, there 
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appears to be little difference between these two experiences. The example of 
aliens-doubt is not actually a doubting experience in my case, but rather an instance 
of I-believe-aliens-do-not-exist in disguise. So unquestioned and unquestionable is 
my doubt that aliens exist that despite any desire to give the appearance of an open 
mind to their possible existence – there is no irrefutable proof that they do not exist 
after all – I actually hold the belief that they do not exist. In this sense, “I believe” 
and “I do not believe” appear to be two sides of the same coin in the phenomenology 
of belief. This example serves to remind us that where we may posit doubt we must 
be careful we have not actually slipped back into belief and so cannot learn anything 
by putting the experiences next to each other. 
 
Perhaps then the best tactic is not to look at instances where doubt about the 
existence or truth of something is definite – for in that certainty, doubt threatens to 
give way to belief – but rather look to cases where the subject has been in inner 
turmoil and strife concerning a single proposition. Here I will take the extreme 
example of phantom limb experience and the more every day examples of reaching 
for a drink thought to be there and the Müller-Lyer parallel lines illusion. 
 
Those who experience phantom limbs appear to be in one of the most powerful 
states of being-with-doubt. They are caught in a direct tension between my-limb and 
I-doubt-my-limb-exists. In the case of phantom limbs, there is a tearing apart of two 
of the fundamental aspects of the my-limb experience: sight-of-my-limb and 
internal-perception-of-my-limb. To drastically over-simplify, these two have 
repeatedly and experientially, since a very young age, been taken together and fused 
in the my-limb experience. Of course, my-limb was always constituted by these 
different parts, but the boundaries quickly disappeared because of the frequent and 
repeated taking of the experience as a single unit. With these boundaries gone, the 
conscious experience of a fragmented understanding of my-limb also disappears. 
Phantom limb, however, takes them apart again and the experience is one of serious 
cognitive dissonance between an experience of internal-perception-of-my-limb – 
which was, up until this point, co-extensive with my-limb – and the experience of 
I-doubt-my-limb-exists. Belief and being appear to have split, at least in 
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experience.2 Belief was the state of being-without-doubt which existed prior to this 
split and will only exist again once the confused experience is reconciled or 
absorbed. 
 
The experience of phantom limb is an extreme case – and an experience I have not 
had – but it did help me reflect upon more everyday examples that I have undergone. 
For instance, reaching for a glass that I thought was there but was gone. Whilst 
talking, I might become thirsty and reach for the glass I believe is behind me. 
However, feeling no glass, I turn and see no glass. In the moment of surprise that 
follows it certainly feels as though I have experienced both no-glass and I-believe-
there-is-a-glass-behind-me. Memory and imagination quickly react and I 
experience my mind trying to find explanations that will allow a recoupling of no-
glass and I-believe-there-is-no-glass. Sometimes this is instantaneous and 
subconscious, but other times the moment stretches on and I am left reeling, trying 
to find an explanation. Doubt fills the gap where being and belief come apart. Now, 
we may not be able to pinpoint whether that doubt is residue I-doubt-there-is-no-
glass because, despite my sensory input, I cannot find an explanation and fully 
reconcile with I-believe-there-is-no-glass yet, or whether it is just a more general 
state of I-doubt-the-existence-of-this-state-of-affairs because I have no coherent 
and understandable account of the matter. Either way, I feel I have left the realm of 
being-without-doubt where belief and being go hand-in-hand and entered an 
experience of being-with-doubt. 
 
Perhaps we can create that experience now with a classic illusion: Müller-Lyer 
parallel lines (see Figure 1). 
 
                                                          
2 For a more physiologically rigorous overview of the potential source of phantom limbs and 
phantom limb pain see (Andoh, et al., 2017) and for brief discussions of why the causes of 
phantom limb pain are still contested see (Giummarra & Moseley, 2011) and (Makin, 2015). 
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Figure 1: Müller-Lyer Illusion 
 
The immediate perception for most of us is that these lines are of different lengths 
and they have the corresponding experience three-lines-of-different-lengths. The 
belief is, at this point, co-extensive with the experience. However, evidence is easily 
provided with a measurement that they are not different lengths but are, in fact, all 
the same length. If you have not experienced this illusion before you can now, 
without permanently marking the paper, either measure each of the three lines to 
see that they are the same length or place a straight ruler vertically at either end of 
the lines to demonstrate that all three align on either side. The reason I stipulated 
not to mark the paper is that whilst the evidence introduced excellent reasons for 
not thinking the three lines are the same length, as soon as it is removed most of us 
will continue to experience the three lines as being of different lengths. As such, 
there is a separation of being and belief in this experience. My experience of being 
when returning to the original diagram is still one of three-lines-of-different-length 
even as I am in a state of I-doubt-there-are-three-lines-of-different-length or even 
I-believe-there-are-three-lines-of-the-same-length. As such, I am caught in a state 
of being-with-doubt that clearly contrasts with the state of being-without-doubt that 
I was in before I had checked the lengths of the lines. 
 
Belief may now appear as though it can only be experienced negatively. It is the 
state of not being in doubt. This may well be how we best become aware of belief. 
Like Heidegger’s hammer, we are not aware of it until it is broken. However, that 
does not mean it is not possible to become more mindful of my current state of 
belief given that I have, in other cases, been in states of doubt. Right now I can say 
I am in a state of belief about many things even if I cannot fully articulate them as 
separate from being, but I do know that they can potentially be separated in the way 
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that other experiences have been – what I take to be my default state of being, is 
thus also a state of belief. This is what I mean when I say I experience belief as 
being-without-doubt. 
 
 
Living alongside abstraction 
 
We now have the beginnings of an account of what a lived experience of an 
epistemological concept might be and how it co-exists with abstract analysis. 
Neither the abstracted nor experiential component of belief negates the other as they 
both have grounding, the former in explaining patterns of human behaviour, and 
the latter in a person’s experience. In some instances, we may try to bring them 
back together or they will go together without issue. In the case of belief, we can 
see every day how deeply ingrained the opening, abstracted understanding of belief 
is, even if it is not always articulated in such a way. As such, the abstract concept 
surely does impact upon our experience of it. However, one may agree with a 
particular line of abstract theorising – as I do with Dennett’s – but still recognise 
that its understanding of the concept of study is not the only way of defining or 
engaging with the concept. In this sense, belief is both an attitudinal, dichotomous, 
intentional, propositional, motivational, changeable state of being, and it is, at least 
for me, being-without-doubt. I say “at least for me” because there is no universally 
defined or recognisable way of understanding the latter. I can only live it and try to 
represent it to others with my own and other’s narratives. 
 
Of course, this is only to analyse the concept of belief. What about related epistemic 
concepts such as truth, certainty and knowledge? What is important to understand 
is that on a lived, experiential understanding of a concept the main question is: 
“what experiences are attached to it?” As I described above, my understanding of 
the lived state of belief is being-without-doubt but that is closely tied, if not often 
co-extensive with, being. However, there are times when what I would consider my 
regular being, and its co-extensive being-without-doubt, are interrupted by an 
emotional or even physical sensation, particularly when that state of being is 
challenged. Others might experience or talk of such reactions when they are 
challenged on the existence or non-existence of a divine being, the validity of an 
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ethical concept such as justice, the integrity of a political ideal, or the fidelity of a 
loved one. In these instances, the belief is not simply experienced as steady being-
without-doubt, nor does it collapse into a state of being-with-doubt as there is still 
an experience of the proposition being correct. It is experienced by me as being-
which-resists-doubt. It seems to me that lived understandings of knowledge, 
certainty and truth reside here without being entirely synonymous or distinct 
concepts. 
 
When I try to identify these lived instances of knowledge, certainty, truth, and so 
on, as distinct from abstract conceptions, I tend towards memories of times when I 
have been so carried away in a passionate conversation on some topic that I have 
exclaimed, “that is so true!” whilst only having a vague sense of what the 
conclusion arrived at was and how we got there. I certainly couldn’t recount the 
argument if pressed. These are obviously cases where the majority of philosophers 
would, rightly, not want to apply an abstracted understanding of certainty or 
knowledge. Yet the experience in the moment was that this was an unchallengeable 
proposition. I felt a physical reaction to the statement which was akin to celebrating 
a great achievement. This was lived certainty and truth. I can recall being carried to 
conclusions whilst following a particular line of thought or reasoning which makes 
such obvious sense that whatever conclusion I arrived at I not only accepted it, but 
was involved with it enough to already envision persuasively and passionately 
defending it. I was certain that I knew the truth of the matter in that moment whether 
I would be able to defend what I knew to the required standards on an abstract 
understanding of those italicised terms or not.  It is not just that I am experiencing 
being-without-doubt which is stable through lack of challenge, I am being-which-
resists-doubt where the stability of my being, insofar as I experience it as tied up 
with the proposition at hand, is tangibly withstanding an assault. Indeed, this might 
help us understand those instances where we convince ourselves of something 
without any extra proof or reasoning, where we think about something until we 
state: “Yes, I am sure that is the case”. If you cannot call such an experience to 
mind, think of what might be going on for a game show contestant who moves from 
guessing ‘B is the correct answer’ to being sure that it is. In those instances, no extra 
proof has been provided and an abstracted understanding of justified surety, 
knowledge, and so on, might scoff at such a statement. However, at least as I have 
19 
 
experienced it, there is a solidification of my state from being-with-doubt all the 
way through to being-which-resists-doubt. Whatever an abstract or psychological 
analysis might reveal and posit about how and why we do this and what that must 
help us deduce about the nature of the subconscious, belief, knowledge, and so on, 
it remains that we live and directly experience the move from intuition or guess 
through belief and into certainty without any abstracted justification, only with a 
live feeling of it. 
 
This notion of lived justification is a highly anti-intuitive one for someone of my 
schooling and upbringing given just how dominant and ingrained the conditions of 
articulation and narrative have become in Western society. As such, I experience 
such justification and my being-which-resists-doubt tensely and nervously. I am 
still experiencing certainty but I attempt to introduce doubt or resist any external 
recounting of the experience precisely because if I were asked to recount it I am 
aware it will be received negatively. In a legalistic society where one’s defence 
from accusations of wrongdoing depends upon how precisely and articulately one 
can recount the narrative of one’s own and other’s actions, using a lived experience 
of justification is tantamount to accepting that one will be found guilty. However, 
lived experiences of belief, knowledge, truth, and so on, when captured by the move 
from being-without-doubt to being-which-resists-doubt, reveal how strongly we 
can live an experience of holding a justification for our beliefs that stands apart 
from what we can recount. As (Dupré, 2007) argues, we trust and are confident 
about certain beliefs in a way that is sometimes answerable to logical justification 
but can exist independently of it. To put this in terms of what has been outlined so 
far, on an abstract account one might require me to defend the claim that I believe 
or know my foot exists via reasoned and accessible argument. However, regardless 
of whether this argument were deemed to be a successful philosophical defence or 
not, I would still experience being-which-resists-doubt if challenged on the my-foot 
experience. The experience is simply too strong, too immediate and too clear. To 
draw from the children’s literature in chapter two, in George MacDonald’s The 
Princess and the Goblin (2006), the princess attempts to tell her nurse and friend 
that she has seen her long-dead grandmother but they will not believe her. When 
she asks why, the nurse simply answers, “Because I can’t believe you” (p. 8). 
People only “believe what they can” (p. 61). When what they are being asked to 
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believe is the presence of a dead woman, even if the grandmother had shown herself 
to them then they would not have believed their senses and simply called it a dream. 
For, “seeing is not believing – it is only seeing” (p. 62). In this instance, the nurse 
alludes to the fact that her certainty or knowledge that dead people cannot come 
back to life is, experientially, being-which-resists-doubt even in the face of a kind 
of justification that may well, abstractly, constitute enough to believe, be certain, or 
know that something is the case. On the opposite side of things, whilst we may want 
to say that the Princess’ certainty or knowledge is unjustified and so does not count 
as an instance of abstract knowledge or certainty, this does not negate the fact that 
she is experiencing and living it as such. 
 
At the level of lived experience, we can also see how we might experience belief, 
justification, knowledge, or certainty even in the same proposition depending upon 
the context. For example, right now I experience “pi to the nth digit” stably. I may 
not be able to reel off the correct numbers but I am confident that pi is a fixed 
mathematical concept and that a brief interaction with a search engine or a 
competent mathematician would reveal at least some of those digits to me. As such, 
even without checking what pi is to the nth digit I experience “pi to the nth digit” 
as being-without-doubt despite my lack of immediate, abstract justification. 
However, this can very quickly become being-which-resists-doubt if what pi to the 
nth digit is suddenly mattered to my life. For example, I have a vivid memory of 
myself as a child watching a game show where the contestant had to remember what 
pi was to a seemingly impossible amount of digits. Along the bottom of the screen 
were the digits. “Pi to the nth digit” was now an experience of being-which-resists-
doubt, not just because the digits were given to me on the television screen but 
because I desired that answer to be correct as I wanted the contestant to win and 
they were matching up with what was on the screen. For example, had the contestant 
been there for less compelling reasons then I would not have had the same 
experience of being-which-resists-doubt. However, in this instance, it mattered to 
me that what was on the screen was correct so that the person could win. 
Alternatively, I can also remember when pi to the nth digit mattered to my 
mathematical examinations, and I also remember that during the examination I 
experienced “pi to the nth digit” as being-with-doubt. I had revised it, I thought I 
knew what it was going in, but with the pressure of what pi was to the nth digit 
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mattering to my life I questioned it and so experienced it as being-with-doubt when, 
in fact, that position was one where I had much more abstract justification for saying 
I knew what it was than I do right now. In the game show and examination scenarios 
“pi to the nth digit” had consequences and so my experience of it mutated to fit 
those scenarios, whereas right now “pi to the nth digit” bears no consequence and 
even with no rational or logical reasons for it to do so it manifests as being-without-
doubt. As such, it appears as though which epistemic concept I experience in 
response to the world is dictated by a pre-existing relationship to what is in the 
world. In these different scenarios I experienced belief, certainty and doubt in 
relation to the same proposition because, ultimately, the experiential side of these 
epistemic concepts is something I live as much as I abstractly discuss or prove. 
 
 
Is a lived understanding anti-philosophical? 
 
Several objections may be raised at this point, but a particularly pressing claim 
might be that this entire project is at odds with how philosophy is generally 
understood as a discipline. For example, in her analysis of poetry as philosophy 
Karen Simecek (2013) identifies how one widespread understanding of any 
philosophical inquiry mandates that it must meet the demands of generality, 
rationality, and justification. She maintains that such an understanding has led many 
philosophers to reject poetry as a source of philosophical insight precisely because 
it is the product of “an ‘overflow of feeling,’ both expressing subjective experience 
and giving rise to a subjective experience for the reader as he or she responds to the 
content together with the mode of presentation.” (p. 28) It appears to me that the 
above analysis of a lived dimension of epistemic concepts is also a product of 
feeling and an attempt to understand epistemic concepts in and via an expression of 
subjective experience. Additionally, I have been inviting you, the reader, to follow 
in having a subjective experience in response to it and attempting to call to mind 
your own lived understandings. As such, does this stand at odds with the generality, 
rationality, and justification required of philosophical inquiry? Am I simply doing 
terrible and ill-formed poetry? I am certainly seeking to prompt you to consider 
what it is to experience an epistemic concept rather than engage in an inquiry which 
“seeks to establish truths or knowledge about the general nature of x by thinking 
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abstractly about x” (p. 28). Indeed, I have set up this account as moving away from 
precisely that. I am, like Simecek’s understanding of poetry, “encouraging you to 
dwell on particulars” and this, on a standard model of philosophical inquiry, stands 
“in tension with the kind of abstract thinking required for philosophical inquiry” (p. 
29). 
 
Simecek goes on to compellingly argue that one can get suitable generality, 
rationality and justification via poetry. We can move beyond the context of the 
poem and demonstrate that the subjective experiences being reported and created 
are of importance to the general public’s understanding of the concept in question 
insofar as the experience gives us access to the unobserved structures and standards 
embedded in them. I agree and would want to extend this argument to my own 
analysis by suggesting that reflecting on the experience of the concepts alongside 
their abstracted definition may well give us similar access to structures and 
standards. For example, after identifying my lived understand of belief I might ask, 
how do the structure and standards of my lived experience differ from those applied 
to the abstract concept and does that say anything about how I ought to interact with 
belief or particular beliefs? I will return to this question below. Here, however, I 
want to explore where I depart from Simecek’s understanding of philosophy. On 
Simecek’s account, in order to be philosophically worthy an analysis of an 
experience must not only help the individual learn something about the concepts, 
the lesson must be of importance to the general public; it must still be generalisable.  
 
I endorse Simecek’s contention that we “do not merely want to interfere with how 
an individual thinks, because this supposes that we have already worked out the 
standards for our conceptual understanding” (p. 37). The philosophical approach 
taken in poetry, taken here, and extended to education later in this thesis, does not 
dictate concepts but rather makes recommendations about “what we ought to mean 
or how we ought to think of things in order to truly reflect on the nature of the world 
or our normative demands (the meanings reflect our values) or both.” (p. 37) This 
whole project is intended to challenge the very idea of what is demanded if one 
wants to call something a complete epistemological account. However, Simecek 
continues that a philosophical understanding is still based upon a “robust grasp of 
concepts” which she cashes out as meaning, “establishing a deep enough grasp that 
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we (as a community of language users) use the concept consistently and coherently 
with full appreciation of the values involved.” (p. 38) I contend that this is one type 
of understanding that may be highly valuable to many projects, but it is not the only 
way of understanding, nor is it the only way of philosophically grasping, the 
concept. As such, it is not as “robust” as it might be. 
 
A holistic philosophy will also recognise and care about the lived experiences of 
concepts and how they are grasped by individuals and between small groups not 
just so more can be learned in order to create a consistent and coherent use between 
as many of us as possible, but because it is a mode of engaging directly with the 
concept and, ultimately, the other. This stands in tension with a traditional 
conception of philosophy insofar as the non-traditional approach I am pursuing is 
likely to highlight as much difference as similarity, and the final account may well 
not be consistent or coherent. To take the above examples, the experiences of 
knowledge, truth, belief, and so on, are potentially as varied as there are numbers 
of people who have experienced them. 
 
Does the introduction of such variety not mean there is never a robust understanding 
of the concept as it seems to be opposed to generality? Does such an account create 
a conceptual mess rather than help us grasp the concept in question? One might 
look at how I understood my experience of belief as being-without-doubt and ask 
whether this is not simply the abstract definition of certainty or ask whether putting 
experiences of knowledge and truth on a scale of being-which-resists-doubt creates 
hazy boundaries where they need not be. These charges may hold some weight, but 
the result is not that such an account resists philosophy, only that they stand in relief 
to other styles of investigation and hinder certain goals. When the abstracted 
definitions and inquiries are put alongside experiential accounts, they actually 
create a holistic understanding of the concept that embraces rather than shies away 
from the possibility that we are beings who exist and live in a conceptually messy 
and experientially driven world whilst also being capable of at least attempting 
abstract reasoning and drawing parallels between thought and understanding via 
reduction of shared traits or agreement on precise terms. If a philosopher is truly a 
seeker of truth, wisdom, or understanding, it must be remembered that we live our 
concepts as much, if not more, than we define them and that these concepts do not 
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stay in neat boxes when they are experienced. The necessity of precise distinction 
is present when engaging in abstract concept analysis in order to regulate and order 
thought, but the fact that subjective experience adds variety to a concept where 
traditional philosophical analysis attempts to bring coherence does not mean that 
they have to stand in tension. They complete each other. Like two jigsaw pieces, 
staring at the details of one might stop me from being able to appreciate the details 
of the other, but they still fit together to create a whole. Trying to look at the fine-
grained details of both the lived experiences of a concept and how to understand it 
abstractly may be impossible, but it does not mean the two do not join to create a 
single picture. The intricacies of any individual piece of the puzzle are as beautiful 
and important as the whole, and, in this sense, the whole is not more than the sum 
of its parts, but nor is a fine-grained appreciation for one piece reason to say one 
understands the whole better than those who specialise in other pieces. Indeed, 
when the pieces are gathered together, we can see how the pieces join and where 
they might even cooperate. Just as the motivating and explanatory functions of 
belief seem to depend on belief being able to have a lived force, so we often live 
some of the responsibility to form accountable and articulable beliefs. 
 
This is not to say that the experiential dimension to understanding a concept cannot 
be generalised, only that it does not need to be in order to be part of understanding 
a concept and to be used in philosophising. On the contrary, one might find that an 
experience of justification – of being-which-resists-doubt – resides in sharing the 
experiential dimension with others and having them express their recognition of the 
account. Indeed, the more widely this happens and the more people express it the 
more one philosophising at the abstract level is likely to take notice sensing there is 
something about the ‘truth’ of the concept to be expressed. Not that such recognition 
is necessary, and whether it does or does not happen the experience of the concept 
is not invalid. 
 
 
The role and value of a lived understanding 
 
George Levine (2002) argues that the story of traditional, Western epistemology 
has thus far been one of responsibility to the objective world, understanding the 
25 
 
nature of the world as it exists independently to us, and discovering the truth of the 
matter. Due to the belief that an embodied and perspectival view obscures the 
world, this responsibility demands self-denial or a metaphorical sacrifice of one’s 
subjective view in an attempt to reach the Nagelian “view from nowhere”. Levine 
powerfully characterises this in terms of the expression, “dying to know”. In order 
to reach the world as it is in itself or even an abstracted concept which can exist in 
agreement between a community, the self must be sacrificed. As such, what is lost 
on such a self-sacrificial account but gained in an attempt to seek experiential and 
lived understandings is an insight into the other. 
 
In trying to meet and communicate with the other at the view from nowhere, we 
must remove ourselves and ask them to do likewise. As such, were we to 
accomplish the project we would be empty and exist nowhere alongside the world 
and its objects. We would be with the world, not seeing or sensing it but simply 
with it, and whilst we would be on the common ground of nowhere there would be 
no real communication between us for there would be no subject to interpret, speak 
or hear. The traditional project then, in its attempt to achieve a true vision of the 
world, asks us to care about the other and ourselves only so that we can discover 
and remove what constitutes our subjectivity to better see the world. This is 
supposed to provide an understanding of the concept by clearly seeing what, in the 
world, lies at its root. A lived understanding, however, does not try to look through 
the subject to see what is shared at the root of the concept but looks at the subject 
in order to understand their experience of the concept. To give a complete account 
of a concept one must also understand other subjects not so that we might remove 
their subjectivity but because it is what provides the understanding. In this sense, it 
also restores communication – I speak to you – and the struggle to understand a 
concept not just in abstraction but as a lived experience is also a struggle to 
communicate with and fully understand the other. 
 
This resurrection of the importance of the subject should bring to mind the 
standpoint epistemology of feminist scholarship. Due to the centrality of the subject 
in an experiential account of understanding, questions such as “who is experiencing 
knowledge or belief?” are taken to be just as important as what is being known, 
believed, and so on. As such, a lived understanding is in full agreement with the 
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claim that there is no such thing as ungendered, declassed, deracialised knowledge 
or belief. If we accept that there is the lived element to a concept then we cannot 
reject the fact that there are these gendered and racial dimensions to it. My being-
with, being-without and being-which-resists will all be determined at least in part 
by my experiences of my gender, race, economic background, and so on. One might 
look at the introduction to this thesis, the stories from my life that have been running 
alongside my arguments, and my attempts to explain epistemic concepts and read 
in them, firstly, my experience of a tense completeness between what is lived and 
what is abstracted and the value of both, but, also, secondly, a dull or mundane set 
of stories which reflect the fact that as much as I am entranced and captivated by 
these epistemic concepts I have not experienced them in the way that narratives 
from feminist epistemology often outline: as concepts which are withheld, which 
other, which disempower, and which demand conformity. 
 
Many feminist scholars also seek to find a liberatory epistemology through such a 
standpoint approach. This is an epistemology that is interested in explaining how 
oppression operates and that can affect social change through revealing and 
countering such oppression (Grasswick, 2011). It is also an epistemology which 
makes visible “the forms of ignorance systematically produced and reinforced by 
mainstream perspectives that still insist – explicitly or otherwise – that particular 
groups of knowers, particular forms of knowledge, understanding, and insight, or 
particular topics and questions about human knowledge are beyond the pale of 
epistemology ‘proper.’” (Rooney, 2011, p. 13) Such positions seek to make visible 
the oppression that has arisen from the project of seeing the world from the view 
from nowhere and asking that subjectivity be removed. In a turn away from the 
actual goal of the project, the powerful subjects in this tradition have deemed their 
subjectivity to be or to be the closest to the objective. They have then claimed other 
subjects to be deficient and made their goals the “proper” goals of epistemology. 
Even where those that are deemed ignorant are allowed to grow in knowledge, they 
are only allowed to grow along lines which maintain the power-structure in place 
so that they cannot overtake the ‘expertise’ of the powerful and they can only be 
tested and deemed to have achieved in accordance with tests and thresholds set by 
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the powerful.3 Indeed, Nietzsche scathingly exposed this power dynamic when he 
said of abstract and reasoned philosophising: “behind all logic and its autocratic 
posturings  stand valuations […] requirements for the preservation of a particular 
type of life.” (Nietzsche, 2002: p. 7)  
 
One may claim that such power struggles and oppression are a bastardization of the 
goal that is at the heart of the traditional project and, as such, the project cannot be 
deemed any the less because of those who perverted it. However, incorporating a 
lived understanding of concepts and epistemology resists this happening insofar as 
the request for experience and stories, and the desire to see the other rather than to 
see them in order to remove them, is inherently anarchic. It embraces the fact that 
questions such as ‘what is belief?’ and ‘how do you know?’ can be answered not 
just through traditional means but might also “expect a narrative-like response 
emphasizing personal experience” (Noddings, 2011: p. 416). As such, it constantly 
challenges whatever the static, ‘powerful’ definition is, leaving room for liberation. 
For how can there be any single legitimately privileged understanding of a concept 
if each lived dimension is being articulated by the only one experiencing it and that 
individual, in turn, has no access to any other understanding except via its 
gatekeeper: the other? 
 
Despite its challenge to hierarchies and power in the conceptual and epistemic 
domain, lived understandings do not seek to overthrow traditional epistemology 
and philosophical inquiry only to replace them with a different tyrant. For example, 
Noddings notes of some standpoint feminists that they claim those who are typically 
disenfranchised have a privileged knowledge given by their disenfranchisement. 
Their situation and experiences mean their narratives “are epistemically richer and 
more accurate than those generated through traditionally objective methods” 
(Noddings, 2011: p. 414). The claim may be that they have experienced differently 
and so add texture to current understanding, or that in experiencing the rejection of 
power their accounts move towards awakening others, or perhaps that they are 
experiencing from a peculiarly embodied standpoint as they inhabit rather than 
                                                          
3 To take just one example, Erin Tarver (2017) provides an excellent analysis of this at work in 
sports fandom. 
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reject their subjectivity. Whatever may ground the claim, however, an issue arises 
which might cause my experiential account to diverge from standpoint 
epistemology so characterised. The notion of one account being “epistemically 
richer” than another reinstates the belief that there is a single end goal which can be 
used to measure the value of all accounts against. As explained above, the challenge 
to power in an experiential account is based upon the individual’s experience and 
this eradicates not just the power base for the currently powerful, but any objective 
or universal claim to a legitimate hierarchy altogether. There may be agreement 
between some as to the most valuable kind of epistemic account, but there is no 
way for that judgement to be imposed upon another who lives their concepts 
differently. 
 
To return to standing a lived, experiential understanding of a concept next to the 
traditional, abstracted philosophical one: both are pieces of the puzzle which should 
be explored in full and to as great depth as possible but both are still single pieces. 
Similarly, within the experiential side, individual narratives form small parts of the 
design that make the experiential piece and must all be drawn to see a complete 
picture. As such, the abstract philosophical account, for all of its historical ties to 
the abuse of white, masculine, heteronormative power, remains another way of 
understanding concepts with its own, worthwhile goals and pursuits, and any one 
subject’s experiences are not ranked any higher or lower than any other’s by any 
objective standards. Here I am in agreement with John Chandler’s scepticism about 
the kind of strong positions laid out by Noddings above, as there seems to be no 
good reason to remove any of these projects – or experiences – from the table 
completely. Chandler and I wholeheartedly embrace the fact that in some situations 
one or another may not work or may be associated with social ills, but a liberatory 
epistemology cannot liberate through exclusion and “we should reject the whole 
idea of monolithic, global standpoints which predetermine our methodology across 
the board, whether we identify them with gender, class or anything else.” (Chandler, 
1990: p. 381) 
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Virtue epistemology 
 
When looking at Simecek’s understanding of philosophical analysis, I alluded to 
asking how the structure and standards of a lived experience might stand up against 
an abstract conception and what that might say about how we ought to interact with 
epistemic concepts such as belief. As has hopefully started to become clear, where 
a traditional analysis has sought the truth of the matter and the external world as it 
exists in itself via the removal of self, a lived understanding asks instead that one is 
faithful to one’s own experience and the legitimacy of the other’s experiences of 
the concept. Putting these side-by-side, particularly in light of feminist analyses of 
how the traditional project has been enacted, I find that I cannot help but ask 
questions like: How should epistemic concepts be presented? How should I 
experience and pursue them? And so on. The study of epistemology, as well as our 
epistemic practices, are human endeavours and are bound up in intersubjective and 
ethical decisions. “How do we want to go about our epistemic business?” is as much 
a question of who we should and want to be as any other human domain. What 
norms do and should govern our epistemic behaviour and our interactions with 
others? What should I believe? What should I know? Who should know? Who do I 
trust? Who do I believe? What makes for a flourishing or good life in the epistemic 
sphere and beyond? Indeed, the forms of approaching epistemology and conceptual 
understanding that I have been looking at separate in many ways precisely because 
they answer these questions differently. Their goals and what they are willing to do 
to see them met are distinct. 
 
Some forms of virtue epistemology direct themselves towards these questions. All 
virtue epistemology shares the view that establishing what the epistemic virtues are 
will help answer epistemological questions, but determining what the virtues are 
depends upon what they help us achieve and what epistemology is aimed at 
discovering. For example, traditional virtue epistemologists are divided over what 
kind of virtues will help us achieve a better understanding of knowledge and 
justified belief. Reliabilists such as Ernest Sosa tend to focus on physical faculties 
such as good eyesight and memory as they reliably allow us to access the truth: a 
justified belief is a belief formed by such virtues. Responsibilists such as Linda 
Zagzebski, on the other hand, look to character traits over physical dispositions 
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because whilst reliably achieving the truth is a good, how we get there matters. 
However, these positions are based upon traditional epistemic projects such as 
defining knowledge and refuting scepticism. Radical virtue epistemology has 
challenged what the goal of epistemology is and so redefined the virtues to fit that.  
For example, if gaining a holistic understanding of a concept is the goal, one might 
say that someone who is open minded to and patient with the stories of others is the 
virtuous agent. Or, if someone believes the end goal of all human life, including 
how we use and pursue our epistemic concepts, is to lead a fulfilled life, faculties 
which allow access to truth or a disposition which is not inclined to accept a state 
of affairs without infallible proof may switch from virtues to vices insofar as the 
latter wastes much of a person’s life and the former might cause an agent to miss 
those instances where truth does not contribute to a kind or loving action. 
 
Through an analysis of Dostoevsky’s The Idiot, Taylor (2014) explores the nature 
of virtue ethics and its ability to ask of abstract ethical analysis whether it might 
“come to undermine the connection between understanding what human life is like 
and living a human life” (p. 286). Radical virtue epistemology, much like some of 
the philosophers already discussed, is wary of traditional epistemology doing the 
same thing and forgetting what the demands made by everyday life are during its 
analysis. For example, Roberts and Wood (2007) claim that traditional accounts, 
including traditional virtue epistemology, are stuck in the fastidiousness and 
technical finery of abstract reasoning, Heather Battaly (2010b) maintains that 
epistemologists, particularly sceptics, are ripe to become intellectually self-
indulgent to the point of allowing the strength of their desire for truth to prevent 
them from seeing the value in other parts of life, and Manson (2012) highlights how 
a traditional epistemic focus has led to the prevalence of an acquisitionist model of 
knowledge-seeking, where truth and knowledge should always be acquired, which 
ignores the fact that in life there is also often virtue in not knowing or finding out. 
Asking traditional epistemic questions, for example, could not get us to the 
realisation that the responsible, virtuous agent “will not needlessly put herself, or 
others, at risk by her epistemic pursuits” (p. 259). 
 
It may be argued that considerations about what implications follow from a pursuit 
of truth or knowledge and their desirability should be left to the domain of ethics, 
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but the exclusion of such thoughts and defining them as belonging somewhere else 
is, precisely, to take a stand on what the nature and value of epistemic concepts such 
as knowledge are, how the issue of scepticism can be addressed, and what the end 
goal of epistemology is. It is to say that epistemology is detached from life, will be 
complete once the relevant definitions and arguments have been found, and that 
other philosophical areas, such as ethics, can be omitted from this domain not only 
for the sake of a single study but completely. It is that thinking which has turned 
epistemology into the narrowly specialized and detached subject it is has been 
criticized for being. Instead, Roberts and Wood maintain that epistemology must 
be brought back, via the virtues, to a realisation that is embedded in emotion, caring 
about things, and that the basic purpose of definitions is actually “to facilitate 
understanding of the concept in question […] not just get a formula that “works”” 
(2007: p. 19, my emphasis) and that “the great purpose of philosophical 
epistemology is to sharpen our understanding of knowledge and related epistemic 
goods” (p. 19). 
  
Jason Baehr (2011) has split radical virtue epistemology into strong and weak 
camps depending on whether it seeks to jettison traditional goals altogether or 
illuminate others. Just as with my argument above for not allowing a complete 
rejection of a traditional, abstract approach to epistemology, I do not see that there 
is a good reason to completely remove traditional goals. However, I have argued 
that an understanding of the kind which Roberts and Wood gesture at necessitates 
taking into account how people experience these concepts and the norms and 
identities that are formed around them, particularly given that such experiences will 
be entirely bound up with their outlook on life, projects, and who they desire to be. 
Indeed, because of this subjective element, there is no absolute sense of what an 
experiential understanding should be but there are experiences – as I gestured 
towards in my brief discussion of lived justification – that help us understand what 
kind of epistemic agent we want to be. For example, through my continual 
experiences in relationships, I have come to see that I want to be the kind of person 
who is honest as much as possible, who continually thinks about alternative 
perspectives and how others interpret the situation, who uses “I feel” statements 
over “You are” statements, and so on. I want these norms to govern my epistemic 
conduct whether because they allow me to achieve other goals – such as effective 
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communication and positive working environments – or simply because I 
experience them as the right way to go about things and, to foreshadow terminology 
used below, they provide my existence with a sense of worth. 
 
One need only consider Joseph Wright’s ‘An Experiment on a Bird in the Air Pump’ 
(Figure 2) to recognise that the type of person we want to be extends to how we 
want to go about knowing, believing and our epistemic inquiry. How do we want 
to introduce others to knowledge, what kind of environment do we want to create 
for belief and understanding, what characteristics do we wish to create in those who 
seek to know and understand, and how do we treat others, including the non-human, 
in our endeavours? The central figure in this painting may well have learned some 
piece of knowledge from this experiment and he may end up being able to transfer 
and justify this knowledge to the other characters, but this is not all that is going on. 
Each of the figures is experiencing knowledge and what it is to be led to knowledge 
differently. Indeed, there is something very uneasy about this being in a domestic 
setting and the imposition of “looking” that is being made upon the girl shielding 
her eyes, the other girl who is horrified, and the boy who seems torn between 
wanting to escape and play a role. Others are bored, pensive, and intrigued. If I were 
to transfer my own experience, some in the scene may come to inhabit a state of 
being-which-resists-doubt in relation to whatever might be learned from this 
process, but others may experience being-with-doubt not because the process is not 
one which should logically and reasonably prove its conclusion, but because the 
methods of obtaining it were not virtuous. The justification may pass abstract tests, 
but it does not pass the lived one. Or, knowledge may not be experienced this way 
at all, but knowledge and learning may now be a state of being-without-compassion 
or, to return to the feminist analysis from above, experienced as the realm-of-men. 
If we observe the face of the man conducting the experiment, he is not looking to 
any of those in the room but to the viewer. Although his expression is an intensely 
difficult one to read, he is certainly engaging us and framing the experiment with 
his arms as if inviting us to engage with it and be the final figure in the array of 
human reactions to the experiment. What kind of epistemic agent will we be? For 
all our movements towards abstract discussion and experimentation, this question 
cannot be detached from our experiences of being a subject in these situations. 
 
33 
 
 
Figure 2: Joseph Wright's 'An Experiment on a Bird in the Air Pump' (1768), National Gallery [online] 
  
Being-with-worth 
 
Epistemic concepts and how we conduct epistemology may be continued in the 
traditional, abstract way in order to achieve an unfiltered view of the truth of the 
matter and the external world. However, I have argued that parallel to this, and 
occasionally intertwined with it, is our lived experiences of these concepts and the 
implications of being an epistemic agent. In order to fully and holistically grasp 
epistemology we must embrace its lived dimension and the stories of those who 
live it regardless of the complexity, tension and difficulties they might bring. Bound 
up in this is another, vital experience which demands attention and demonstrates 
that one must face the question of what kind of epistemic agent one wants to be 
head on: being-with-worth. This experience is, ultimately, an awareness of the 
worthwhile nature of one’s existence that can determine how we treat and explore 
epistemology and can indicate where virtuous activity lies. 
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Just as with being-with-doubt or being-which-resists-doubt, being-with-worth is a 
difficult experience to fully narrate and it certainly does not have a universal cause 
at its core. There is no single object, action or interaction that we all share that 
causes us to experience our current existence as worthwhile. However, I take it as 
given that there is such an experience. In the same way that I tried to distinguish 
belief, doubt and certainty I believe I can separate being-with-sensation-and-
emotion, being-without-worth and being-with-worth.  
 
An experience of or lacking worth is not an everyday occurrence. For many of us, 
what constitutes our regular experiences are sensations and emotions. We move 
through life encountering and responding with joy, sadness, anger, calm and so on, 
but we rarely notice or represent to ourselves the worthwhile nature of our 
existence. I bite into the chocolate cake that rests next to me, experiencing the brief 
relief the pleasant taste brings to the worries and anxieties I am experiencing as I 
write this thesis. I rush down the street afraid I will be late to my next meeting, I 
stop on a bridge captivated by the beauty of a sunset, I stub my toe on the desk and 
yell in joy as I win a sports match. All of this is possible without experiencing the 
presence or lack of worthwhileness. This is being-with-sensation-and-emotion.   
 
Being-without- and being-with-worth are breaks in or additions to these experiences 
of sensation and emotion. They are not the experience of the grief that comes with 
losing a loved one or the happiness that comes with achieving something I have 
trained hard to acquire. They are the falling away or filling up of my awareness of 
existence with a sense beyond immediate sensation or emotion, a sense that my 
experiences are playing a role in a holistic understanding of the nature of one’s life 
and activity as worthwhile or worthless.  
 
This can be, but is not necessarily, tied to a sense of purpose given by another or by 
oneself. For example, I might judge that my life has been worthwhile in its attempt 
to complete one or more tasks set by myself, a parent, a friend, a divine being, and 
so on. Or, I might deem my life worthless because it did not achieve one or any of 
these same goals. To take another example, it may be that one feels life has been 
full of powerful and varied experiences and was, as such, ‘a life well lived’. Or, its 
opposite might have occurred, and I conceive of my life as a life wasted. A third 
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possibility, to return to Nietzsche’s fable, may be that life is experienced as 
worthless because of the impossibility of lasting impact; no matter what deeds I do 
or experiences I have there is no eternal record or endless ripple effect. Conversely, 
it may be that in this freedom from eternal repercussion comes a liberation and 
sense that every moment is worth something if it is done in pursuit of what one 
wants.  
 
Ultimately, we should not see being-with and being-without-worth as sad or happy 
states of being. They are beyond such emotions insofar as anxiety, sadness and grief 
might come alongside a deep conviction that I am living a life worth living, and my 
happiness, pleasure and triumph might be bodily and temporary reactions that soon 
wilt because of an underpinning sense that my existence is not worth very much. 
As such, in amongst the maelstrom of sensations worth or its lack emerge as 
separate, fundamental feelings, and, when they do occur, they are what all other 
experiences must measure themselves against. 
 
To return to Wright’s painting, it is not just that the figures in the painting are 
experiencing epistemic concepts in a certain way, but these concepts are interacting 
with their conception of a worthwhile life and they are helping to mould it as well 
as being weighed and measured against it. If this is an instance of knowledge, or 
scientific inquiry, is it part of what they take to be a worthwhile life? For example, 
it is not just that the female and child figures in the painting are experiencing the 
experiment, its process, its resultant discovery and knowledge as belonging to the 
realm of adult men, they are also experiencing whether that realm is one that they 
desire to belong to and if it offers any promise of providing an experience of being-
with-worth.  
 
The young woman seems to think not (Figure 3). She has turned her head from the 
scene and there is clearly little interest in the advancement of her scientific 
understanding. One might read her and the man she is talking to as young lovers 
and posit that she has attributed being-with-worth to a state that exists after finding 
the correct suitor. Her whole existence at this point is lacking in comparison with 
that ideal, and there is nothing in the scene that she has turned her head from that 
will allow her to achieve that. However, I find it hard to see amorous joy in her 
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eyes. She does not meet his wet, longing gaze nor is she avoiding it in a flirtatious 
fashion. It is as though she is looking down on him with an internal sigh at the game 
she is being forced to play. One could draw a lead between her pretty “collar” and 
his hand as he necessitates her attention, knowingly or otherwise, with his 
privileged (and yet subservient) position. Neither knowledge nor social interaction 
is helping her explore what she takes to be worthwhile. For her, this scene only 
contains a scientific realm that is closed to her and a social one that she is forced to 
engage with and she is not just experiencing a temporary boredom but is in the 
depths of being-without-worth. 
 
 
The young children, on the other hand, are all experiencing scientific inquiry and 
understanding as being-without-compassion but they experience it differently in 
relation to how it plays into their future and current being-with-worth. The youngest 
girl, for example, gazes upon the scene despite her sister’s efforts to pull her into 
an embrace and the socially-correct response for a young girl (Figure 4). She 
Figure 3: Young Couple from 'An Experiment on a Bird in the Air Pump' (see Fig 2) 
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continues to look as the bird struggled even as her face clearly shows signs of 
sadness, and fear or empathetic anguish is suggested by the slight grip her hand has 
on her sister’s clothes. She overcomes all of this then to look on in defiance of the 
experiment’s grotesqueness. One might say she is forming a standard of being-with-
worth that stands in stark contrast to what she is witnessing. Beyond her immediate 
reaction of horror and pain, she is coming to a deeper understanding that an 
existence filled with and orientated around such activity and the pursuit of knowing 
about the world through such methods would be worse than worthless, it would be 
downright evil. Her tenacious looking could almost be read as a chastisement of the 
viewer’s sense of worth if they do not feel her indignation along with her, 
particularly if one reads her as a precursor or early instance of the Romantic, 
innocent child who was about to come to prominence and signal how the industrial, 
over-scientific adult might be saved from themselves. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Young Girls, from 'An Experiment on a Bird in the Air 
Pump' (see Fig 2) 
38 
 
The young boy may well be feeling as the youngest girl does. The fact that he has 
turned and moved away from the scene under the guise of a helpful and physical 
task, gripping the chord as if he were a miner or sailor using the rope to hoist buckets 
or a sail, and the look of trepidation on his face as he glances back speak to this 
(Figure 5). However, he has turned back, unlike the young woman, as he knows 
that what lies behind him is the realm of men and scientific knowledge that he is 
destined for and should desire. Despite his emotions, this is where his being-with-
worth is to be found, not necessarily in the practice itself but at least in the 
recognition and acceptance the practice will bring him. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
They are thus assessing the virtue of scientific inquiry and the characteristics of 
those who engage it upon the basis of the role it may play in facilitating their 
achievement of being-with-worth. The observer of the painting then is not just being 
invited by the central figure to respond to the lived experience of epistemic activity 
Figure 5: Young boy, from 'An Experiment on a Bird in 
the Air Pump' (see FIg 2) 
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but is also being presented with a palate of conceptions concerning what constitutes 
the worthwhile life. We may simply identify with the character that best reflects 
what we already believe and experience or we might assess and at least attempt to 
experience and reflect upon the alternative conceptions and whether we have given 
them their due. This latter course I will argue is the virtuous one. 
 
 
Virtue as what achieves being-with-worth 
 
Here I wish to briefly explore Alasdair MacIntyre’s understanding of virtues and 
external and internal goods to help explore the role being-with-worth plays in an 
overarching conception of a virtuous and good life. According to MacIntyre, a 
virtue, at least in its broadest sense, is “an acquired human quality the possession 
and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal 
to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such 
goods” (1981: p. 32). Internal goods are the experiences or states of being which 
are defined and experienced as excellent only through the specificity of a practice 
and its community. External goods are those which can be achieved in a multiplicity 
of ways and so are only contingently tied to the practice.  
 
MacIntyre’s famous example is of the child playing chess. If a child plays chess to 
win only because of the promise of candy they are chasing an external good. The 
candy has no necessary link to chess, it is only attached to chess because it has been 
offered as a reward and it could be attained by other means. As such, the child could 
be motivated to cheat and not engage with chess as a self-contained practice with 
its own standards of excellence but only as a means to achieve candy. However, 
MacIntyre continues, we might hope that “there will come a time when the child 
will find in those goods specific to chess, in the achievement of a certain highly 
particular kind of analytical skill, strategic imagination and competitive intensity, a 
new set of reasons […] for trying to excel in whatever the game of chess demands.” 
(p. 30) If the child now cheats, they cheat themselves out of the internal goods of 
chess rather than gain the external good of candy. 
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It is important to note that only a few paragraphs earlier in his paper MacIntyre did 
not define the internal goods as those things which are necessary for achieving 
excellence in a practice but rather those things which are “realized in the course of 
trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and 
partially definitive of, that form of activity” (p. 30). As such, we should not mistake 
what MacIntyre is saying. He is not saying that only excellence in chess is an 
internal good, nor that adeptness in the aforementioned skill, imagination and 
intensity are virtues. Rather, excellence in chess and this specific brand of skill, 
imagination and intensity are the internal goods. The virtues are those character 
traits that grant us access to these.  
 
MacIntyre then extends his explanation further by briefly exploring the internal 
goods of portrait painting (p. 31). His discussion of this appears to be much more 
confusing than it need to be, but, best as I can understand, MacIntyre claims that 
there are two kinds of internal good for the portrait painter: the excellent products 
and performances of the practice and the life lived in pursuit of the excellences of 
the practice. When we bring the chess player and the portrait painter together we 
can identify a list of MacIntyre’s internal goods of a practice: those products and 
performances that are excellent according to the practice, the life lived in pursuit of 
the excellences of the practice, and those character traits or skills that are acquired 
as part of that pursuit. To be a truly internal good on MacIntyre’s account, none of 
these can be acquired as part of another practice or by other means. In other words, 
were that practice not to exist these goods would not be achievable. 
 
In After Virtue MacIntyre extends his definition of the virtues through two more 
stages. The above is the first stage where he situates the virtues in relation to 
practices, but in his second stage he situates them in relation to the good life for all 
humanity. The good life, according to MacIntyre, is nothing more or less than “the 
life spent in seeking for the good life for man” (2007: p. 220).4 The virtues then are 
those things which not only allow us to access the internal goods of a practice but 
also are what give us access to more varied and deeper understandings of what the 
                                                          
4 MacIntyre uses the word “man” rather than “humanity” and so direct quotations reflect this 
where my own writing uses the latter. 
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good life might be and which “sustain us in the relevant kind of quest for the good” 
(p. 219). In the third stage MacIntyre claims that it is impossible for one to seek the 
good or exercise the virtues only as an individual, as we are all bearers of a social 
identity and inherited past which constitutes our moral starting point and 
particularity; “the story of my life is always embedded in those communities from 
which I derive my identity.” (p. 221) Any attempt at individualism will ultimately 
fail because of this and a quest to seek the universal good will start from it. We are 
each a part of a “living tradition”, a “historically extended, socially embodied 
argument” (p. 222) which will strengthen or weaken depending upon how well and 
how thoroughly we exercise the virtues of that tradition. As such, the virtues are not 
only aimed at the good life of the individual but at the sustaining (or rejecting) of 
those traditions the individual is a part of. 
 
What I take to be correct in MacIntyre’s account is his understanding that the virtues 
must be in service of some end and their value is instrumental. It is difficult to see 
how any character trait or ability could be valuable in and of itself. I also hold with 
the need to distinguish between goods that are internal to a peculiar context and 
experience and ones which are external to it and bear no necessary connection to 
the subject’s situation. Indeed, as everything I have outlined so far in this chapter 
would suggest, I even fully embrace MacIntyre’s localised and experiential 
description of these goods. For example, one might complain that much of what 
MacIntyre has thus far described is highly uninformative. What has he really told 
us about the “highly particular kind” (1981: p. 31) of chess-based versions of the 
skills he outlined? He may have made a broad gesture towards the end goal of 
portrait painting via his repeating of an Orwell-qualified, Wittgensteinian dictum 
concerning the ability of portraits to reveal the soul and provide everyone with the 
face they deserve, but he said little about the actual life of a painter and he readily 
admits that the community can adapt not only what constitutes excellence in this 
practice but also the very goal of the practice. As such, we are left somewhat reeling 
and without insight if we are not part of that community. Providing such 
information is not his or any other virtue theorist’s task however. That is rightly the 
task of the painter and the chess-player to express within their community and the 
internal goods he hints at are goods that, in many instances, resist any more detailed 
articulation. In fact, such an attempt would risk losing the goods their specificity, 
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as analogies are drawn for the uninitiated and personal or communal experience is 
lost in translation. I also cannot deny his third stage, for it is the kind of account I 
provide above when exploring the different traditions surrounding epistemic 
concepts. My own story, all our stories, which constitute the experiential and lived 
understanding of epistemic concepts form part of the “living traditions” which 
underpin the legitimacy of the claim for an equal voice. Where I depart from 
MacIntyre, however, is in his account of where the distinction between the internal 
and external goods must be drawn, his fervent emphasis on communities of practice 
as being a locus of internal goods, and his account of an individual’s search for the 
good life being the good life for all humanity. 
 
MacIntyre sees an internal good as one that can only be achieved through engaging 
in a particular practice and subjecting oneself to the standards of excellence set by 
the community. He also takes the good life to be the one spent seeking the universal 
good of humanity. Yet, if external goods are still goods – as he admits – why leave 
them out of being part of an account of the virtues, and why necessitate the search 
for the good of all humanity as part of the good life? In terms of the former it is 
because external goods, on MacIntyre’s conception, are mostly, if not exclusively, 
finite. As such, chasing them breeds competition and undermines what is now 
starting to appear as something that takes on almost sacred connotations for him: 
the community. MacIntyre’s emphasis on historicity is one that may well allow for 
one to become more enlightened about oneself and one’s heritage, and emphasising 
one’s role and (critical) subjugation to the standards of the community may well 
bring about some of the safety, sense of meaning, and so on, that come with such 
communal interaction for most, but these are not necessary by-products of the kind 
of engagement that MacIntyre talks about. MacIntyre’s almost disciple-like attitude 
towards the community – something that perhaps fits more with the tendrils of 
Thomistic Natural Law which creep through his writing – blinds him to something 
much more basic and which I have argued for: that all of these things, the 
community, his so-called external and internal goods, and the universal good of 
humanity, are best explored and explained in relation to that experience being-with-
worth. Whatever tradition I might be supporting or rejecting, whatever practice and 
standards of excellence I choose or am seduced into surrendering myself to, they 
are motivated by the search for and experiences of being-with-worth, and being-
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with-worth is the only experience which is undeniably, unequivocally and 
universally a good experience. Communities might be built around shared 
experiences of what constitutes a worthwhile life and they may support our 
exploration for it, but they are subservient to it. 
 
This being-with-worth is not the Aristotelian flourishing life as it not built upon a 
teleological world view. There is no particular ideal of this state of being that we 
are all striving towards, although a belief that there is and an attempt to bring it 
about might be part of some models of it. Being-with-worth is simply an experience 
that cannot be denied as good for one who achieves it and is that which all other 
structures within a life are built or destroyed in relation to. All other goods are 
external to me and are good instrumentally and contingently based on their ability 
to cause it. 
 
A virtue then may be defined in an adapted MacIntyrian fashion as: an acquired 
human quality the possession and exercise of which enables us to directly or 
indirectly achieve experiences of the internal good, namely, being-with-worth. As 
such, if I am asking questions about what sort of epistemic agent I should be, I am 
really asking the question: “What sort of epistemic qualities, practices and 
experiences allow me to achieve being-with-worth?” What I can then continue to 
agree with MacIntyre on is that this is, in some sense, determined by my cultural 
and social context, tradition and practices, but the search for it is also, in many 
instances, hap-hazardly a matter of trial and error and thus is facilitated by 
experience and understanding of as many conceptions of being-with-worth as 
possible. This is what stands behind the claim I made above about the virtuous 
observer of the painting and it needs much more defence. However, this is a defence 
the remaining chapters will implicitly mount. 
 
 
Completing a virtue theory 
 
In this chapter then I have advocated the need to recognise that epistemic concepts 
have a lived dimension that must be accounted for and taken as a worthwhile area 
of philosophical inquiry if we want to come to a holistic understanding of their 
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nature and how we use them. Part of this included a recognition of the narratives 
that come with such a lived conception and that each of us not only experiences 
these epistemic concepts in valuable ways but that we should attempt to articulate 
and share those experiences not only for the sake of finding the abstract truth of the 
concepts but to understand them and one another better. However, these are 
ultimately normative claims concerning the nature of the virtuous epistemic agent 
and inquiry and are defensible, at least in the terms I have laid out, only by appealing 
to their potential for deep and lasting experiences of being-with-worth. As far as I 
am concerned, this is a legitimate appeal, as experiential accounts, although not 
wholly constitutive of worth for many, speak directly to our being much more than 
abstract analysis. Abstract analysis thus loses touch with the experience of the 
worthwhile life much more dramatically by cutting out the lived dimension of 
concepts than the latter does by ignoring the former. In addition to this, I take it as 
irrefutable that worth is found for many of us (although, contra MacIntyre, not all 
of us) in inter-personal, discursive and legitimising communities of practice. 
 
If this is truly to be an account of a particular type of weak but radical virtue theory, 
there are other questions that need to be answered.5 Some I have already addressed. 
I have provided an account of the nature and definition of a virtue. I have indicated 
that epistemic virtues might be somewhat, although not wholly distinct, from other 
types of virtues if they pertain to how one acts and conducts oneself in relation to 
the search for knowledge, truth, belief, justification, certainty and so on. I can also 
make explicit what was hopefully implicit in the above, that a lived epistemology 
and the search for being-with-worth means that the virtues are concerned primarily 
with the achieving of being-with-worth and that all other states and achievements 
in the epistemic realm – such as knowledge, truth, justification, trust, and so on – 
cannot be good in themselves but can only be good in relation to this end. Also, due 
to the fluctuating nature of what will cause a sense of being-with-worth (between 
people and within a person) the virtues similarly vary and, at all times, we are 
making a best approximation of what will continue to incur a state of being-with-
worth. What is left now is to turn to the nature of some of the particular epistemic 
virtues and virtuous epistemic activities. For this, I will be turning to the area of 
                                                          
5 Adapted from Baehr, 2016, p. 3 
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study which inspired this thesis and was rooting the ideas in my consciousness long 
before I discovered them in this form; the childlike figure of nineteenth-century 
children’s literature. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46 
 
Chapter 2: The Childlike Figure and their Virtues 
 
The Golden Age of Children’s Literature 
 
The childlike figure – the figure that is to embody the virtues I wish to promote – 
is one that I have constructed from a variety of texts published during The Golden 
Age of children’s literature. It is always difficult to pinpoint the defining features, 
starting and finishing places for such a nebulous concept as a “Golden Age”. 
However, in children’s literature criticism it is usually used to refer to a style of 
writing for and conception of children that came to full force in texts published in 
the 1860s and lasted into the early 1900s.  
 
If pushed for something even more precise, it is particularly tied to the publication 
of Lewis Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland in 1865, However, I hesitate 
to follow those who locate the beginning of this Golden Age with Wonderland. 
Firstly, because Charles Kingsley’s The Water Babies was published in 1862 
(around the time when Carroll was first recounting the adventures of Alice to Alice 
Lidell and her sisters) and, as will hopefully become clear, this text deserves to be 
considered as part of the era. Secondly, Wonderland creates such radical models of 
child education and children’s literature (if it suggests any models at all) it stands 
out even from the other texts that characterise the Golden Age. In many ways, it is 
as much the black sheep of the period as it is the defining text of it.  
 
Determining the end of the Golden Age is just as, if not more, tricky. Different 
discussions concerning the Golden Age that I have witnessed in the literature and 
person allow the incorporation of texts such as Rudyard Kipling’s Just So Stories 
(1902), J. M. Barrie’s Peter and Wendy (1904), Edith Nesbit’s The Magic World 
(1912) and A. A. Milne’s Winnie-the-Pooh (1926). Indeed, depending upon which 
characteristics one was trying to emphasise, I do not imagine it would be too 
difficult to extend the period as far as Swallows and Amazons (1930), The Family 
from One End Street (1937), Five on a Treasure Island (1942), The Lion, the Witch, 
and the Wardrobe (1950), or even further. 
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For the sake of ease, I will not be explicitly constraining the concept to strict texts 
or dates, but I will be roughly limiting the following discussion to those texts written 
between 1860 and 1900. There are some interesting generalisations that can be 
made about the works of this period and their character which speak directly to a 
virtue-based model and they are orientated around, at least as I read it, something 
akin to being-with-worth and how epistemic activity can feed into or hinder such a 
search. 
 
 
Understanding ‘child’ and ‘childhood’ 
 
In his Centuries of Childhood (1996) – the criticised but respected first major study 
of the historical development of childhood – Philippe Ariès traces the separation of 
childhood and the child as distinct periods and constructs from the rest of life back 
to the fifteenth- and sixteenth-centuries. He then points to the seventeenth century 
as the time when childhood stopped being viewed with amusement and began to be 
considered with moral seriousness. Throughout the eighteenth- and early 
nineteenth-centuries different conceptions of what constituted the child’s difference 
fought for dominance in the social consciousness. Two of these are captured neatly 
in Alice Through the Looking Glass when the Unicorn responds to Alice’s 
appearance and Haigha’s announcement that she is a child: “I always thought they 
were fabulous monsters!” (1965: p. 213) Here the Unicorn juxtaposes the two 
understandings of children as “fabulous” and as “monsters”. 
 
The “fabulous” side of childhood refers to the notion that the child is a pure and 
innocent being. They represent a state of and oneness with nature, an intuitive and 
untainted link to the divine, and a state before sin and immoral urges. The child did 
not always remain a passive symbol of this either, and in many works of children’s, 
and even adult, literature much could be learned from the active child voice. For 
example, the “angelic” children in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century children’s 
literature were the ones who usually died young and returned to their rightful place 
in heaven still pure and innocent, but not before they left their divine mark on their 
family and friends through well-borne and idealised responses to illness, hardship 
and society. As such, this innocent child “serves as the perfect catalyst for the 
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conversion of corrupt adult characters […] [and] as an example for the child reader” 
(Vallone, 2001: p. 279). These children were thus not only a moral voice in a corrupt 
and cold modern world, an exemplar for children and adults alike, but they also 
acted as a symbol of hope for adults that rediscovering at least the essence of their 
own inner innocence and connection to nature and the divine was possible. The 
child and childhood thus remained “a refuge from the painful complexities of 
modern life” (Gubar, 2009: p. 4) and was emblematic of a “pre-Victorian state of 
spiritual and imaginative well-being” (Furneaux, 2011: p. 189). 
 
The corresponding conception of how to treat, raise, educate and write for children 
was one that emphasised the need to protect and prolong childhood, not only for the 
child’s sake but also for the adult who was viewing it with hope and nostalgia. A 
carefree existence became the fundamental right of every child and, with that, 
“childhood became an increasingly popular locus for fantasies about leisure and 
freedom from adults.” (Makman, 1999: p. 199) Children should be allowed free-
reign with their imagination and to safely play away from the mature, adult world 
for as long as possible. Education should happen gradually, through play, 
experiential discovery, and a process of gentle guidance in reasoning to 
conclusions. It should also be something open to all children as, by this 
understanding, they were “society’s victims, struggling, often against hopeless 
odds, for physical and spiritual survival” (Briggs and Butts, 1995: p. 133). As such, 
alongside a duty to help and instruct the child where necessary, authors took up 
what Avery refers to as the “duty to entertain” (1975: p. 122) as well. 
 
This competed with the “monstrous” view of the child as one who, rather than being 
innately innocent, was in a natural state of savagery. The child was an uneducated 
and unformed token of base drives and, even worse, original sin. On this 
understanding, the (good) adult was wise, knowledgeable and experienced and, as 
such, should be educating the child in what was right and wrong with directness 
and verve. The adult was the gatekeeper and arbiter of factual and moral knowledge 
and within the collective adult mind is everything the child needs. During their 
education, whether formal, literary or at home, the child should be ready and 
grateful to receive this and, if not, must be forced to for their own salvation and 
society’s good. Lerer traces such reasoning back to the Puritanical texts of the 
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seventeenth-century and the realisation that books could not only shape the lives of 
children but that “only through reading, through performing the catechism, and 
through reflecting on exemplary narratives could the child be prepared for heaven” 
(2008: p. 83). 
 
Although some proponents of this conception of the child might still have ascribed 
to the Lockean view that a fantastical story was a legitimate tool for sugar-coating 
the necessary morals and making them easier to swallow, it was undoubtedly the 
moral instruction that came first. Others simply did away with the frivolity and, 
although they told stories, they contained few fantastical elements. As Maria 
Edgeworth asks in her preface to Parent’s Assistant, why should we given children 
tales of giants and fairies just because they like them? “It may be said that a little 
experience in life would soon convince them that fairies, and giants, and enchanters, 
are not to be met with in the world. But why should the mind be filled with fantastic 
visions, instead of useful knowledge? Why should so much valuable time be lost?” 
(2003 [1796]: p. 4) Her father shows that they are both steadfast in this conviction 
when he writes the preface for her Moral Tales for Young People: “we have 
disclaimed and reprehended all attempts to teach in play. Steady, untired attention 
is what alone produces excellence” (2003 [1802]: p. 169).  
 
Given that the most prevalent funders of literature for children entering the 
nineteenth-century were Christian organisations concerned with saving children’s 
souls through correct education, this model was possibly the more prolific even if 
there were staunch advocates on both sides. Sarah Trimmer, for example, bemoans 
even those of a Lockean ilk and declares their attempt to entertain as well as 
“improve the heart or cultivate the understanding” a failure (1976 [1802]: p. 20). 
All they have succeeded in is paving the way for a corruption of the youth and they 
have allowed a ‘Continental’ way of thinking to take hold, where revealed religion 
and a sense of duty are abandoned. Trimmer sees in children’s literature instead a 
worrying trend towards imitating scripture, depicting Nature as God, emphasising 
chance over divine plan, and that children are above restraint. This continues into 
the mid-nineteenth-century. William Caldwell Roscoe warns adults that, due to 
children’s omnivorous reading habits, they must be careful in their selection of 
books and not choose those that will “fill their minds with a confused medley of 
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ideas” (1976 [1855]: p. 23). Roscoe’s worry is that the child’s imagination is too 
strong, and its vivacity confounds the borders of reality and fiction, allowing 
emotion and fantasy to overtake reason and sense. The child is not yet 
knowledgeable enough to resist this and so the adult is needed to guide the way. He 
also warns against those stories where “the author attempts to slip in his moral 
unperceived, and by a sly sidewind to influence the character of his reader. This is 
lost labour […] the story should be devoted to its purpose, and the exposition be as 
plain and direct and forcible as possible. Children like this.” (p. 38) The well-
intentioned but stern Mary Martha Sherwood follows suit in works that have the 
potential for inciting fear and paranoia by dwelling on the all-seeing eyes of God. 
Indeed, in one infamous and vividly described event from The History of the 
Fairchild Family (1822) the children are taken to gaze upon the still-swinging body 
of a hanged man. According to Sherwood, “it is the greatest blessing which we can 
possibly receive, to be made to know our God, and to be made acquainted with all 
that he has done for our salvation.” (p. 2, my emphasis) To this end she offers 
guidance to parents in between stories via prayers to be said with their child after 
the story. Sherwood rejected the idea that the child could be reasoned into good 
behaviour but must be taught to obey instantly. Avery (1975) highlights how in her 
story Obedience, for example, the child who obeys immediately and swallows their 
medicine survives, whereas the child who refuses on the basis of supposedly 
rational principles dies.  
 
Alongisde and amongst these competing views was also what Avery terms the “cult 
of the rational and learned child” (1975: p. 157). For the most part it is aligned with 
the latter of the above views due to its focus on the education of the child in vast 
amounts of knowledge and insofar as it does not treat childhood as something 
sacred like the Romantic view. However, this “cult’s” image also separates from 
that of Edgeworth, Sherwood and others. The emphasis on reason is something, as 
has been highlighted, that is not necessary for the kind of education proposed by 
Sherwood. Similarly, in light of the strides taken in scientific inquiry and 
exploration during the period, the moralistic link to the divine was fading and, on 
this conception, science and industry became the motivating reasons for a child’s 
education. Indeed, Trimmer’s lamentation of the loss of revealed religion and duty 
could be caused as much by this scientific conception as the Romantic one. In this 
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sense, the “fabulous” and “monster” conceptions recombine in rallying against this 
“cult” and depicting the “revival of religious mysticism and a renewed feeling for 
the numinous” in childhood and through the child (Prickett, 2005: pp. 12-13). How 
these square with the mysterious nature of the Divine is different, but they recognise 
and embrace it where this rational and learned child may not. The latter child either 
scandalously understands God through nature and reason or, even more radically, 
turns from God to science by denying him or because of his unknowability. It is this 
battle that, in part, determines the nineteenth century as “a paradoxical combination 
of sincere religious belief and profound religious doubt.” (Labbe, 2000: p. 97) 
 
In my terms, what we can see from this brief account is that in the eighteenth- and 
first half of the nineteenth-century there was a battle to give the most compelling 
account of what constituted and could bring about being-with-worth amidst 
growing social reform and oscillations in the public understanding of what roles 
religion, science, knowledge, and childish imagination might play for both the 
individual and society. This was a struggle waged both openly and implicitly in the 
pages of children’s literature as authors sought to indoctrinate, persuade or reflect 
their own conception in their works. This continued into the 1860s but the decade 
also signalled the general triumph of a model which designed children’s literature 
around children’s own experiences, which valued the child’s reading experience as 
much as it did the lessons which may or may not be hidden in the text, and began 
in earnest to place the judgement of what was good and enjoyable for them to read 
in the hands of children themselves. The period also began to take seriously the idea 
of children as metaphysicians, as human beings who could work with the logic of 
complex, imaginative ideas and situations and interpret the meaning of works but 
without falling into the trap of wanting to cram them full of knowledge or entirely 
jettisoning the idea that they might have an intuitive understanding of the world and 
what might stand behind or beyond it. 
 
The roots of this paradigm shift are often followed back to Catherine Sinclair’s 1839 
work, Holiday House. Even though the changes are not thought to have taken broad 
control and large strides until much later in the nineteenth-century, and the text both 
contains an obvious angelic child in Frank and many moral lessons, there is a clear 
focus in at least the first half of the novel on a narrative which cares about and offers 
52 
 
insight into the author’s understanding of a child’s thoughts, feelings and 
experiences. In the characters Harry and Laura, Sinclair “puts forward boldly the 
charm and interest of the undisciplined child” (Godley, 1976: p. 96). Harry and 
Laura fit none of the models so far described, and what gives the book its 
“freshness” in the period is “the sprightly and sympathetic manner with which 
Sinclair describes the exploits of the children” (Butts, 1995: p. 83). From this 
beginning, and through the rise and development of these ideas in the Golden Age, 
by 1890 Edward Salmon was commenting on the change that was happening in how 
children were represented: “a healthier and more natural tone characterises juvenile 
literature today, and our writers are in the habit of going to life itself for the models 
instead of evolving from their inner consciousness diminutive prigs to be dignified 
with the names of boys and girls.” (1976: p. 333) Even those groups which had 
sought to bring primarily and overtly didactic and morally instructive tales to 
children for the sake of salvation, such as The Religious Tract Society and The 
Society for the Protection of Christian Knowledge, widened their publishing remit 
to take into account the secular and creative tastes of the new generation. As 
Maureen Nimon notes, by the end of the nineteenth-century even Sunday school 
magazines such as Aunt Judy’s Magazine have moved from being fierce and 
unequivocal defenders and promulgators of religious values to being scarcely 
distinguishable from other children’s magazines of the time. The punishments grew 
less harsh, the need to be constantly on guard waned, and even the characters “were 
often children who were recognizably human, rather than personifications of virtue 
or vice.” (1988: p. 248) 
 
In addition to this, the experiences of previously disempowered groups were 
beginning to be represented in these works. Children were obviously beginning to 
get a voice they had never had before, but, perhaps because children’s literature was 
not taken as seriously and so not as heavily screened as adult literature, children’s 
authors, particularly women, were also slipping in their subversive and angry 
messages concerning the status of girls, women and animals. Kimberly Reynolds 
points to the fact that both women and children were at this point disparaged and 
repressed by the prevailing social order and this identification led to women using 
children’s literature to poke fun at the male establishment: “no longer were they 
attempting to reproduce male values and attitudes, rather they began to challenge 
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and subvert” (1994: p. 28). For example, Juliana Ewing – a prolific and beloved 
author of the time who will play a significant role in the below account – is clear in 
her anger at the distinctly different treatments that boys and girls are subjected to. 
In ‘Benjy in Beastland’, for example, she is explicit in her disdain for the excuses 
made for boys in relation to their meanness of character: “They have a license which 
no one would dream of according to “the girls”, but it may sometimes be too readily 
decided that “boys will be boys”, in the most obnoxious sense of the phrase” (p. 
121). She repeats this in ‘The Land of Lost Toys’: “It is generally understood in 
families that “boys will be boys”, but there is a limit to the forbearance implied in 
this extenuating axiom” (p. 32), whereas in ‘Timothy’s Shoes’ she demonstrates the 
opposite, that girls are denied as full a childhood as boys are given and that they are 
expected to have a conscience and mend their own clothes almost by nature. Unlike 
boys, “you can make [girls] work, and they can amuse themselves when they’re not 
working.” (p. 92)  
 
We also read in Anna Sewell’s Black Beauty explicit and implicit claims about both 
animal and child cruelty – cruelty to those without a voice. Like ‘Benjy in 
Beastland’ it seeks to rid the world of not only wrongful treatment of other living 
beings – wrongs more often perpetuated and overlooked when committed by young 
boys and men than girls and women – but also the inaction of those who stand by 
and watch: “My doctrine is this, that if we see cruelty or wrong that we have the 
power to stop, and do nothing, we make ourselves sharers in the guilt” (1993 [1877]: 
pp. 160-161). It is also a call to become educated, experientially if possible, on as 
many matters as possible. Ignorance, according to the novel, breeds wrongdoing 
and suffering and although it is not as evil as deliberate malice or looking upon evil 
and doing nothing, it does place the ignorant at fault. 
 
The matter of how much of a moral should be contained within a work of children’s 
literature had not been settled. For example, for all of Tom Brown’s School Days’ 
depiction of the inner workings of the child and events with immediate relevance 
to the child, Hughes is happy to reveal his moralistic intention in writing it: “My 
whole object in writing at all was to get the chance of preaching. When a man comes 
to my time in life and has his bread to make, and very little time to spare, is it likely 
that he will spend almost the whole of his yearly vacation in writing a story just to 
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amuse people? I think not.” (2005 [1857]: p. 3) At the other end of the spectrum, 
Lewis Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland proved that a moral was not necessary for a 
successful story. Not only does Alice “escape the moral-finder” (Dusinberre, 1987: 
p. 59) but authorial mastery is seemingly abrogated, and, by Carroll’s own 
admission, meaning is intentionally left to be decided by the reader rather than 
provided or strongly suggested by the writer (p. 42). Other authors struggled to find 
where they wanted to lie on this scale. Juliana Ewing’s stories, despite their 
attention to the experience and enjoyment of the child, are inconsistent in their 
presentation of morals and moralising. As her sister Horatia Gatty writes, she much 
prefers those books where “Julie’s” lessons can be inferred rather than the ones 
where they were explicit and didactic with horrid children standing in direct 
contrast to the good (1887: p. 37). The fact that she can write this indicates Ewing’s 
dabbling in both direct moralising and this hidden or even non-existent style. The 
wrestling with the need for or how best to present a moral will be returned to. 
 
*** 
 
This account is dense and obviously generalised. Many of the patterns taken from 
it have a variety of qualifications and interact with each other. The authors are not 
immune from falling into one or the other camp at different points, as my outlining 
of Ewing on moralising above indicates. For example, a prolific criticism of some 
of the male authors from this period is that they continue to perpetuate a 
romantically idealized childhood due to their own repressive needs. On top of this, 
for all its social commentary, these child figures are undoubtedly middle-class. 
Even those poor heroes cannot help but appear as middle-class constructs of what 
the poor could achieve were they to raise their standards. However, what is 
important to note is not only the conceptions of what gives existence its worth – 
natural innocence, divine duty, scientific knowledge – and how they are best 
achieved, but that the Golden Age indeed emerged bearing the residue of these 
understandings alongside a developing sense that: (a) the child’s experience of 
worthwhile life comes over and above the role they play in an adult need for a 
nostalgic and idealised link to a better existence, (b) the child’s experiences of a 
worthwhile existence matter right now as much as their future experiences, and (c) 
the child deserves and needs to have an active voice in constructing their own 
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understanding of what was worthwhile and of the spaces and opportunities for 
experiencing being-with-worth. As such, what has emerged from the above is that 
during the Golden Age the worthwhile life of a child (and other disenfranchised 
voices) was captured by a developing sense of agency and of immediate and active 
access to creating experiences of life’s worth. This could create both an immediate 
sense of a worthwhile life and set up a future with possibilities for continuing such 
experiences. Alongside this, however, writers during the period were struggling 
with understanding life’s worth as residing in a space between the dutiful, other- or 
divinely-directed moral life and the individual, freely imaginative and playful one 
and whether it was possible to marry a fact-filled, increasingly naturalistic and 
scientific understanding with legitimate experiences of the unknowable and 
transcendent. The period was also beginning to recognise that whilst childhood may 
have some particularities which gestured towards resolving some of these issues, it 
was not a state to be entirely idealised or one which was entirely separate; it 
contained insights as to life’s worth that all could share in. 
 
What is noteworthy about this generalised, historical style of trying to account for 
a particular notion of the worthwhile life is that it is, to use an image that will return 
in this thesis, a shadow. It is flickering, incomplete, interpretable and without a solid 
existence, not to mention that it is cast by a continually mutating mass of humanity 
and interpreted by a situated and complex individual. As such, it gestures towards 
what might actually be worthwhile in a life but it resists complete articulation and 
a definitive list of end goals because it is part of an unending and unfinished cultural 
battle. Any attempt to render it complete by an individual such as myself is to deny 
this constant movement of both the mass, the shadow, and myself.  However, an 
account and experience of the shadow is possibly its own greatest defence in two 
senses. First of all, as the rest of this chapter is dedicated to, the virtuous 
characteristics and activities described come with their own experiential flavour and 
residue. The virtues then, perhaps paradoxically, constitute part of the 
worthwhileness of the end goal insofar as the worth of the end point can be “tasted” 
in their appetizer. Secondly, my own experience is an experience at least of being-
with-worth whilst encountering the texts and their call to embody the below virtues 
as well as trying to create spaces to cultivate and educate others for them. Perhaps 
then, what is outlined above and below is not the way to being-with-worth but is 
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itself the being-with-worth for me and I can only hope to strike a chord with the 
reader and to inspire or influence some similar journey in them. It is with this in 
mind that I now wish to explore the virtues of childlike learner. 
 
 
Conceiving of the childlike figure and childlike virtues 
 
The first thing to note is that there may be some who immediately recoil from the 
word ‘childlike’. For example, in his search for a term to denote the distinct nature 
of children’s literature, Peter Hollindale puts the word ‘childlike’ aside as he takes 
it to be “a word denoting innocence and naivete which we use with condescending 
approval.” (1997, p. 46) However, this is not the case for the nineteenth century, 
where childlike figures are, ultimately, those who have access to current being-with-
worth and have maximised their future chances of it. They are thus revered. 
 
Secondly, it is important to state that the childlike figure is not necessarily a child. 
As most virtue theories maintain, when we begin to get a conception of our goals 
we often turn our gaze towards those who we believe have achieved them or who 
have the tools to achieve them, so that we might learn from them. In this instance, 
the culturally created child, and some children, are that, but not every child does 
achieve childlike status or experiences of life’s worth and not every adult fails to. 
Thus, my conception of the childlike does not contain the idealisation or the 
pessimism of the Romantic account. Its child object is not entirely fictitious and it 
is a state which the adult can achieve. However, the child is not entirely opposed to 
this ideal either and there is something to be learned from characteristics seen in 
many children. As such, this childlike figure resists the ‘monstrous’ account from 
above as well. The importance of this will also become apparent in the next chapter 
where I tackle an issue that many literary critics take with nineteenth-century 
children’s literature and which philosophers take with any appearance of: 
sentimental nostalgia. 
 
The capability of the adult to partake in and the child to exist apart from a state of 
chidllikeness is perhaps the first and most important link that my conception of the 
childlike has with George MacDonald’s. George MacDonald was a Scottish author, 
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minister and theologian. He was not uncontroversial in the beliefs he espoused in 
the course of his sermons and writings, and he was often at odds with church 
doctrine. However, his beliefs lie at the heart of his largely successful career as a 
children’s author, not least of the all the notion of the childlike. On the matter of 
who is and can be childlike, MacDonald opens his collection of theological 
teachings, Unspoken Sermons, with an interpretation of the childlike as one of the 
central divine elements in man, boldly stating that “God is child-like” (1997 [1867], 
p. 12). Indeed, in many of his fictional works, the wisest and most powerful figures 
take on the form of a child and a youthful demeanour whilst maintaining an air of 
age and wisdom, and a character’s moral purity or epistemic capacity is often 
revealed through their ability to recognise these figures as childlike and see them in 
their youthful form. And one of, if not the, most quoted of his expressions is: “I do 
not write for children, but for the childlike, whether of five, or fifty, or seventy-
five” (1976 [1864]: p. 164). Whenever he wrote, MacDonald wrote in order to speak 
to or to inspire the childlike in his reader, and he spoke to that which could link the 
child and adult in their divine possibility. MacDonald’s childlike was not a virtuous 
state that could only be obtained in childhood, it was “an essential lifelong attitude” 
(Hilder, 2003: p. 56).  
 
Despite its centrality to his works and thinking, however, what the childlike is, how 
to recognise a childlike character, and what it means to adopt a childlike state of 
existence are not fully spelled out. The majority of critics who discuss MacDonald’s 
works implicitly follow the sentiment explicitly argued for by King (1986): because 
there is never a clear statement from MacDonald as to exactly what the childlike 
means it should be treated as a guiding but largely intuitive notion. That is to say, 
we may be able to pinpoint two or three concrete characteristics from studying 
MacDonald’s notion of the childlike, but, ultimately, we should rely on our 
instinctual feeling as to what it means and allow it to guide us from a more 
enigmatic position in our conceptual repertoire. Such an interpretation does 
resonate with several key aspects of MacDonald’s thinking. For example, his 
scepticism regarding analytic and rigidly schematic thinking, his rejection of the 
overly-rationalistic thinking that he saw as characterising the scientific 
methodology pervading the society around him, and his promotion of the strength 
of will and capacity to act upon a honed sense of intuition and moral feeling. Indeed, 
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as the first chapter of this thesis has suggested, I have a lot of sympathy with these 
positions and emotions and I take no issue with the traits ‘incomplete’ and 
‘intuitively guiding’. However, MacDonald’s depiction of the childlike, as far as I 
am concerned, fails in a few ways: it cannot detach itself completely from at least 
some hidden, regressive desire that it shares with the Romantic conception; it 
struggles to find its footing in how it might be experienced and embodied by real 
(in other words, non-divine or idealised) women; it does not do enough justice to 
the potential of scientific and empirical exploration; it often overestimates the 
metaphysical and theological capability of children and often refuses to create 
guides where they are necessary despite having them where they are not; and it is 
inextricably bound up with a Christian God and faithful obedience to it. As will 
hopefully become clear, many of these issues are overcome by placing 
MacDonald’s stories alongside those of, for instance, Lewis Carroll, Juliana Ewing 
and Charles Kingsley.  
 
What is not accounted for by these works, however, is a separation from the divine 
without also a complete removal of morality. For these writers one cannot be 
simultaneously childlike and be disobedient to or disassociated completely from the 
divine. That is not to say that one will not waver in commitment to the divine and 
so one’s childlike status, but any wavering means a loss of virtues and access to 
what is of the utmost importance and worth to life.  This divine element is not a 
problem for this thesis insofar as I am translating what remains to a context that 
does not require a Christian, or other, God. I am not rejecting God as a potentially 
powerful element of the concept for some and, as will emerge below, I am following 
these works (if not their authors) in leaving open a potentially non-secular concept 
of the behind and beyond. However, it does mean that what I am isolating cannot 
be the same notion as what is found in these texts. This religious element, more than 
anything else, creates a necessary gap between the nineteenth-century sources and 
my own project. I will have to provide an account what it is to have the virtues I list 
without the divine. That will hopefully become clear as we move through them and 
into my educational contexts. 
 
With it understood that the childlike learner need not, and should not, refer only to 
children, that it is founded upon but not synonymous with MacDonald’s conception, 
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and that I will ultimately disassociate it from the divine, I will now turn in earnest 
to some of the core virtues of the childlike learner which allow them to experience 
and continue to chase in good stead being-with-worth. The virtues I will focus on 
are playfulness, a capacity for wonder, and intellectual humility and open-
mindedness. 
 
 
Playfulness 
 
As mentioned, for these authors there are certain moral, divinely-decreed rules that 
are unbreakable and off-limits. Outside of this, however, the Golden Age is one that 
promotes play and the childlike learner is undoubtedly playful. Childlike play is not 
found in childish flights of fancy or the playful romping of the Romantic child, nor 
the play-based learning that was rejected by the moralists cited above, although 
such things might have their place. Childlike play and playfulness are active and 
involve the creation of meaning alongside and in direct negotiation with fellow 
players of whatever age. This kind of play facilitates a sense of one’s existence as 
worthwhile through moments of ownership, community, fun, enhanced 
understanding and a life-long disposition to continue in this mode and to explore 
possibilities and alternatives. 
 
 
Playful collaboration 
 
The first and perhaps most prominent form of playfulness found in these texts is in 
those moments where children bring about or accept moments of creative 
collaboration before and during story-telling. As Marah Gubar (2009) argues, many 
of the Golden Age authors viewed the child as complex, accultured human beings 
who are caught up in the constraints of their society just as much as the adults. 
However, rather than slip into what was presented as the normal story dynamic of 
the children gathering round to be told a faithfully recounted and pre-selected story, 
whilst having some wisdom imparted via a (hopefully) entertaining experience, 
many of these texts frame and intersperse the main story with images of creative 
interaction and negotiation between storyteller and listener as to what should be in 
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the story and which rules it and they must conform to. This spirit of playfulness and 
co-conspiracy in breaking and changing the rules is not just delighted in by the child 
but the adult also and, in this collaboration, a childlike nature is seen in all involved 
even if they all bring something different to the negotiated space.  
 
Children are depicted as being capable of setting the terms of and reshaping stories. 
They are, in Gubar’s terms, “artful collaborators” who, with the right adult, can 
avoid “the fate of functioning as passive parrots.” (2009: p. 6) Yet, they are not self-
sufficient and their imagination and play are not presented as distinctly superior to 
that of the adults. Indeed, we get the sense that without the adult, the experience 
would not achieve being-with-worth. This is a collaboration that is founded upon a 
childlike willingness to employ imagination and take a fresh approach to the rules 
but also the childlike humility, further discussed below, found in the willingness of 
the one capable of facilitating such play and a surrendering of control even to the 
child to do so. Gubar focuses on child narrators in Juliana Ewing’s stories, 
particularly highlighting The Brownies and the continual revision of stories by 
children in the text.  For Gubar, these acts highlight how “the prescriptive power 
that adult scripts wield over children is mitigated by the force of revision” (2002: 
p. 43). However, it is important to note that whilst it is the handing over of the 
power to revise to the child that is perhaps the most novel element of these texts, it 
is not just children who do the revision, it is also adults who do it for the child and 
for themselves, and the children need the material for revision. They need a 
structured piece to play with rather than a blank piece of paper. As one young lady 
comments at the end of Ewing’s ‘Melchior’s Dream’: “I don’t think I could have 
dreamt such a wonderful dream.” (1895 [1862]: p. 47) For childlike play and being-
with-worth to occur, these different elements must be present in the same space – 
the imaginative, creative and passionate figure and the well-versed, foresighted, 
humble figure. Because of this then, it is not just the children who are offered the 
chance to break free of narratives and structures rather than revere them, it is also 
the adult.  
 
This joint endeavour in creative collaboration and childlike play is a model that is 
repeated and emphasised in Ewing’s works. For example, in ‘An Idyll of the Wood’ 
the children make their case for leaving behind the old rules of stories which must 
61 
 
end happily, have everyone survive and get married, and be fictional. They demand 
a sad, true story where everyone dies and there is a bad ending. In ‘Melchior’s 
Dream’ the Christmas guest and Richard haggle over the nature of the story with 
Richard demanding that he be freed of the precedent set by his school usher that 
close-to-life tracts must be used that indicate the good and bad behaviour of boys 
at his school. The guest agrees to avoid a true story so long as he is allowed to use 
Richard’s name in the story. Richard assents and fiercely guards this agreement, 
almost immediately interjecting to declare, “I smell a moral.” (p. 19) The 
storyteller, keen not to deceive his audience but aware that he is not technically 
breaking any of the new rules simply responds: “Your scent must be keen, for it is 
a long way off.” (p. 19)  
 
These kinds of interaction happen across other stories of the period. For example, 
we see it in MacDonald’s ‘A Scot’s Christmas Story’ when the children ask for a 
tale of Scotland although, in this instance, they are breaking the rules not only for 
their own sake but for the teller’s: “Because you will like it best yourself, papa” (p. 
311). In Christina Rossetti’s Speaking Likenesses, despite creating a caricatured 
narrator who is averse to fantasy and sternly calls for silence and attention before 
her story, she cannot cease the children from their questions and whilst she often 
attempts to simply placate them and move on, in other instances she cannot help 
but be drawn into creating more details and so revises the story for and with them. 
In her movement between her first and second story, the Aunt is caught by her own 
logic and drawn into full-blown creation for and with the children when they 
demand the story of the frog who couldn’t boil the kettle: 
 
“Oh, but you do know it, Aunt.” 
“No, indeed I do not. I can imagine reasons why a frog would not 
and should not boil a kettle, but I never heard any such stated.” 
“Oh, but try. You know, Aunt, you are always telling us to try.” 
“Fairly put, Jane, and I will try” (1992:  pp. 342-343). 
 
And by the time she comes to telling a third story there is very little resistance: 
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“If Jane and you wish for a winter story, my next shall freeze hard. 
What! Now? You really do allow me very little time for 
invention!” 
“And please, Aunt, be wonderful.” 
“Well, Laura, I will try to be wonderful; but I cannot promise 
first-rate wonders on such extremely short notice.” (p. 350) 
 
The models that are being presented are undoubtedly meant to be replicated in real 
life book reading and interactions between story-telling adults and their child 
audiences. And, as Deborah Thacker points out, just as in the texts, book reading is 
a social game where the adults play with the illusion of control so that the child can 
playfully test adult power and their own authority. Indeed, the adult may take a cue 
from examples such as ‘Melchior’s Dream’ and when adopting the authorial or 
narrative voice, if they are reading out loud, may take control with that voice, play 
with it, negotiate the story with their child, and disrupt the “conventional, 
controlling modes of storytelling.” (Thacker, 2000: p. 7) This is a model of playful 
activity for the dual audience of adult and child implied by these texts. A dual 
audience that becomes one via the childlike “sprout” – to use an image from 
Mencius’ virtue theory – in each of us. 
 
In childlike play, old rules are being identified and subverted and new ones 
playfully put in their place. This is not to say that these children and adults 
completely subvert the society they live in, however. In fact, they enjoy many other 
comforts of “civilised” life alongside their creative interactions. Indeed, one might 
think that many of the examples I have provided are tame in comparison to what 
we might think represents playful and subversive behaviour and collaborations in 
contemporary society or even children’s literature. What is the potency of asking 
for a story without a moral when compared with the rule-breaking and dark play of 
teenage dystopian fiction for example? However, even outside of the context of a 
stricter and more moralistic Victorian society, I have not come across any 
contemporary, mainstream texts which frame the telling of a central story with a 
depiction of creative negotiation and collaboration between storytellers. Many 
contemporary books may invite the child to fill in the gaps of meaning and the 
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morals of stories are ambiguous if not gone entirely, but that is not the same thing 
as the promotion of creative and playful collaborations. 
 
There is still the possibility of giving and receiving nuggets of moral wisdom 
amongst this playful collaboration – after all, “a tale without a moral is like a nut 
without a kernel, not worth the cracking” (Ewing, 1992 [1870]: 105) – but even this 
is presented as all the more potent and better for the playful collaborations that have 
preceded it. Indeed, the worthwhile nature of this playfulness is not just found in 
the interactions but is also visible in how the children must deal with the emotional 
fallout of their creative interactions. For example, the request mentioned above in 
‘An Idyll of the Wood’ for a sad, true story is followed through on and “though they 
were tired of stories that end happily, when they heard it, they liked a sad ending 
no better than other children do” (p. 61). Richard’s requests also lead to a less-direct 
and more enjoyable experience for the children, but it is one which he admits, “hit 
me rather hard.” (1865: p. 49) This impact is both the price and the payoff of such 
collaborative, playful activity. 
 
These negotiations and interactions can go wrong however, as Smith finds out in 
MacDonald’s Adela Cathcart. At a Christmas party held by his hosts, Smith finds 
himself faced with a room of young children and asks them if they like fairy-stories. 
They say they do and he proceeds to excite their imagination by asking if they have 
heard of a number of tantalising stories about a giant that was all skin, a princess 
with a blue foot or Don Worm of Wakemup. However, unable to tell all the stories 
he offers the decision of what kind of story it will be to the room and suddenly he 
is faced with a cacophony of voices and arguments over whether the story should 
include a wicked fairy or not. At this point, Smith takes control of proceedings and 
guides them towards a story about a bad giant (denying that he knows any good 
stories about good giants in the process) and tells them one of MacDonald’s most 
famous stories which was to go on and be published apart from its place in Adela 
Cathcart: ‘The Giant’s Heart’. However, upon finishing the story the room is 
aghast: 
 
“Silly thing!” said a little wisehead. 
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“What a horrid story!” said one small girl with great eyes, who 
sat staring into the fire. 
“I don’t think it at all a nice story for supper, with those horrid 
spiders, too,” said an older girl.” (p. 337) 
 
Smith tries to take back control of the situation by suggesting a game and fails and 
then, upon hearing that at least one child is planning to use his story to scare a 
sibling he makes his final mistake: ““No, no; you musn’t be unkind,” said I; “else 
you will never help little children against wicked giants. The giants will eat you too, 
then.”” (p. 337) Smith has too hastily and heavy-handedly revealed the moral of the 
story and he is scoffed at by the children and Smith admits one of the older girls 
“made me feel rather disappointed with the effect of my moralizing” (p. 338). 
Knoepflmacher interprets this scene as MacDonald acknowledging “that not every 
reader will relish this or any other of his elliptical fairy tales” (1998: p. xviii) Indeed, 
we might put the failure down to the type of children in the room. By the standards 
of the virtues being explored in this chapter, they do not seem childlike as their 
interjections during the story are not collaborative and imaginative, nor are they 
interacting with the story with a humble and wonderous disposition or on its own 
terms. They interrupt competitively and to merely criticise the more fantastical 
elements (p. 320; 322) and Smith sees no option but to cease their interjections: 
“Then don’t you find any more fault with it, or I will stop.” (p. 322) Yet, it feels 
like there is more to Smith’s heavy-heart when he reflects that “the disappointment 
was no more than I deserved” (p. 338). We might deduce that in addition to the 
children’s approach, he was also not the most childlike and conducive to a shared 
and truly playful experience. From the start it appeared as though he was simply 
manoeuvring the children towards a story which he knew and which he felt was 
worthwhile rather than honestly engaging them in a playfully creative and 
collaborative process. He performed an appearance of playful interaction rather 
than genuinely facilitating one and he paid the price. He takes comfort in the fact 
that a single girl stays behind to say that she thought it was a nice story and she 
would be good, but his moralising to the reader after this –“The darling did not 
know how much more one good woman can do to kill evil than all the swords of 
the world in the hands of righteous heroes” (p. 338) – feels somewhat hollow after 
what has happened and it  is as though there is a lesson in here that MacDonald is 
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trying to recount from experience. To reach the childlike beyond those that are 
already good, these interactions must be genuine and skilful on the part of the adult. 
His moralising and slightly sneaky approach to collaborative storytelling 
undermines the childlike in him and through his failure it is reinforced that childlike 
playfulness requires the childlike in the child but also the adult. 
 
Perhaps somewhat worrying to a contemporary reader about the playful practice in 
these texts, however, is that this playful activity, whilst being enjoyably subversive 
and creative, also has the potential to perpetuate and solidify what we would take 
to be unhealthy relationships and rules. While some structures are played with, there 
are others are left untouched. These are usually the most hidden, deeply entrenched 
or insidious ones. The less these structures are played with the more they stop 
appearing as externally imposed rules and the more they are simply handed down 
as givens, even via playful and creative activity. As Lerer (2008) comments, this 
playful collaboration may well be part of an educator appealing to children’s tastes 
but for most of these authors they also wanted to, and thought it right to, attempt to 
shift that taste in certain directions. In keeping some moralising and some social 
structure, we might want to say that these narrators and their authors don’t fully 
capitalise on or open themselves up to the full potential of the model they are 
promoting. For example, I have already highlighted that a Christian God and 
morality underpins these texts and MacDonald maintains in his essay ‘The Fantastic 
Imagination’ that there are moral rules that even imaginative literature and fantasy 
can’t play with: “In physical things a man may invent; in moral things he must obey 
– and take their laws with him into his invented world as well.” (1976: p. 164). 
Additionally, Gubar (2002) argues that we still cringe at the paedophilic overtones 
of the Doctor asking Tiny to “kiss my fluffy face” in Ewing’s Brownies and we 
should suspect that despite the playful and collaborative model he has still exerted 
a coercive force and trained Tiny to behave in a way that satisfies his desire. 
Auerbach and Knoepflmacher (1992) also point to how Speaking Likenesses, for all 
its playfulness, depicts the child listeners as being goaded into ferocious charitable 
sewing and there are strong overtones of this being feminine work which will be 
perpetually handed down along with the stories from generation to generation. 
However, how this childlike model of playful activity might develop its potential 
for self-awareness and openness is something I will return to in chapter four and we 
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can put it to one side for now in order to acknowledge that the lives of these childlike 
adults and children are depicted as not only being more worthwhile because of their 
collaborative playfulness, but also that those living them experience this worth. The 
children are set up to become positive and active forces in shaping and influencing 
the society around them, as opposed to being static images and emblems of 
escapism or empty vessels to be filled as quickly as possible. Both the adults and 
children in these interactions are now drawn into fun, transgenerational 
relationships and create works with immediate vitality and potency. These are not 
just fleeting, positive experiences, but are life-affirming ones that gesture towards 
an underlying sense of one’s capability to shape and impact the world, something 
that very much indicates that one has worth. 
 
Playful nonsense and playing with shadows 
 
In his comprehensive and intriguing work, Philosophy of Nonsense: The Intuitions 
of Victorian Nonsense Literature (1994), Jean-Jaques Lecerle contends that the 
nonsense literature of the Victorian period reflects the polarisation of the speaker 
between their understandings of language as speaking (“it is language, not I, that 
speaks, the words come out of my mouth ‘all wrong’”) and me speaking language 
(“I am in full control of my utterance, I say what I mean and mean what I say”). 
Nonsense, in its breaking but also radically conforming to, the rules of a language 
both supports and subverts the myth of a precise, informative and world-tracking 
language. From similar beginnings, Lerer also argues that during this period 
nonsense became emblematic of the “force of the imagination” which could issue 
a direct challenge to “the logic of adulthood and the laws of a civil life” (2008: p. 
191). Stephen Prickett suggests it does so in at least two main ways. He points to 
the works of Lear for a form of nonsense which challenges current society and 
structures of meaning based upon a tour-de-force of “emotion, nostalgia, and sheer 
buffoonery” and then to Lewis Carroll for nonsense which works with undeviating, 
‘adult’ rationality but pushes it “to its furthest and wildest extremes” (2005: p. 124). 
All of this indicates nonsense’s subversive character and, according to Lecerle, 
nonsense texts for children during this period, “aim at (and choose their characters 
from) the type of child who has not yet been captured by the institution” (1994: p. 
4). In this sense, the nonsense that is used in these texts is an extension of the above 
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collaboration in that it allows the author to explore their own understanding of 
society and language whilst playfully subverting rules, but, in their expertise with 
language, they also create a space for the child to begin playing with meaning and 
the form of language in a different way to the playful activity outlined above. The 
permission to play provided by nonsense, it is hoped, will then extend away from 
the text and allow the childlike figure to question and challenge the “nonsense” they 
begin to see around them.  
 
However, despite its fame in the Alice books and making a few appearances in 
MacDonald’s Princess stories, it is not overly prolific in the Golden Age. Nonsense 
is a specific, jovial and linguistic instance of a potentially broader project which is 
to make sense of the meaning of society and life itself. Playing with nonsense can 
provide an immediate, worthwhile experience but the result is, as Alice says of the 
Jabberwocky, that it “seems to fill my head with ideas.” (1965: p. 142) These ideas 
still need to be worked through and transformed into something else. Where 
nonsense plays with the bounds of common sense and opens up the possibilities and 
playfulness of language, it only accidentally achieves or needs further collusion to 
get to the level of social or existential playfulness. Perhaps this is what fantasy and, 
in particular the fantastical images of shadows, do in the works of MacDonald and 
Ewing. They attempt to more directly facilitate reflection on our deepest and darkest 
selves as well as the social constructs around us. 
 
‘The Shadows’, told by Smith during Adela Cathcart and which, like ‘The Giant’s 
Heart’, went on to be published outside of Adela in other collections, tells the story 
of Mr Rinklemann’s rise to kinghood in the fantasy realm of the shadows. The 
shadows that come to visit Rinklemann claim they are the shadows of humans, not 
inanimate objects. Indeed, they become upset at the thought of being associated 
with the latter. What they mean when they say they are the shadows of humans, 
however, is not that they retain human form, or that they have one form at all, but 
that they are the shadows shaped by the fact that humans are aware and conscious 
beings with moral sensibility, hidden desires and regrets, and reflective capabilities. 
Their form, it seems, adopts the shape of our innermost thoughts and feelings. As 
with clouds and inkblots, they take no unquestionable or predetermined shape, but 
rather take on the form of whatever emotion or thought is present in the viewer at 
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that time. However, where clouds float and inkblots remain still, these shadows 
dance and change to give mesmerising life to that which is seen. To put it in playful 
terms, they repeatedly change their shape and rules and never allow one form to 
dictate their existence for too long. They are the shadows cast by our own flickering 
and changing immediate memories, thoughts, and feelings. As such, whilst they are 
always at play and changing and jesting, they “always jest in earnest” (p. 191). In 
fact, they can do nothing but be earnest for they are filtered through the “truth” of 
our perception. 
 
To demonstrate this, the shadows take the form of Rinklemann’s conscience at the 
start of the story and it is precisely in light of this that we can read his fearful 
aversion to them. To him the shadow’s “insane lawlessness of form” (p. 194) makes 
them worse than goblins and gnomes which are, at least, solid and complete and so 
understandable and conquerable. However, he does admit that even through their 
metamorphoses they retain their identity – they are “each of his own type” (p. 194). 
In this admission he expresses precisely the tension that exists when one does not 
recognise oneself in how one interprets the shape of a shadow. For the shadows as 
they exist independently of the observer do have an “insane lawlessness of form”, 
at least insofar as the flickering flames do. Yet they also have a “type”, namely that 
type given to them by their human observer. This is the type that comes from that 
‘object’ that now exists between the flame and the wall to mould their appearance 
– human perception. Apprehension of the shadows comes from having oneself 
revealed in this lawlessness. Indeed, their play and energy draws directly upon the 
conscience and ideas of the viewer. For example, where there is a clean conscience 
their energy is positively playful or gone. Towards the start of the story the shadows 
are subdued by Mrs Rinklemann’s entrance and despite their best efforts “the queen 
only smiled, for she had a good conscience.” (p. 199) Similarly the shadows cannot 
scare children who have not yet developed a sense of self or a worried conscience. 
The shadows actually declare that they “especially belong to children” (p. 207), as 
the child’s imagination lets them dance happily and act out scenes of wonder, and 
that they seldom seek to frighten anyone: “We only want to make people silent and 
thoughtful.” (p. 196) However, they cannot help what form they take and what lies 
in wait in those silent and thoughtful moments if the viewer has a tarnished 
conscience. For example, one shadow tells of a time he prompts a granddaughter to 
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think of her grandfather sat alone in the dark. He is sat alone because “he has filled 
his own mind with shadows, which we Shadows wanted to draw out of him. Those 
shadows are very different from us, your majesty knows. He was thinking of all the 
disappointments he had had in life” (pp. 214-215). 
 
Indeed, due to this moment of interpretation or creation of meaning that comes only 
through their playful form, the shadows argue they are necessary to humanity. They 
demonstrate this by telling the stories of their successes and their interactions with 
humanity. They made a murderer confess, halted a wedding by revealing a bride’s 
true nature, stopped an alcoholic from being able to drink alone, and inspired a 
musician to play “a shadow-dance that fixed us all in sound forever” (p. 204). They, 
of course, recognise that their abilities lie in whether the observer can engage with 
this process or see something there, which, in turn, depends entirely upon their 
willingness and disposition. For example, they tell the story of a miser who they 
could do no good for:  
 
I tried very hard, but […] although I made all sorts of shapes on 
the walls and ceiling, representing evil deeds that he had done, of 
which there were plenty to choose from, I could make no shapes 
on his brain or conscience. He had no eyes for anything but gold. 
(pp. 210) 
 
It is this limitation that is worrying the shadows in MacDonald’s story the most, 
due to a fatal turn they have witnessed in human nature. They are the shadows of 
“the twilight of fire, or when one man or woman is alone with a single candle, or 
when any number of people are all feeling the same thing at once” (p. 195). They 
exist in moments that teeter between light and dark, wakefulness and rest, the 
ordinary and the magical, and it is their existence on this brink that also provide 
them with their strange, playful power. But humanity is attempting to banish them 
completely – and so hide from what their playing can reveal to a person about 
themselves – through the proliferation of new, artificial lighting. Humans, it seems, 
are attempting to destroy precisely those spaces where shadows are most powerful: 
the still moments between waking and sleep, between full light and dark, and the 
corners of rooms as one sits awake with a candle. If we extend this via the 
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interpretation of MacDonald’s childlike figure as a rebuttal of over-rationalisation 
and scientific explanation, we may understand it also as humanity’s attempt to shed 
light on things that were a mystery. We no longer wish to play with the shadows in 
candlelit moments for they are now a matter of scientific inquiry and the utmost 
seriousness. They must either be still and completely understood or completely 
gone. 
 
These shadows have so far put an emphasis on the need for playful, unsettled and 
unsettling moments of interpretation and fluid meaning as well as the need to follow 
this play up with an openness and willingness to conduct self-reflection; to see in 
the meaning that has been drawn from the fluidity – or the nonsense above – an 
understanding of what we are bringing to that meaning. The meaning was not found 
in the shadow, it was found in the form we gave it and so was in us. Playful images 
and creations represent and interpret us as much as we interpret them, just as on 
Lecerle’s account of nonsense we speak language as much as language speaks. 
However, this seems to place emphasis on the childlike figure being self-reflective 
rather than playful. That is indeed another virtue, but playfulness still comes before 
it and underpins the point being made here when we look at another work of 
MacDonald’s. ‘The Golden Key’, and at what happens in Adela Cathcart around 
the telling of ‘The Shadows’. 
 
In another link to the Divine, MacDonald believed our imaginative and creative 
(and so our playful) capabilities are our most God-like traits (1976). This is borne 
out in ‘The Golden Key’ when Tangle and Mossy are in search of the realm which 
casts the shadows on the earth. There is more than a little hint here of the allegory 
of Plato’s cave where the cave-dwellers sit and watch shadows on the wall, taking 
them for reality, until one breaks his chains and turns around and heads outside to 
learn the truth that stands behind the shadows rather than gaze upon mere 
appearances. In search of that realm, Tangle and Mossy enter a fantasy realm, or, 
at least, a realm ‘beyond’ this one. Here dwells, amongst others, the Old Man of the 
Fire – simultaneously the oldest of the Old Men met by Tangle but who appears as 
the youngest, a naked baby. Whilst childlike and somewhat divine, the Old Man of 
Fire is not the creator of the shadows Tangle and Mossy were looking for. He does, 
however, play with different sized balls of colour in order to cast his own figures 
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and shadows upon the floor, and he does, therefore, engage his divine, imaginative 
faculty to create his own shadows – just as we all can. 
 
It is important to see that in MacDonald’s philosophy it is not just playful shadows 
cast by other objects that can be interpreted as shining a light on our inner workings, 
but we can create our own playful, enigmatic and shadowy texts for others. That is 
simply part of who we are as human beings and bringing that worth to someone else 
is something that the childlike figure also finds worth in. Indeed, ‘The Shadows’ is 
discussed in Adela Cathcart in a way that implies that the story is a type of shadow 
if the above reading is correct. For example, Adela interrupts Smith’s telling of the 
story at least twice to ask for an explanation of the its meaning. In both cases, Smith 
responds that he is not sure and even responds with a question of his own: “How 
can I tell?” (p. 196). These responses by Smith confuse and frustrate Adela who 
proclaims that she now has a distrust of Smith as a storyteller because she does not 
believe him to have had any meaning in mind. However, as she continues to ponder 
she admits that her depression has somewhat shifted because of the story (p. 218). 
In her attempt to find meaning and engage with the shadowy mystery of the story 
she has begun to read anew herself and her beliefs. It is not just Adela who is 
affected by ‘The Shadows’ either. Immediately after its telling we are treated to a 
reinvigorated Smith as he ponders upon a snowstorm and revels in “the sense of 
being lapt in a mysterious fluctuating depth of exquisite shapes of evanescent 
matter” (p. 221). If we compare this to his mood and the situation after his failed 
telling of ‘The Giant’s Heart’ we can see that in this attempt there is a genuineness 
to his creative project and his claims to not be aiming at a meaning – of his creating 
a flickering shadow - and both he and his audience benefit from its playfulness. He 
allows the listener to stand between him and the wall and interpret the shadows that 
are cast during the telling, rather than asking them to stand aside and simply gaze 
upon a shape. 
 
*** 
 
The virtue of playfulness then is the disposition to identify rules and structures, to 
challenge them or create new ones, and act according to the new paradigm. The 
kind of playfulness seen in childlike figures is one that involves well-intentioned 
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active collaboration with other childlike figures, a willingness to indulge in 
nonsense and play with shadows, as well as to create one’s own shadowy, playful 
material for others. Such things not only create positive experiences of community 
and fun but also a sense of personal worth through seeing and enacting one’s own 
power in the world and on others. Childlike play reveals that there is much to the 
world that one can interact with in a meaningful and creative way and one’s 
experience of life becomes “full” in the way outlined in chapter one. The childlike 
life is not only worthwhile because it is empowered through playfulness but also 
because it empowers others through the creation of shadows – it perpetuates the 
valuable experience. 
 
How is this an epistemic virtue? On a more traditional model, one may well argue, 
as Lecerle does in relation to nonsense, that playfulness gives one a kind of implicit 
knowledge about the workings of language, literature and social interaction. On a 
lived understanding, however, playfulness would immediately appear to facilitate 
many more experiences of being-with-doubt given its ability to undermine and shift 
structures of meaning. The more rules that are played with, the more that are viewed 
as potential playthings. This is a good thing insofar as it allows for increased 
exposure to different ideas of what is worthwhile by playing with those ideas and 
pieces of knowledge that are dictated to provide worth. However, it can also work 
to strengthen those meaningful structures that do remain. My resultant knowledge 
may well go beyond being-which-resists-doubt insofar as it is now also being-
which-has-resisted-doubt and, if it has been involved in an intensely personal 
playful experience is built upon a strong experience of meaning-created-with-and-
through-me.  
 
I will be extending my definition of play and playfulness further in chapter four – 
particularly in relation to the challenging realm of dark teenage play which is 
missing from this literature but which is characteristic of late-twentieth century 
children’s literature – and, as already mentioned, I will be returning to the 
challenges of play which ignores its own structures and divorces it from the divine. 
However, for now, it is time to turn to a second virtue. 
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Capacity for Wonder 
 
As with the concept of the childlike, George MacDonald does not give a complete 
account of the nature of wonder, but he deliberately echoes Francis Bacon when he 
writes: “wonder, that faculty of the mind especially attendant on the childlike 
imagination, is the seed of knowledge” (1895: p. 15). This sentiment, whilst 
emphasising the childlike imagination, is in line with the reverence wonder has been 
treated with throughout the history of Western philosophy ever since Socrates 
declared that wonder was the feeling of the philosopher (Theaetetus, 155d) and 
Aristotle claimed that all philosophy begins in wonder (Metaphysics I: II), and it 
retains a central place as a core virtue in my conception of the childlike learner. 
 
To generalise, wonder is the emotion we experience when we encounter an object 
or event that appears to be at odds with the world as we know it. We are surprised 
that it does not fit into the categories we already have and are baffled but intrigued 
by. A desire is created in us to know more about the object and to incorporate it into 
our understanding, but even as we fill this gap the object of wonder stands as a 
symbol for how the world has the potential to surprise us and the powerful aesthetics 
of the unexplained. For example, as a child I did not understand rainbows and 
experienced wonder at how they could even be possible. I sought to know more 
about these beautiful objects which defied my expectations of what was capable of 
occurring in the world. Even as I learned more about how they are formed and why 
they might be aesthetically pleasing, rainbows maintained traces of this wonder as 
their aesthetics still extended beyond their explanation and their form embodied a 
memory of how the world could be accessibly strange.  
 
This experience of a motivating incompleteness can be contrasted with experiences 
of other mysterious objects that come with negative emotions such as fear or 
disgust. Where I embraced the wonder of rainbows, I rejected the unknown of the 
dark. What was cloaked in the corner of my room was just as unknown to me as the 
origin of rainbows, but where looking at a rainbow was an experience of beauty and 
life-affirming possibility, the dark was an unknown which I had no desire to 
explore. I shunned opportunities to explore the mysteries of the dark and I sought 
to end its existence as quickly as possible. Rainbows elicited a positive response to 
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the limits of my current knowledge, whereas the dark was an experience of myself 
being under threat from those limits. Both my response to rainbows and the dark 
were invitations to imagine or prompted my imaginative faculty. What could the 
origin story for a rainbow be? How on earth did it get there and where did its colours 
come from? What lies in the dark and why would it be there? What would it want 
with me? However, where one experience prompted me to open the door to my 
imagination willingly and I embraced its results, the other inspired firm resistance 
to the reflexive response to create what was beyond the visible and tangible. I asked 
the rainbow to help me create but I demanded that the dark keep its gifts to itself, 
even if it did not listen to my demands very often. 
 
Neither the dark nor rainbows elicited awe, and wonder can be helpfully understood 
as different from awe. I put the distinction in these terms: whereas wonder includes 
a perception of oneself being equal to the task of understanding of the object in 
question, awe prompts a feeling of the inadequacy of one’s understanding. In awe, 
we are over- or disempowered rather than inspired to search. Wonder creates a 
transitory state of lack and we experience the removal of that lack as possible. Awe 
brings with it an inescapable unknowability, a sense of one’s own powerlessness 
and that one’s very existence is insufficient. Awe, in this sense, is as disempowering 
as wonder is empowering.  
 
Wonder then is a feeling of surprise at something beyond one’s understanding that 
causes the imagination to pleasantly swell and motivates an imaginative and open 
form of inquiry, often with an aftereffect on our conception of the possibilities 
present in the world. 
 
Because of the element of surprise, which enables us to find something new and 
exciting in the world, the experience of wonder has been closely linked to childhood 
and, for many, it is directly tied to the undeveloped and inexperienced mind of the 
childish figure. This link is drawn out in some works analysing the Golden Age. 
For example, Schrock explains wonder in MacDonald’s writings as “the explosion 
of new meaning into the mind, only possible to the naively expectant child” (2006: 
p. 67, my emphasis). Here Schrock is expressing the understandable sentiment that 
wonder is tied up with the ignorance of the child who, because of their lack of 
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experience, has the potential to experience wonder at almost every turn. However, 
whilst the existence of wonder may be more prolific in childhood it is not necessary 
or limited to it. It is not mere amazement or a regressive emotion which, due to the 
pleasure of the experience, motivates one to stay in the wonderous state as long as 
possible. We are not meant to retain the same subject of wonder and stay ignorant 
or naive. The rainbow, as I said above, may retain the fingerprints of wonder and I 
experience these along with it, but it should no longer be the object of wonder. If 
this is the case, I did not capitalise on the motivation, I simply rolled in the pleasure. 
I do not understand the world any better. The childlike figure, however, uses their 
wonder to seek understanding even as they retain a conception of the world and 
grant that it may never be fully understood and there is potential for wonder still in 
everything. 
 
We should also be wary of Schrock’s use of “naïveté”, which implies that wonder 
requires naïveté. However, a gap in knowledge or understanding does not imply 
naïveté. Both at the start and end of Adela Cathcart we are reminded that Smith has 
this wondrous mind-set as he gazes into two snowstorms and sees a “vague and dim 
solidification of space, a mysterious region […] out of which anything might come” 
(p. 1) and “a mysterious fluctuating depth of exquisite shapes of evanescent matter” 
(p. 221). It is here that he seems, if not entirely comfortable, at home with an 
underlying sense of excitement. It seems to be this wondrous mind-set that must be 
re-born in order to set Adela back on a childlike path as, after some of the stories, 
she begins to wear looks of deep interest and “abstracted thought and feeling” again 
and to “mark, learn, and inwardly digest it, for she had the appearance of one who 
is stilled by the strange newness of her thoughts.” (p. 150) Smith further articulates 
a feeling that now looking like this she is experiencing a consciousness of existence 
quite different from anything she has felt before. And Adela is certainly not a naïve 
child, nor is Smith. 
 
For an adult to retain the childlike capacity for wonder without simply regressing 
they must put in work and resist the trappings of old age and experience, which 
would seek to tell them that they have found the right path to understanding and a 
sense of the world being known and mundane; these are issues to be returned to in 
the below discussion of intellectual humility. MacDonald often uses metaphor and 
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fantastical description as a way of trying to help the adult reader rediscover their 
capacity for wonder and the young child to experience it. For example, consider 
this passage at the start of The Princess and Curdie. Mountains, where the narrator 
tells us: 
 
are portions of the heart of the earth that have escaped the 
dungeon down below, and rushed up out. For the heart of the earth 
is a great wallowing mass, not of blood, as in the hearts of men 
and animals, but of glowing hot, melted metals and stones. And 
as our hearts keep us alive, so that great lump of heat keeps the 
earth alive: it is a huge power of buried sunlight – that is what it 
is. (2006: 85)  
 
Just as with Nietzsche’s fable at the start of this thesis, one might ask after the truth 
of this description. Does it contain some truth but ultimately stem from a deficient 
understanding of plate tectonics and, because of its lack, it is filled with slightly 
more fantastical elements? Is it simply meant to be a childish fantasy that, although 
containing a modicum of truth, is meant to entertain and set the scene for a fantasy 
rather than inform? Or, is this beside the point? The metaphor is meant to inspire a 
childlike mindset in its reader and evoke an experience of wonder towards 
something that may have once been perceived as wonderous but has become an 
everyday object to them in their ‘old age’. There is wonder to be found in old 
experiences recast if we are only willing to engage with them in a different, 
childlike way. 
 
Although I have focused on MacDonald, wonder is a recurrent theme throughout 
the literature of the Golden Age and authors regularly attempt to elicit it. For 
example, in ‘An Idyll of the Wood’, the old narrator is one who continues to find 
wonder in the woods unlike all the other adults who come there and have grown 
used to it. The regular, summer visitors to the wood will picnic there year after year 
and they see it as the same and hear the same song being sung by every bird. They 
do not realise what he does and that no lifetime could reveal all of the beauties and 
lessons of the wood. There is always some new detail to be wondered at in the 
wood, and each song is different and beautiful in its uniqueness. Each new wonder 
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and each new song is capable of driving one’s understanding in a new direction. It 
it is only the childlike character with a continuing capacity for wonder and who is 
willing to work at retaining it who hears and experiences the wood as continually 
worthwhile in its newness. Those who lose this only experience the picnic. 
 
Nonsense has already been discussed in relation to playfulness, but what was not 
fully discussed was how part of the pleasant experience might come from the way 
in which Carroll’s use of language and word play causes a wondering at the very 
way language works. Language suddenly becomes something unfamiliar, without 
clear boundaries and a realm of possibilities. It is no longer completely understood 
but we simultaneously feel like we may well, once again, be able to master it. We 
may not be able to – we fail to command the temper of verbs and the pride of 
adjectives impenetrably as Humpty Dumpty does – but this oscillation between a 
perception that we can and our inability to just adds to language’s endless capability 
as a vehicle for wonder. As a human construct it constantly lures us into thinking 
that we can get to grips with it – and so does not stray over into the realm of awe – 
whilst always remaining capable of becoming strange and delightfully mysterious 
again. Gyring and gimbling hold no terror for me and yet they never cease to set 
my mind inquiring. 
 
However, where the wonder of the Alice books is contained within wondering at 
logic and language and the wonder of MacDonald’s work in fantastical metaphor, 
the wonder of Charles Kingsley’s The Water Babies also comes from an appeal to 
the strangeness of the world we already inhabit. As Prickett writes of Kingsley: “No 
fictional fantasy could equal the variety and peculiarity of the life he found teeming 
in the rivers and sea; there was no need to pass through any looking glass” (2005: 
p. 145). Indeed, the narrator of The Water Babies tells us of a time when elephants 
would be thought of as impossible monsters (1994: p. 48), and declares that 
“German bogey painters […] could never invent, if all their wits were boiled into 
one, anything so curious, and so ridiculous, as a lobster.” (p. 91) For many, the 
elephant and the lobster may have lost their charm but we can re-find wonder at 
their existence by being asked to consider them afresh and with this new capacity 
for wonder turn it onto the world and cease to speak of strange things that cannot 
exist and cannot happen and, instead, look to the strange things that do exist and do 
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happen every day. Even Maria Edgeworth, an author I separated from this childlike 
conception at the start of this chapter, embraces the wonder of the natural world. As 
Immel, Knoepflmacher and Briggs (2009: p. 228) argue, Edgeworth’s use of 
Rosamond’s experience of a flea under a microscope in her story ‘Wonders’, 
depicts the extraordinary and fantastical potential of an ordinary creature. 
Edgeworth too demonstrates the alluring potential of nature and its ability not just 
to incite pleasure but to fill readers with the transformative power of knowledge 
and inquiry.  
 
*** 
 
A capacity for wonder must be worked for as we age and become familiar with the 
world, but maintaining a capacity for wonder is not an impossible task. I will be 
discussing the ways in which I have tried to bring wonder into my practice as a 
teacher and to develop the virtue of a capacity for wonder in adult education in 
chapter four. However, for now, it is important to note that this attempt to create in 
oneself a capacity for wonder can reinvest the world with joyful potential where it 
has been lost in our ‘adultlike’ existence. The context above was one where science 
was perceived as generally threatening, and many worried that it had already 
affected the worldview of society. However, what the search for wonder gave to 
science, and what allowed those worries to be placated in some, was the status of a 
realm of high adventure. Wonder does not separate science and the natural world 
from the humanities and literature, for they share “a common feeling for the 
strangeness of a world whose seemingly solid matter turns out to be a sea of atoms” 
(Shaw, 1999: p. 2).  
 
An experience of wonder then holds the potential to be an experience of being-with-
worth in and of itself through the way in which the world becomes a constantly 
surprising place to be, pregnant with stimulating experiences conducive to a life full 
of worth. As an epistemic virtue, it positions us in a positive relationship to not 
knowing rather than one which emphasises any deficiency in us. Through wonder 
we experience the epistemic life as a constant unveiling rather than an unending 
search to fill a gap. In each new encounter there is not the reminder of our lacking, 
but an experience of dramatic and pleasing challenge.  
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Of course, some might turn away from this experience insofar as it contains a high 
possibility for instability as the world is always able to surprise us and give us 
something new which can unsettle our current structures of meaning and 
interpretations of existence. Yet what could vanquish that concern about the 
stability of meaning appears only to be the belief that one has found correct answers 
and, more importantly, that everything in the world can be reduced to whatever 
terms you have already used in accounting for existence. This, I want to argue, is a 
huge leap of arrogance and closed-mindedness which cannot lead to a stable sense 
of being-with-worth where the above can. At this point it is important to note that, 
as may be becoming clear, these virtues are very much interwoven and must be 
understood in relation to each other. Playfulness can lead to wonder and the capacity 
for wonder is broadened by intellectual humility. Alternatively, an experience of 
wonder can lead to playfulness through the creation of meanings behind the 
wonderous object and to intellectual humility by having one’s sense of the mystery 
of the world re-invoked. So now I will turn to the virtues which stand opposed to 
this vice: intellectual humility and open-mindedness.  
 
 
Intellectual humility and open-mindedness 
 
Playfulness is often conceived of as a character trait that is childish. It is tied to 
flights of fancy, figments of the imagination and a lack of seriousness. Wonder is 
similarly associated with a childish state of mind that is lacking in experience and 
naïve. Playfulness and wonder are taken to be things that will disappear as one 
‘grows up’, matures in reasoning, rationality and complex relationships, and sees 
the world for how it ‘really’ is. If they are dabbled in as part of later life they are 
because one has children in need of a playmate, needs a break from the real world 
or is, for some reason, stunted in one’s development. They, like ‘blankies’, night 
lights and thumb-sucking, are artefacts of an existence that has been transcended. 
Yet, as I have been outlining, this need not be the case. Playfulness and a capacity 
for wonder can be childlike insofar as their continued practise can provide 
experiences of existence’s worth beyond the merely regressive. However, if these 
virtues are to achieve their maximum potential, they require an openness to 
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engaging in what might be perceived as childish by others, a humble 
acknowledgment and revealing of the gaps in one’s own understanding, and to the 
possibility that alternative ways of viewing the world might be correct. This 
capability is what I am calling childlike intellectual humility and open-mindedness. 
 
There is something of a humble self-effacement and joking connected to the status 
of the child in many of the Golden Age texts, but they also come with a knowing 
nod to the potency of their position. For example, in Ewing’s ‘The Land of Lost 
Toys’, Aunt Penelope takes on the role of storyteller. She maintains that her 
excellent capabilities as a narrator come from the fact that she has not had any 
children of her own and so has not yet transferred her “childlish follies and fancies 
to them and become a properly sedate grown-up.” (p. 35) Although she talks of 
“childish” and “fancies”, we can infer that what she is in fact talking about is her 
ability to continue to engage with children’s stories and fantasy. She has retained 
the ability to search for meaning and lessons in them despite their association with 
the juvenile and fantastical. In the story she revisits a wood and tree from her 
childhood and there finds a beetle, a hole and an adventure ready to be learned from. 
She, like many of the children in the stories I have been recounting, is still able to 
move between worlds and traverse the boundaries between the adult world of 
serious reality and the childlike world of fantasy. However, she does not enter the 
fantasy world purely as fantasy. She is able to bring stories and learning back with 
her. It is this that marks her our as childlike rather than childish figure.  
 
Where the childish figure travels to the fantasy realm merely for pleasure and 
escapism and the adultlike character does not or cannot make the journey because 
of their understanding of the realm of mere fantasy, the childlike figure can venture 
out and explore the possibilities of the fantastical realm, or what lies beyond and 
behind the world, in order to make remarkable discoveries. Indeed, the adultlike 
figure who cannot see the possibility and symbolism that is inherent in this fantasy 
realm, who dismisses learning from the symbols and emotions made there, is 
actually creating another fantasy: that there is nothing to be learned from the 
fantastical. We can see such a warning in MacDonald’s The Flight of the Shadow. 
His protagonist, Belorba, has just met for the first time the woman who is to cause 
her much grief for the rest of the story. She relates to us that upon meeting this 
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woman she had doubts about her being a witch or ogress. However, she quashes 
them and thinks them to be silly thoughts. Instead of listening to the intuitions of 
childhood reading and the ‘truth’ of what stood behind these stories when meeting 
this woman, she dismisses them as she has been told that those images and tales 
bore no impact on real life. As such, she falls foul of surprise and is hurt when this 
woman does, indeed, turn out to be evil. 
 
The adultlike characters in these texts already have pre-set notions of where 
knowledge and learning will and should come from, most often presented as logical 
reasoning and the immediate senses. They thus dismiss any learning that comes 
from beyond these boundaries. They might be amazed, shocked or baffled by an 
object in the world or an experience but they will maintain that there is an 
explanation to be had via the routes they already ascribe to. As has already been 
mentioned in my first chapter, in one scene from MacDonald’s The Princess and 
the Goblin, Princess Irene attempts to tell her nurse and friend that she has seen her 
long-dead grandmother but they will not believe her. When she asks why, the nurse 
simply answers, “Because I can’t believe you” (p. 8). People only “believe what 
they can” (p. 61). When what they are being asked to believe is the presence of a 
dead woman, even if the grandmother had shown herself to them then they would 
not have believed their senses and simply called it a dream. For, “seeing is not 
believing – it is only seeing” (p. 62). As was discussed when I noted this interchange 
in chapter one, the nurse alludes to the fact that her certainty or knowledge that dead 
people cannot come back to life is, experientially, being-which-resists-doubt even 
in the face of a kind of justification that may well, abstractly, constitute enough to 
believe, be certain, or know that something is the case. Because of where the 
experience comes from – the fantastical notion of a dead woman returning to earth 
– it simply cannot be the case. However, the childlike figure does not discount a 
potentially educatory experience because of the sphere to which it belongs and they 
traverse the above boundaries as part of their search. They are not limited in what 
counts as evidence for truth and are open and receptive to novel routes to 
knowledge.  
 
In many of these tales, for example, there is a point where the fantastical happenings 
can be attributed to a dream, hallucination, post-death experience, and so on. Yet it 
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is only the adultlike learner who takes heed of this and discounts the experience 
because of this. The childlike learner cares not for the nature of its embodiment, 
only what they can take away from it. One who has a childlike personality is one 
who recognises that these stories and tales may not be true in the strictest sense, but 
they engage with them as they also recognise their own limits with regards to 
knowledge of the world and existence. If we look to how the interaction between 
narrator and reader is presented in Charles Dickens’ A Christmas Carol we can see 
an example of this.  The narrator tells the reader that Scrooge “found himself face 
to face with the unearthly visitor […] as close to it as I am now to you, and I am 
standing in the spirit at your elbow” (p. 62). This narrator does not exist in any strict 
sense for the reader, but the words, lessons, and experiences are being presented to 
them as worthy of an audience despite coming from an unreal yet somehow present 
voice. We should not fight this experience and debate its strict reality, as Scrooge 
attempts to do when he claims Marley’s ghost to be but a bit of spoiled food (p. 56). 
The strict reality of the spirit for Scrooge – or the fantastical realm or even the 
narrator for the reader – is beside the point; it is their message and that message’s 
potential for knowledge formation that we must engage with and evaluate as well 
as the emotional experience involved in the journey to it. Scrooge’s journey from a 
so-called man of reason and harsh scepticism to one with an open mind allows him 
to ultimately engage with what the spirit has to say and the night’s fantastical 
experiences and adjust his life on that basis. 
 
As such, the childlike mind – one which is open to experiences of wonder and 
disposed to playfulness and the possibility for revolutions of thought upon the basis 
of this – is exploratory, bold and creative in their epistemic life. They can be so 
because their open-mindedness and humility allow the world to retain its status as 
full of possibilities and many paths to epistemically relevant experiences remain 
open. The world can still have an impact on thought and understanding rather than 
the world simply being there to be assimilated and explained under a pre-decided 
structure of thought.  
 
In this openness to possibility comes an unbounded potential for playfulness and 
wonder, and in an openness to wonder and play we continue to demonstrate our 
own humility and open-mindedness. These virtues thus align in a symbiotic whole 
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which renders the world a realm of possibility and oneself a creative and active 
agent in it. The childlike virtues support experiences of being-with-worth by setting 
positive epistemic projects for the agent and by construing the world as an exciting 
and promising domain for those projects. 
 
 
Facilitators and spaces of virtue 
 
The above has articulated why playfulness, a capacity for wonder and intellectual 
humility and open-mindedness can be conceived of as three of the core virtues in 
the search for being-with-worth. They were found rooted in and explored through 
the Golden Age of children’s literature. Before moving on to explore how a lived 
understanding of epistemology and these virtues might shift the boundaries of 
debate around questions of nostalgia, literature and testimony, I want to return to 
this literature to see what can be understood about which characters and what spaces 
allow for the development of these virtues. These authors embraced the 
responsibilities that came with the virtues they were highlighting, and their texts are 
filled with spaces and guides that were not only troubled by the industrial, scientific 
world but that wrestled with the fall-out of the empowerment that their literature 
was trying to bring about. An inquiry into this will be of great import in the 
implementation of my teaching philosophy in chapter four. 
 
 
 The childlike teacher 
 
How do these authors maintain that one best facilitate and cultivate these virtues 
and how might they think one can educate for them? We have already seen 
examples of good and bad storytelling in the form of Smith and can deduce from 
his experience that one who works to bring about a childlike disposition should act 
in good faith towards any creative collaboration and seek to create works of a truly, 
rather than faux, shadowy nature. This storyteller should not be the Socratic ironist, 
who at least on some accounts feigns ignorance in order to work towards some 
predetermined end. They should instead display the virtues of playfulness and 
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humility, bravely taking on the unknown element of this type of collaboration, in 
order to bring these virtues about in others.  
 
This model can be extended to leaving room for the childlike learner (of any age) 
to take up the active role not only during but after the story. Even if a moral is 
exposed, there should be a moment where the child can decide whether they want 
to engage with the meaning they have created, and with what they have taken from 
the experience, or not. They should be challenged or invited to consider the meaning 
and the potential role it might take in their future life, but they should not have the 
meaning, even if co-created, forced upon them. Such force threatens the 
empowering foundations of the creative experience. For example, in ‘Idyll of the 
Wood’ the children ask if the old man really did hear the story in the birdsong that 
fills the woods. He responds that he did, but that he is aware not everyone could 
hear it even if they stood where he did. At the end he tells them that he still hears 
the song of the bird even though it is dead because its ghost resides on the topmost 
branch of the tree outside his cabin. The story ends as the children are laying plans 
to get into the woods but we are never given an answer as to whether they make it 
past their parents and into the woods or if they hear and understand the song. We 
get a sense that a childlike reader, one who has been inspired by the story of the old 
man and is playful and open-minded enough to meet the story on its own terms, is 
being invited to adventure, to seek the truth behind the story that exists in the wood 
and its birds, and to find meaning outside the authority of adults. But it is not an 
explicit invitation. The teacher of the childlike cannot lead them there if they wish 
them to retain and practise their virtue, but must allow them to see and grasp the 
opportunity themselves.  
 
Similarly, in Jean Ingelow’s Mopsa the Fairy, after a hundred pages of action and 
adventure and a desperately moving return to the human world by the protagonist 
Jack, he is kissed good night and heads to his room: 
 
Then he got in his little white bed, and comfortably fell asleep. 
         That’s all. (p. 316) 
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The beauty of this ending is the addition of the final line. Auerbach and 
Knoepflmacher suggest that these last two words soothe the reader as the mother 
soothes Jack on his return but that they also “imply that there can be no return to 
the imaginative worlds Jack has now altogether forgotten.” (1992: p. 209) However, 
I read this final, jolting line as one which rocks the comfort of the image preceding 
it. It is a challenge to the reader rather than a closing of the door. It is inviting one 
to assent or rebel against whether that is, in fact, all. The story is over, but should it 
be revisited? Is there nothing more that can be taken from it? Does the experience 
have nothing the reader can use or reflect upon once they close the book? It is in 
the reader’s response to these questions that they do or do not find their childlike 
nature and virtue. 
 
The childlike educator is thus one who invites and attempts to stir action but does 
not enforce it. Aiming to create wonder is also integral to the childlike educator’s 
efforts. As we saw above, many of these texts do not just extol the virtues of a 
disposition to wonder, they attempt to create experiences of it through their stories. 
It is in this light that we should read MacDonald’s claim that teachers should be 
fairies (McGillis, 2003). Teachers are those who ‘queer’ the world and make it 
strange and ambiguous again. As Nicola Bown argues, fairies returned to the 
Victorians “the wonder and mystery modernity had taken away from the world 
(2001: p. 1). The childlike teacher is one who does the same to education and spaces 
of learning. Part of this comes through allowing the learner to question, not just to 
give them the answer, but, once again, not just for the sake of letting them find their 
own way to the truth but because they may have something fresh to contribute. In 
this sense, the childlike teacher displays the virtue of intellectual humility in order 
to facilitate the student’s disposition for wonder. For example, in ‘The Higher 
Faith’, MacDonald talks of how, often, an aspirational child will approach the 
scholarly disciple in order to seek answers, trusting that the disciple’s place of 
pedagogical power means they have something valuable to bestow on them. 
However, rather than meeting this childlike questioner and their being so full of 
heart, “unusual feeling”, “lively hope”, and “wide-reaching imagination” (1895: p. 
34) with enthusiasm and learned humility, the disciple responds that there is no 
answer in any book they know of and so there is no answer at all. In their arrogance, 
this disciple does not ascribe to the notion that something not revealed to the 
86 
 
scholarly community could be revealed to a child and he forbids them from 
searching further with an authority brought on by “years and ignorance” (p. 35). 
This disciple does not recognize the qualities of childlikeness and instead sees only 
a child whose lack of experience means they have nothing to bring to learning or 
the conversation. Those who have a strong and embedded childlike character are 
compelled to answer these questions and seek their answers regardless of the 
adultlike figure, but this results in them turning from the community the teacher is 
a part of – a difficult and painful process. However, the teacher who shares in the 
childlikeness of the child can capitalise on the nature of these questions and develop 
the virtue of the student. They do not dissuade them, they provide what knowledge 
they have, but they do not provide rote answers or pretend they have the answer. 
Those that remain childlike as teachers humble themselves to become co-learners 
in the face of such questioning. 
 
Perhaps the most childlike educator from the Golden Age is Kingsley’s narrator in 
The Water Babies. As with the above texts, the narrator ends the story on a 
deliciously unstable and playful note which allows the reader to embrace a humble 
yet powerful and active stance or to turn away from the story as they see fit. 
Additionally, as was explored in the section on the virtue of wonder, this narrator 
is a voice that seeks to create wonder in their reader. We can also note the way that 
the narrator dabbles in playful nonsense during their story, and promotes humility 
throughout the text by challenging the intellectual arrogance of both fictional and 
real figures from the contemporary world of science. On top of this, however, the 
narrator of The Water Babies stands out as a childlike educator due to the sheer 
chaotic energy of the voice and narration, something that I experience as inspiring 
and motivating and therefore conducive to the other virtues.  
 
Humphrey Carpenter writes that The Water Babies is “self-contradictory, muddled, 
inspiring, sentimental, powerfully argumentative, irrational, prejudiced, [and] 
superbly readable” (1985: p. 24). He and others (Darton, 1982; Manlove, 1975; 
Horsman, 1990) have taken this to be reflective of Kingsley’s own chaotic and 
emotionally-charged disposition and it is perhaps for this reason that the narrative 
voice is the strongest character in the book. It is prejudiced, angry, sentimental, 
funny, and deeply caring. For Darton and Horsman, this is the weakness of the voice 
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as it flitters from nonsense to moralising and mistakes passion for fact, but, for me, 
it is all the more entertaining, all the more endearing, and all the more sincere for 
these qualities. It is its paradoxical humanity coupled with the relentless energy for 
what is worthwhile in life, regardless of how internally inconsistent it might seem, 
that makes it a voice worth experiencing. None of the critics named believe this 
voice to be an artistic choice on the part of Kingsley – although Manlove floats the 
idea – and I am sceptical too. However, regardless of whether Kingsley intended it 
or not, at its best and most energetic, the narrative voice throws the reader into the 
unexpected and, taking them by the hand, runs with them at a furious pace and 
headlong into play, stopping only to tearfully or sentimentally gaze with high 
emotion on a poignant scene. Although we might not want or always be able to go 
to the exhausting heights of Kingsley’s narrator, one cannot deny that the vivacious 
teacher, who embodies and faces the virtues they want to extol at every turn is one 
who is immersed as far as possible in them and gives to them a potent lease of life. 
Evidence of this reading of the narrator can be found in the next chapter’s discussion 
of the epistemic value of literature where the narrator features heavily. 
 
As such, the childlike teacher appears to be one who: engages in the playful and 
creative process in good faith; challenges and invites the learner to take an active 
role in meaning making and narrative tasks without forcing them to; attempts to 
make the world wonderous and strange; genuinely acts as humble co-explorer with 
the learner; and embraces their role with vivacity, emotion and their humanity on 
display. However, we can add to this at least one more thing. We have already read 
in the above how the childlike is not just one who interacts with and facilitates 
others engaging with playful creations and shadows, but is also one who creates 
them. As such, the childlike teacher should also be read as the creator of texts such 
as the ones I am discussing, but also as one who creates spaces for the childlike 
student to flourish. I now want to turn to one such space: the Victorian Christmas 
hearth. 
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Christmas as a childlike space 
 
Christmas was an important time for a range of Victorian writers, whether their aim 
was to exploit a lucrative financial trend or to capitalise on the opportunities to 
develop their readership’s social and moral character. However, the form that 
Victorian Christmas stories sometimes took does not always sit easily with the 
expectations of the current reader. At contemporary productions of the long-running 
West End show The Woman in Black, for example, the line “Christmas is the perfect 
time for telling ghost stories” is usually met with a round of slight chuckles. To a 
modern audience, the idea that terrifying or mysterious tales have a place at a time 
of year when we are meant to feel safe and blanketed by seasonal warmth, is a 
comical one. That the dark fantasy of Tim Burton’s The Nightmare Before 
Christmas (1993) stands out amongst the plethora of contemporary Christmas films 
and books testifies to this. Indeed, the juxtaposition of the film’s two main worlds, 
Halloween Town and Christmas Town, and the presentation of their complete 
ignorance of each other, exemplifies what holiday historian Steve Roud has called 
the eclipse of Christmas’ mischief and magic by Halloween (2008: p. 529). We no 
longer expect to see a Christmas collection begin with a call for “Hobgoblins, Raw-
Heads and Bloody-bones, Buggy-bows, Tom pokers, Bull-beggars; and such like 
horrible bodies” (Anon, 1734: p. 10), nor do we witness the workings of fairies, 
goblins and witches on our Christmas cards (see Appendix A). We have moved 
more towards what William Thackeray advocated in 1847 when he reacted against 
this ghostly and serious vein. Namely, that Christmas literature and festivities 
should be characterised by “a proper, pleasant, rouged, grinning, junketing, 
pantomimic business” (Thackeray [1847], cited Forrester, 2016: p. 51). However, 
whilst this shift seems to have broadly happened, it was a gradual one, and during 
the transition there are Christmas spaces which utilise both Christmas’ safe 
sentimentality and its ghostly origins in order to create experiences that are both 
secure and unsettling. This is a space which, if approached playfully with a capacity 
for wonder and humility, allows the childlike figure to access lessons which will 
reverberate with them for a long time. 
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So important was Christmas to George MacDonald that he rarely mentioned any 
other holiday in his stories (Gabelman, 2014). According to Smith in Adela 
Cathcart, Christmas is part of the “childhood of the year” where we experience 
Christ as “that strong sunrise of faith, hope, and love” (p. 19) and reject being old, 
cunning, selfish, careful, distrustful, petty, weak and foolish men and women and 
re-embrace the childlike in our hearts. Even putting aside this Christian message, 
we can see how MacDonald often uses Christmas in his invocation of the 
mysterious and the thoughtful, and, according to Sadler, he depicted it as the time 
when “one must be willing to cast off the cloak of adult doubts and cares long 
enough to spend that special night, if we can find the place, in the wise woman’s 
magical hut; a night of self-realisation that may have, for adults and children alike, 
some frightening consequences about it” (1973: p. 20). Indeed, one might say that 
Sadler’s description perfectly sums up the Christmas journey of Adela from 
depression to reinvigoration via stories which, when embraced in a childlike 
fashion, cause deep, sometimes frightening, but ultimately saving, self-reflection. 
This is the holiday that, after all, inspired the creation of Smith’s ‘The Shadows’ 
amidst the flickering candlelight. It could equally apply, however, to the central 
character of the great Christmas story of the Victorian period already discussed as 
extoling the virtue of childlike humility: Scrooge. 
 
The childlike potential of a Christmas space infused with safety and shadows is also 
borne out in Ewing’s texts. From the opening story of her first ever publication, 
‘Melchior’s Dream’, right through to her 1884 ‘The Peace Egg: A Christmas 
Mumming Play’, Christmas continues to appear in her writing as a time of joy and 
wonder. However, it is also occasionally tinted with a dark or mischievous and 
mystical feel. She uses this side of Christmas to depict haunting experiences which 
focus upon one’s ability to learn from strange events in a childlike fashion. 
‘Melchior’s Dream’ has already been discussed in this thesis as a story which 
engages in creative collaboration, but it can now be noted that part of what 
facilitates this interaction is the Christmas setting. It is a time where the children 
are amongst the safety of family and, even if arguing, are feeling the warmth of 
home as a blanket against the cold outside. It is thus the perfect time for these 
unsettling stories which prompt self-reflection. The learner is safe and has the time 
to delve into them, and when they emerge from them they return to that same safe 
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space and to the embryonic warmth of family and fireside which can allow for the 
growth of the ideas the story has implanted. 
 
We also see Ewing’s version of the childlike teacher at work in her Christmas 
spaces. ‘Melchior’s Dream’ introduces us to the mysterious, older male figure that 
is a staple of the space across here stories. The squabbling and grumbling of the 
household’s children is not stopped by their parents, but by their father’s visiting 
college friend who, as we have seen, negotiates creatively with Richard whilst 
simultaneously creating something powerful and affecting. In Ewing’s ‘Snap-
Dragons’ we see a similar male presence – a mysterious guest to the festivities who 
puts an end to the arguing and ‘snapping’ of the children by telling thought-
provoking, if only half-finished, stories. Indeed, this character is tinged with even 
more mystery than the one from ‘Melchior’s Dream’. Just before the ‘magical’ 
happenings of ‘Snap-Dragons’, when the tongues of fire from the burning brandy 
pot turn into actual dancing dragons and teach Harry a purgatory-like lesson, we 
are treated to a scene dripping with undertones of incantation and witchcraft. We 
are told the guest sits, smiling grimly, by the fire, taking in the disagreeable family 
and servants. He begins to chuckle quietly, but the sound is described with repetitive 
and odd words: “St! St! At it! At it!” (1888: p. 32) And, as he says (or even mumbles 
or chuckles) these words, “it seemed as if the voices of Mr. and Mrs. Skradtj rose 
higher […] and the children’s squabbles became louder […] whilst the snap-dragon 
flames leaped up and up, and blue fire flew about the room like foam” (p. 32). 
Indeed, when we couple this description with the illustration of the scene (Figure 
6), we get the feeling that the family is stood around a witch’s cauldron or pagan 
fire creating mysterious potions under the watchful eye of the stranger. These are 
certainly the ‘queering’ educators referred to above, but also ones who recognise 
the potency of fantastical experience and seek to bring them about knowing that 
they will take the shape that is necessary for the child without them having to force 
it into a certain form. The simply facilitate the experience.  
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Figure 6: Illustration from Ewing, J. 1888. Snap-Dragons and Old Father Christmas, London, Society for 
Promoting Christian Knowledge, p. 31, illustration by Gordon Browne 
 
The reason they emerge at Christmas, however, is that they recognise its focusing 
potential. The cover of Ewing’s ‘Snap-Dragons’ (Figure 7) and the illustration to 
its companion story ‘Old Father Christmas’ (Figure 8) both show children locked 
into imaginative experiences in front of dancing flames and shadows. Particularly 
in the latter illustration there is a very definite border separating the world and 
beyond the fire-side captivation and from their own, focused imagination. Even in 
the first illustration, however, there is no world beyond the fire, no worldly 
interruptions. There is only complete focus on the flickering shapes at hand. These 
are experiences facilitated by childlike teachers but they are ones only entered into 
because Christmas is both mysterious and safe. The children enter into the darker 
and more mysterious side but can only do so because they have the time and 
joviality to allow for engagement with fantasy and magic. 
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Figure 7: Cover of Ewing, J. 1888. Snap-Dragons and Old Father Christmas, London, Society for Promoting 
Christian Knowledge, illustration by Gordon Browne 
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Figure 8:  Illustration from Ewing, J. 1888. Snap-Dragons and Old Father Christmas, London, Society for 
Promoting Christian Knowledge, p. 52, illustration by Gordon Browne 
 
Both the snap-dragon and the old, mysterious male figure also make an appearance 
in Ewing’s most enigmatic Christmas tale, ‘Christmas Crackers’. This is an 
unsettling but enchanting tale that depicts the drug-addled or magically-intoxicated 
guests of a Christmas dinner engaging in visions of their respective hopes and fears. 
The mysterious male figure, here an ‘old tutor’, is once again present and he is 
suspected of casting some sort of hallucinogenic or magical powder onto the fire 
that brings about the guests’ visions. In this story we see the ‘queering’ teacher who 
creates experiences within a primed space in their darkly playful extreme, and the 
full potency of flickering shadows and restless flames as catalysts for individuated 
self-reflection is revealed. 
 
Many of the experiences of the guests are positive however and their after-effects, 
despite having their roots in a drugged and hypnotic state, are treated with childlike 
humility. For example, under the influence of the smoke, the pastor at the gathering 
is transported to the sighting of the star of Bethlehem. His gusto for his Christmas 
Day sermon and faith had become stale and tired but this vision brings back to him 
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a rekindled fire of belief. The young visitor at the dinner is initially presented to us 
as an exemplar of a philosophical mind and one governed by “disinterested feeling” 
(p. 148).  He is poetical and articulate, full of technical and warranted feeling, but 
only at the expense of his vitality, sincerity, and expression of true, lived emotion. 
In his fantasy he flounders in impressing his love until he makes a simple speech 
that invokes memories of childhood. He is thus reminded that the family hearth, the 
memories created, and genuine, natural feeling, will stay with him longer, and serve 
him better than the ‘disinterested feeling’ of the academic. The daughter keeps her 
end of the cracker after it became her grandmother’s wedding-day brocade in her 
vision, and the young twins see themselves in their future desired professions. The 
grandmother finds herself holding her old wedding-veil which invokes positive 
memories of her past and is then comforted by a figure with “beauty not doomed to 
wither” (p. 160) after seeing her future deathbed. Even the dogs dream of their 
favourite playful roughness: “growling a warlike manner through their teeth, and 
wagging peaceably with their little stumpy tails” (p. 162). 
 
Yet the story is not entirely positive in its description and language. The tutor is 
described as “grotesque-looking”, “lank and meagre”, with skin like stretched old 
parchment, and eyes that glare green (p. 145). On the other hand, this description is 
not a consistent one. The only character in the story to experience the tutor 
negatively in reality is the widow’s son Macready (or “MacGreedy” as he is known 
for most of the narrative). The tutor scares neither of the other boys, nor the animals, 
and whilst the daughter recognises an air of the magical about him she stresses his 
generous, intelligent, ingenuous nature, and his “kindly” use of these positive 
characteristics (p. 148). Other descriptions of him also depict him as mischievous 
rather than demonic. For example, when the daughter’s dream is over we are told 
his shadow “scrambled on the wall like an ape upon a tree” (p. 156). MacGreedy 
experiences the tutor negatively, however, not because the tutor is a sadistic or evil 
character, but because of his own nature. MacGreedy may not have a vision – he is 
too busy stealing crackers, too selfish, and too greedy to care about the smoke or 
others – but his reaction to the tutor is subjective to his nature all the same. 
MacGreedy is often caught by the tutor trying to steal raisins from the children who 
have earned them by fishing them from the flaming snapdragon, and is shocked by 
him into dropping them or swallowing them whole (p. 146). MacGreedy is 
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continually caught doing something he knows is wrong, and will probably be 
punished for. As such, his adverse experiences of the tutor come as a reflection of 
his guilty conscience, not from the tutor’s own nature. He is a “half-scared mouse” 
under the tutor’s gleaming “cat” eyes (p. 146). The only participant to have a 
horrible vision is MacGreedy’s widowed mother. Her adverse experience in her 
vision is also one that reflects her troubled mindset. She sees herself as the bride of 
fairy-tale character Blue Beard, and is caught revealing the secret cupboard where 
he keeps his dead wives. Blue Beard, assuming the shape of the tutor, brandishes a 
scimitar, ready to kill her. The widow is in mourning and burdened with a 
troublesome son and it is also suggested that she is a nervous person – she “squeaks” 
at the cracker’s snap (p. 160). She is a woman overwhelmed by doubt and concern 
so it is no wonder then that her smoke-induced vision is one of confused terror.  
Where everyone else has fantasies and visions, she has “horrible dreams, light 
nightmares” (p. 161), and is besieged by the terrifying image of Blue Beard and his 
cause, the tutor. 
 
‘Christmas Crackers’ goes beyond Ewing’s usual Lockean proclamation that a 
tale’s moral must be wrapped up in pleasant layers. It is completely ambiguous as 
to whether it is a ‘nut worth cracking’ at all: “whether it contained an almond or 
not, remains a mystery to the present time” (p. 163).  If a character or reader takes 
a moral lesson with them, it is because they put it there. In the self-reflective state 
promoted by the tale, we and the characters see and magnify what was already 
within us; it is truly a shadowy creation with the most mysterious of educators. 
What one makes of the positive and negative effects and whether this educator is 
truly childlike or irresponsibly childish is a point of contention but, even if one, like 
me, comes down on the side of the former, it offers warnings that these experiences 
need to be handled with care by those who create them, for whilst MacGreedy may 
deserve his conscience pricking, we cannot be sure his mother does. We can only 
hope that her return to the safe space of Christmas is enough to help her work 
through the vision or forget it. Yet, is the Christmas space truly safe for her given 
her mental state and background? Is any educational space truly safe enough if one 
comes with enough baggage? Although this space is being painted as ideal for this 
kind of learning, does it too not have its chinks if the one entering it is already on 
unsure footing? These are questions which Ewing and the authors do not seek to 
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address but they are questions I will return to when I discuss designing my own 
educative spaces in chapter four. 
 
 
An aside on childlike obedience 
 
Before moving on, the problematic necessity of the divine in the above conceptions 
of the childlike must be returned to. For all of the agency given to childlike figures 
by these authors, obedience and intuited faith are still virtues for them and their 
texts educate for them. For example, MacDonald directly addresses childlike 
obedience in Unspoken Sermons and declares it to be obedience to the truth and 
what is “beheld and known.” (p. 8) He appeals to some internal compass, not unlike 
Aquinas’ synderesis, which directs us towards what the divine wants of us and we 
will somehow know its quality and should follow it. In ‘The Gifts of the Child 
Christ’ the character Phosy is full of wonder and ready to attempt to believe 
anything if she feels it has a divine source, and in The Princess and the Goblin 
Irene’s ball of string is a powerful emblem of faith (a guide that is felt but not seen) 
but the following of the string is an act of blind obedience to a woman for whom 
Irene only has an intuitive feeling. In At the Back of the North Wind Diamond 
wrestles with his emotions and understanding of the divine North Wind and despite 
seeing her as a wolf and being unfazed by the screams of those who drown in her 
natural disasters, concludes that he will continue to love and serve her because he 
does not, cannot, will not believe that she is cruel (p. 348). Similarly, it is only 
through learning to show complete faith and trust in what the unmistakable divine 
fairies teach him that Tom can start on his road to salvation at the end of Kingsley’s 
The Water Babies. Ewing, has been interpreted by some as turning away from or 
subverting religion in pursuit of female empowerment through intellectual pursuit 
(Auerbach and Knoepflmacher, 1992; Sebag-Montifore, 2001) and it is true that 
religion is not as overt in as large a portion of her corpus in that of other authors. 
However, other critics such as Keen (1994) provide compelling evidence for 
reading Ewing in a largely conformist way and her own sister writes of the mutual 
support Ewing and the Christian community gave each other and that all were 
“conscious that Julie held her talent as a direct gift from God, and never used it 
otherwise than to His glory” (1885: p. 76). Similarly with the Alice books in which, 
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for all their perceived lack of morals, Alice is not a childlike figure. When placed 
against Reverend Charles Dodgson’s life whilst it may extol and free and childlike 
disposition, it was likely meant to be read alongside a higher moral realm that exists 
outside of the text. 
 
I want to flag up that I am not taking obedience of this kind to be a virtue as, to my 
mind, it removes some of the worthwhile agency and activity that are being built 
up around it. I here simply acknowledge that I am leaving something out of my 
reading of this period’s childlike. I could simply secularise this and maintain that 
obedience to some sort of internal compass and meaning is enough. Indeed, an 
awareness of oneself as being guided by and committing to a moral code may 
provide many with a sense of a worthwhile life via having a purpose or being part 
of something larger, but I cannot bring myself to say this must hold for everyone 
and, at least as I experience it, the search for such a virtue cannot be at the core of 
my conception of the virtuous life and classroom. 
 
*** 
 
The virtues of playfulness, a capacity for wonder and intellectual humility all allow 
for experiences of being-with-worth insofar as they fill our objects and state of 
existence with possibility rather than limit, and they increase agency rather than 
moves towards stasis and passivity. They also do so in a way that shifts our 
experience of an epistemic life to that if a vivified and exciting search rather than a 
desperate escape from lack. They gave to these authors and, hopefully their 
audiences, a sense of the world’s grandeur and majesty and a perspective that was 
at once humble and powerful. These writers tried to awaken this in their audience 
by creating wonderous shadows of their own and modelling the humble behaviour 
of the childlike teacher in safe but strange spaces. It is my hope that I can do 
something similar in my own teaching (minus the appeal to divine obedience), but 
that must wait until chapter four. For now, I want to turn to three case studies of 
how my understanding of lived epistemology and virtuous epistemic activity might 
be applied to discussions concerning the cognitive value of literature, the worth of 
nostalgia, and how we interact with the testimony of others. 
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Chapter 3: Nostalgia and the Epistemic Value of Literature 
 
This thesis has thus far been underpinned by a weak, radical virtue epistemology. 
Although the epistemic concepts of knowledge, belief, justification, and so on, have 
their analytic dimension, this thesis has focused on avoiding the potential for that 
tradition to “look death” into those concepts by ignoring their dramatic and lived 
side. It has sought to revive them and has addressed how reflecting on the personal 
experiences associated with them, as well as a playful, wonderous, and humble 
disposition, might help with this by reinvesting the world and the search for 
meaning and understanding with potential and vigour. As was argued when 
discussing playfulness, even if one returns to the traditional epistemic project after 
reflecting on lived experience, playing with meaning, and opening oneself up to 
alternative routes to understanding, the return is one that has given a new lease of 
life to a project that may well have become stilted or has heightened the project’s 
potency by reaffirming its place in one’s world-view. 
 
What has motivated this thesis and provides the virtues with that virtuous status, is 
that an epistemic project so conceived is one which is conducive to achieving an 
undeniable and internal good to one’s life: experiences of being-with-worth. 
However, whilst experiencing the world through a lived dimension invested with 
possibility is a key part of seeing one’s life as having worth, the experiential 
dimension of epistemic concepts and the virtues of playfulness, a capacity for 
wonder, and intellectual humility and open-mindedness cultivate it in another way 
as well: they increase a sense that one’s voice matters and that one has creative 
potential, and they cultivate agency. As the first chapter revealed, traditional 
epistemology has been derided for attempting a disembodied project which side-
lines certain voices, but a lived understanding of epistemic concepts allows for the 
exploration of all voices through their recounting of experience. The second chapter 
then highlighted virtues which give creative power and agency to the individual. 
 
What this chapter will do is test this approach and its claims against two areas of 
epistemic inquiry and, in doing so, defend the role of nostalgia in our epistemic life 
and maintain that literature has a prominent status in those endeavours and artefacts 
we understand as having epistemic value. I tackle the nostalgic experience and 
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attempt to recover its epistemic potential because it is a hard case. Nostalgia, and 
the literary modes that have nostalgic appeal, are the target of severe epistemic 
criticism. The distinctiveness of my position is revealed in part through how I can 
re-think even such an apparently distorting form of experience. 
 
 
Nostalgia 
 
As was laid out in chapter two, a nostalgic image of the Romantic child was 
powerful and prevalent coming into the nineteenth-century and it undoubtedly still 
held some sway even in the texts I discussed. Indeed, children’s literature and the 
feeling of nostalgia appear to be necessarily entwined even today insofar as most 
of us are, at least sometimes, nostalgic about our childhood and the texts that evoke 
or depict memories of it. Many of us often romanticize the events of childhood and 
see it as a time of freedom and frivolous innocence, and some instinctively warm 
to the children around them because they project this understanding onto them. It is 
also a common experience to wistfully remember and idealise the characters from 
those stories which brought us joy during this time, and to extol their virtues and 
repeat our own tales of the way in which they affected and shaped our lives. We 
cling to tattered copies of books hoping that the artefact will anchor us to a better 
time or we buy new copies hoping to pass our experiences on to the next generation.  
 
Some of this may be deemed harmless and natural, and it is not controversial to say 
that the above interpretations of childhood or recounting one’s attachment to 
childhood texts are generally seen as normal and socially acceptable. Yet to be 
called ‘nostalgic’, a ‘romantic’, or ‘sentimental’ in the fields of children’s literature 
studies, memory studies, or analytic philosophy could easily be interpreted as a slur 
on one’s academic character.  
 
However, what is precisely so intellectually repugnant about being nostalgic for an 
idealised notion of childhood is rarely clarified, and it is, more often than not, taken 
as a given that being nostalgic and creating such an idealised image is a bad thing. 
As such, this section will begin by bringing philosophical and psychological 
literature to bear on the notion of nostalgia to help locate and explain clearly what 
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is deemed objectionable about it: namely, its violation of an ethics of memory; its 
sacrificing of the object of emotion for self-gratification; and, in children’s 
literature specifically, the attempt by the adult-author to unjustly impose their 
nostalgic vision on to the child-reader. However, once this has been demonstrated, 
I will go on to show that underpinning such a denunciation is a highly traditional 
and detached epistemology which, whilst raising interesting and pressing concerns, 
is apt to overlook other implications relevant to epistemic life and education. 
Approaching the issue using a childlike virtue epistemology allows for a much more 
open approach to the role such phenomena can play in our lives and in constructing 
experiences of being-with-worth. 
 
*** 
 
Johannes Hofer first used the term ‘nostalgia’ – an amalgamation of nostos (return 
to the native land) and algos (suffering/grief) – in his 1688 medical dissertation to 
label a disease which was befalling soldiers who had been away from their 
homeland for too long. Those stricken suffered an “afflicted imagination” (1934: p. 
381) and lost control of their reminiscing. They became haunted by their memories 
of home to the point of melancholia, listlessness, irritability, sleeplessness, heart 
palpitations, racism, zealous patriotism, and even fever and death (pp. 386-387). 
Hofer argued that this could be cured simply by allowing the soldier to return home 
(p. 382). Hofer’s nostalgia has more in common with our modern use of 
homesickness and has been medically classified as “vanished” (Anon, 1976: p. 
857). In contemporary usage, nostalgia has retained the characteristic of 
uncontrolled longing for return but has taken on a different conception of what one 
is trying to return to and refers to a bittersweet emotion and mind-set rather than a 
physical malady. The contemporary nostalgic subject no longer necessarily wishes 
to simply return to their physical homeland. Rather, they often yearn for a more 
psychologically complete sense of ‘home’: a state of existence, from their own past 
or taken to be symbolic of a historic period, which contains some characteristic they 
feel is not currently being fully expressed or is not accepted by the society they are 
in. In other words, they desire to live in a time and place where a version of 
themselves they see as more complete or happy exists. As such, the bitter side of 
nostalgia is captured by the realisation of the impossibility of achieving such a 
101 
 
version of existence, whether this be because an exact past cannot be recreated or 
because what one longs for is an image that has been shaped into an unobtainable 
ideal that never truly existed and is unlikely to ever exist.  
 
The nostalgic subject’s tendency to idealise has been noted from as early as 1821 
when Dominique Jean Larrey, a French military surgeon, noted how the nostalgic 
patients he studied underwent an “exaggeration of the imaginative faculty” and 
thought of their homes as “delightful and enchanting, no matter how rude and 
poverty-stricken they may be” (cited Rosen 1975: p. 348). Since then, the issue of 
idealising what we wish to return to has been a staple of nostalgia. The nostalgic 
subject is regularly depicted as one who spends their time wistfully sighing over a 
lost past which often never quite existed in the form they are envisioning. However, 
whilst we may externally note this about the nostalgic person, they do not usually 
fully recognise that the ideal never existed, for that would be to negate it. Instead, 
their experience of the bitterness of nostalgia is regularly based upon the alternative 
realisation that the past is gone and unrecoverable, or they blame the world for being 
too corrupt or changed to be able to contain their ideal. The nostalgic subject can 
thus, if they are not careful, suspend themselves in longing and fail to recognise the 
present in any meaningful way as they oscillate between the pleasurable image of 
an idealised past and mourning the fact that the present will never contain it. They 
may take the first steps towards freedom from this oscillation by recognising the 
idealised nature or non-existence of that which they are nostalgic about, but this is 
often not something they are willing to do due to the pleasure the ideal is bringing 
about. 
 
The idealising tendency of the nostalgic subject gives rise to some of nostalgia’s 
negative connotations as it is that idealisation which allows the subject’s longing to 
often be defined as “sentimental” (Wildschut et al. 2006: p. 976). We can be 
sentimental in many ways, but these always involve the selfish creation and 
propagation of a falsity. For example, we describe someone as sentimental when 
they become too emotional too easily and display a level of emotion well beyond 
what we would reasonably expect a situation to induce (Richards, 1960). We call 
them sentimental, as opposed to merely over-sensitive, when they indulge in this 
emotion for the sake of enjoyment (Campbell, 1987) or try to project “a gratifying 
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image of the self” via that emotion (Savile 1995: p. 224). The sentimentalist is either 
trying to present an idealised version of themselves through this emotion (that they 
are the kind of person who can respond deeply and emotionally to certain stimuli) 
or is responding to a simplified, exaggerated, or idealised version of the events that 
are in front of them. In either case, they are expressing what they want to be real 
and who they want to be, and they display the emotions that accompany such a 
reality rather than responding to what is the case. This suggests the sentimentalist 
is limited in some way; they need to replace the real with the ideal as there is often 
something within the real that is too frightening or distressing to approach. This 
may be some deeply traumatic event or it may simply be that they are not the person 
they wish to be. Reality needs to be softened for the sentimentalist. 
 
We thus label as sentimental a work that panders to the softening of reality by using 
rhetorical and artistic devices to create either an idealised vision that ignores many 
aspects of reality for the sake of inducing emotion or an emotional response 
disproportionate to the object it is depicting. Such works encourage people to 
“acquire oversimplified beliefs and act on these oversimplifications” (Newman 
1995: p. 232). Even those who are aware enough to recognise the manipulation 
afoot may still feel the emotion or act because of it, but they also feel as though 
they have been controlled or flattered; they cannot become emotional or act in this 
situation “without also believing [they] have done something wrong” (Butler 2004: 
p. 38). As such, the sentimental work and audience “achieve a kind of gratification 
by false-colouring” (Savile 1995: p. 225) whilst creating an unjustified base for 
belief or action.  
 
It is the false and unjustified idealisations of the object of the emotion or oneself, 
which are then used for the sake of self-gratification, that make sentimental 
emotions such as nostalgia “essentially defective” (Savile 1995: p. 223). In such 
emotions, the emotional reaction, an idealised version of the object, or a deceiving 
version of oneself takes precedence rather than the attempt to respond in a way that 
accurately reflects the nature of the object and subject as they are. The real object 
and a reasonable emotional response are therefore betrayed for other ends. It is this 
betrayal that is arguably an immoral, or at least irresponsible, act, and this betrayal 
is found in the sentimental idealisations that apparently lie at the heart of nostalgia. 
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Additionally, nostalgia can be viewed as immoral if we presuppose an “ethics of 
memory” (Walder 2005: p. 423). In other words, when engaging in sentimental or 
nostalgic recollection we are flouting an inherent responsibility to try and remember 
correctly or to do justice to the reality of past occurrences. It seems intuitively 
plausible that we can at least start to build such an ethic. Walder (2005) argues that 
we could not have social practices such as promising without this type of ethical 
system. If no one was under any obligation to remember the truth, then how could 
we trust a promise or why would we believe anyone’s testimony on past events? In 
everyday communication and processes we simply take it for granted that people 
will try to remember past events correctly, and it appears that it is necessary for 
people to do so for a functioning society. It also intuitively feels like we owe at least 
some memories a certain degree of respect. For example, the narrator of Milan 
Kundera’s The Unbearable Lightness of Being (1984) somewhat bitterly talks about 
the sensation of being touched by some of Hitler’s portraits: “they reminded me of 
my childhood. I grew up during the war; several members of my family perished in 
Hitler's concentration camps; but what were their deaths compared with the 
memories of a lost period in my life, a period that would never return?” (p. 4). If 
we negate such monumental historical or personal memories for our own selfish 
and sentimental gratification, it seems that we detract from the dignity of those who 
lived that memory. We intuitively owe it to those who suffered in the Holocaust, 
for example, to remember their suffering correctly, or else we appear to disrespect 
them, their memory, and the event. 
 
However, maintaining that accurate memory is necessary for society, owed to 
certain situations and people for the sake of their dignity, or that nostalgia’s 
sentimentality is inherently deceptive and indulgent, does not necessarily nullify 
those situations where we sit alone to nostalgically reminisce about a single, 
seemingly banal memory. These situations do not affect those around us or do an 
injustice to some great historical memory; in these situations it does not appear as 
if we owe anyone anything. Indeed, the ‘sweet’ side of nostalgia and the often 
enjoyably indulgent nature of sentimentality bring with them many positives. Much 
psychological research suggests that nostalgic recollection and memories can be 
used as a type of terror management. They provide a “reservoir of meaningful life 
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experiences to draw upon” (Routledge et al., 2008: p. 132), an “enhancement of the 
self, support of the cultural world view, and a bolstering of relational bonds” 
(Sedikides, Wildschut & Baden, 2004: p. 206) that act as defences against 
existential worries concerning mortality and meaning in life. Nostalgic memories 
and objects also create anchors that allow us to maintain and foster a sense of 
continuing identity in the face of changes such as moving, re-locating, married life, 
and growing up (Holak and Havlena, 1992; Sedikides et al., p. 2008). Nostalgia 
helps you feel better about yourself (Arndt et al., p. 2012), results in a “heightened 
energy for living” and an “increase [in] subjective vitality” (Routledge et al., 2011: 
p. 645), and allows you to become less self-serving and defensively aggressive 
when your life’s meaning is threatened (Routledge et al., 2011). Nostalgia 
additionally makes you more likely to be empathetic and charitable (Zhou et al., 
2011), and it can even increase your resistance to cold temperatures as it creates a 
feeling of physical warmth (Zhou et al., 2012).  
 
The accusation of softening reality is therefore challenged by potential 
psychological benefits. Ira Newman takes Little Nell’s deathbed scene in Dickens’ 
The Old Curiosity Shop (one of the most oft-attacked scenes of sentimentality in 
literature) and argues that the apparently mawkish description is an attempt to 
shroud a painful memory in a “melancholy pleasure” which allows for an ability to 
make “oneself vulnerable to the pain of memory, rather than injuring oneself by 
refusing to dwell on it” (Newman, 1995: p. 238). If we cannot face the reality of a 
memory, why, Newman asks, should we not clothe it in nostalgia in order to find a 
release from it? Indeed, Coveney (1967) argues that this is precisely what many of 
the authors of the Victorian Golden Age were doing when they clung to nostalgia 
even as they problematised the parameters of the Romantic child. They, like 
everyone experiencing nostalgia, were trying to relieve the tension which existed 
between their understanding of what gave life meaning and what they felt was being 
imposed by society upon them: in their case, a scientific, rational, empirical, 
industrialised understanding of a demystified world. 
 
Newman initially claimed in his essay that he would challenge the notion that being 
sentimental was to be false to the world. However, he ultimately argues for a much 
weaker position; “there is more to sentimentality than personal insincerity, 
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hypocrisy, or fantasising” (1995: p. 236). Arguing that there is more to 
sentimentality is not akin to arguing that there is no falsehood involved at all. As 
such, Newman’s argument, and the psychological attempts to validate nostalgia 
purely by showing the positives involved in such a self-deception, may well leave 
the sceptic unremitting. Living a lie, reaping some psychological benefit from it, 
and acting in accordance with it may get you so far, but eventually the lie, like most 
lies, will have to be exposed and faced. These benefits are created and maintained 
only at the expense of continuing to live the lie. For all the immediate ‘plastering’ 
these examples may do in terms of self-identity, terror management, and 
bereavement they can never heal the impossibility of return, bring about the 
existence of the ideal, or fully remove our existential worries. They simply avoid 
facing them. Hints that this is the case are already apparent in the scientific literature 
cited above. For example, Wildschut et al. (2006) found that nostalgia can only 
fight depression when the individual already had relatively high self-esteem, thus it 
only worked “for persons who are inclined to repress rather than acknowledge 
negative affect” (p. 983). Sedikides et al. (2008) also speculated that nostalgic 
recollection made the present seem bleaker to those whose happiness was already 
low; the deception was having a negative effect that the truth would not. Ultimately, 
the terror-management of nostalgia and sentimentality are acting only as a “buffer” 
against these negative thoughts (Routledge et al., 2008: p. 137), and, just as when 
we lie, the deception will often come back to haunt us if it is not fully exorcised. 
We owe the memory, whether for an inherent moral reason seen above or our own 
psychological health, an accurate representation and the control to not indulge in an 
idealised lie for too long. 
 
With regards to children’s literature, authors or readers engaging with the nostalgic 
or sentimental depiction of the child, can easily fall into the undulation between the 
bitter and sweet sensations of nostalgia and the deceptive idealisation of 
sentimentality as they neglect the fact that childhood often was and is far from 
perfect, innocent, and carefree. They arguably do so in order to gratify themselves 
by maintaining that such an ideal existed in their personal past and shaped who they 
are, or that it was part of a historical past and can be used to reveal faults in 
contemporary society. In relation to the latter tendency, Fred Inglis asks what 
exactly is wrong with presenting nostalgic joy as “a way of berating the present for 
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not having lived up to the intense purity of longing and the unrealisable aspirations 
which childhood set as a standard for the adult world?” (1981: p. 131). The answer 
apparently lies, as we have seen, in the fact that such idealisations are unrealisable 
and impossible, and by indulging in them we all too often permit the reality of 
childhood to slip away when writing children’s literature. Of course, that this 
nostalgia exists has not gone unnoticed, as the last chapter’s analysis should show, 
as well as the fact that many authors have been derided “for producing escapist 
literature that failed to engage with the complexities of contemporary life and 
promoted a static, highly idealised picture of childhood” (Gubar, 2009: p. vii). 
However, despite this critique the nostalgic impulse arguably still prevails and 
critics such as Maria Nikolajeva (2005), Perry Nodelman (1992), and Nodelman 
and Reimer (2003) maintain that children’s literature continues to largely reflects 
an adult’s nostalgic visions of childhood and so tells the child what constitutes their 
childhood or how it should be, rather than reflecting or exploring how it actually is. 
There is a real worry for these critics that adults have or will colonise childhood by 
persuading children of this image, when, in fact, they are just being made to be what 
adults need them to be. This is a charge clearly aimed at the Romantic and innocent 
conception of the child which arguably still exists today, but could be levelled at 
any author who depicts children in a way that is meant to guide children to conform 
to a nostalgic image which the author remembers and needs. Indeed, in these 
idealisations and forms of nostalgia the author rarely even has a moral reason for 
imposing this image upon the child and thus is seen as completely unjustified in 
their colonisation; they are simply using the nostalgic image for their own 
gratification, regardless of the consequences this has upon the child reader. 
 
*** 
 
Before turning in earnest to understanding how the childlike, virtuous agent might 
interact with nostalgia, I want to address whether my own understanding of the 
childlike is nostalgic. Is my account tinged with the same issues that are highlighted 
above? By appealing to an image so rooted in a whirlwind of Victorian 
sentimentality, have I become caught in it and am I not too ‘colonising’ childhood 
by painting an idealised image of what it is and who the child should be? 
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Firstly, childlike characteristics are not depicted as a necessary part of childhood or 
a child’s life. Virtues such as a capacity for wonder and playfulness may present 
themselves as regular features in children and childhood, and consequently are apt 
to be depicted in child figures, but there is no claim to them defining childhood, nor 
are they necessary or sufficient criteria of being a child. Similarly, the adultlike 
depiction it is juxtaposed against is not considered to be a descriptive definition of 
adulthood. Childlike and adultlike qualities appear in characters from opposite ends 
of the age spectrum. Unlike with the romanticised child, those who depict the 
childlike are not saying this is what childhood is or even that it necessarily clarifies 
its essence.  
 
Secondly, as the childlike image is presenting a set of characteristics and 
dispositions rather than a complete and defined picture of what the child is, it also 
falls short of being an idealised and impossible image. These characteristics do 
exist. We can have a wondrous, humble, and playful epistemological disposition. 
However, the proponents of the childlike need not say that the childlike figure exists 
in separation from any contravening vices, such as childish naïveté. They are only 
maintaining that these are some of the epistemological virtues of one with a 
childlike character. The childlike characteristics are not presenting themselves as 
the ideal either. The ideal would be the combination of them with other virtues not 
fully explored in this thesis, although gestured at below. This ideal balance, 
however, is not the object of any nostalgic reflection we may encounter in relation 
to the childlike. Ultimately, although critics and authors may drift into talking about 
the epistemological wonder and humility at the heart of the childlike quite 
romantically, they are still real and achievable qualities that do not attempt to be the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for any idealised image. 
 
Thirdly, because childlike characteristics do exist and can be returned to after they 
are lost, the impossibility of return is negated and the overwhelming sense of loss 
that pushes us to create and propagate an ideal, rather than face reality, is shunned. 
As such, the childlike state exists, can be returned to, and is not an ideal and is, 
therefore, not a nostalgic one.  
 
*** 
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Nostalgia is a powerful emotion and, as was demonstrated above, clearly has 
positive aspects. Indeed, given that I have constructed a virtue account based upon 
experiences of life’s worth via an existence full of potential and agency, nostalgia 
should have the capability to be a virtue in itself if it can, as the above research 
claimed, create a heightened energy for living and investing one’s identity with 
something meaningful. However, the criticism that any use of nostalgic emotion is 
defective insofar as it is founded on, at least, a pseudo-fiction and involves a 
confusing amalgamation of reality and fantasy is a pressing one. Such a basis for 
one’s actions and sense of worth appears to be unstable and constantly near 
collapse, and, even on a lived account, it seems like seeking experiences of worth 
in nostalgia is reckless. 
 
The feeling of epistemic guilt at the above process, however, is built upon a leftover 
adherence to the notion that our epistemic lives should be built upon eternal and 
immutable truths. As my thesis is developing on a weak, radical basis I cannot deny 
that if one’s life-goal and philosophical pursuit is objective and verifiable truth, and 
one believes actions should be grounded upon this, then I cannot deny the problems 
with nostalgia. However, closing oneself off to the nostalgic experience for fear of 
its deceptive capabilities is precisely the narrow-minded, disembodied problem of 
traditional epistemology as laid out in the first chapter. A childlike capacity for 
humility and openness to novel routes of experiential and lived knowledge 
necessitates looking further and harder at an area dismissed because of its central 
fantasy. What happens if we put aside judgement of that fantasy and take a more 
careful look at nostalgia’s potential benefits? In doing so we can see how nostalgia 
can help us create worth through what it allows us to see in ourselves and the world. 
We only lose this worth if we become lost in nostalgia or surrender to its 
frustrations, rather than by merely engaging with it and its results at all. 
 
When it comes to a lived experience of epistemic concepts, what we know and 
believe, and the potency and justification for these states, are experienced in flux. 
What I feel to be resisting doubt one day may, through lack of use or importance, 
sink into only being-without-doubt the next. Rather than being something I would 
be willing and able to passionately defend, it is now simply part of my every day 
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experiences, my being. I may not even notice this has happened, but when I call it 
back to mind expecting a surge of being-which-resists-doubt I find only the memory 
of it resisting doubt and no understanding or feeling of why or how it was so. I may 
continue to experience it as being-without-doubt, but if the reason for calling it to 
mind is because the knowledge has been challenged I may well find that it quickly 
crumbles past being-without-doubt into being-with-doubt. Take, for example, my 
childhood knowledge that turning my friends into the teacher when asked about 
wrongdoings (‘telling on them’) was to be avoided in all cases. I vividly remember 
holding this as true beyond doubt at one point in my life, even if cannot remember 
and can only guess as to why. However, this knowledge was not tested for a long 
time and even though I may have repeated the proposition in discussions or social 
situations, looking back I can identify that the experience of ‘telling’ being 
categorically wrong was leaking potency for, one day, it was tested and failed. I 
was summoned to the headmaster’s office to discuss the matter of why the entire 
year 6 class was covered in mud after they had been banned from going on the field 
while it was wet. I called upon my knowledge to give me the strength not to ‘tell’ 
but as I dug it out I found it was not attached to anything. There was nothing 
concrete, no resolute image, experience, feeling or argument grounding it. Under 
pressure, the knowledge was doubted and then gone. In this sense, I do not come to 
know something or experience it as known only to have it ‘banked’ as knowledge 
for the rest of my life. “Ever the thing known sinks into insignificance.” 
(MacDonald,1895: p. 5) Similarly, I do not always experience a justification as in 
fact justifying, and my beliefs can fade or change undetected.  
 
Yet certain images and experiences have found at least a partial defence against this 
state of epistemic flux by clothing themselves in nostalgia and burying themselves 
deep in one’s memories and identity. States of being-without- and being-which-
resist-doubt that are founded upon nostalgic memories are reached for and 
discovered to still be potent, even if any articulable link to reasoning has 
disappeared. Even a state of being-without-worth can be turned around by a 
nostalgic link to a previous, even if artificially polished, memory of being-with-
worth. As such, when attached to the virtues, nostalgia becomes a powerful force 
for allowing one’s virtuous existence to continue. For example, as has been 
discussed, a capacity for wonder is considered a virtue on my account as wonder 
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transforms the world around us into one that buzzes with excitement and 
potentiality. It enacts what Fred Inglis calls “a re-enchantment of the universe” 
(1981: p. 61). Nostalgia can help cultivate a life-long sense of wonder by anchoring 
us back to those objects which caused wonderous experiences in the first place and 
allowing them to retain, if not their own capability to elicit wonder, then the 
capability to remind us to open ourselves up to wonder. The object and experience 
of wonder, by becoming an object and experience of nostalgia, thus helps keep alive 
the capacity for further wonder as it grants some access to the experience itself. 
When I experience nostalgia in relation to, for instance, the mountains of the Lake 
District part of that experience is my memory of my childhood state of wonder at 
their might and magnificence and their potential for adventure. Then wonder 
became wondering and I began to learn about them. I grew accustomed to them and 
I explored them and similar features of the world. As such, I can no longer feel 
wonder at those mountains in the same way. Nostalgically recollecting my previous 
relationship to them, however, reminds me that wonder is a state that is valuable 
and worthwhile and that I should not just be lost in the nostalgia of mountains but 
should look to cultivate my capability for wondering at other objects. 
 
Those texts in the previous chapter which not only promote but attempt to instil 
wonder are, when successful, able to tap into this potency and create a moment 
worthy of nostalgic recollection. Just as the scene of reading Alice’s Adventures 
Underground to Alice and her siblings is stored for Carroll in his recollection with 
a vivacity denied to many other memories, so he may well hope that he can use the 
story and its playful nonsense to create a wondrous experience which might gain 
the same status for his listeners and readers. The bestowed story and reading 
experience are arguably intended to “lay where Childhood’s dreams are twined/In 
Memory’s mystic band” (Caroll, 1965: p. 14). Of course, these writers were not 
guaranteed to create wondrous moments, and, even if they did, there was no 
certainty of these moments becoming nostalgic, but they attempt to achieve this by 
appealing to what they know about themselves, their society and children. They 
attempt to place images that capture the wonder, play, creative agency, and other 
virtuous experiences, into the time-proofed fold of the nostalgia so that they might 
be awoken in adult life to remind them of those childlike emotions and situations. 
And they do so “though the envious years would say forget” (Caroll, 1965: p. 128). 
111 
 
 
Peter Hollindale (1974) issues a legitimate warning of romanticising the reading 
process and notes that we may not all be as profoundly affected by texts as many 
children’s literature authors and critics present themselves as being; we may not all 
describe our lives as being entirely changed by childhood textual experiences, for 
example. However, whether it comes through texts or not, a great many of us can 
recognise a childhood blaze of intensity and enthusiasm towards a particular object, 
person, or activity that then transforms into the warming glow of nostalgic memory 
in adulthood. Whether tied to texts, landscapes, relationships, toys or whatever else, 
these moments stay with us and “lie at the very brim of consciousness, ready at the 
right touch […] to be released into the rapid, electric currents of my present thought 
at any time” (Inglis, 1981: p. 62). Thus, these stories, images and experiences retain 
the ability to revivify the world and the potential to bring about a sense of worth 
once again where it has been lost or reduced to simply being-with-sensation-and-
emotion. Ewing’s ‘Christmas Crackers’, as discussed last chapter, reflects this 
excellently in the experience of the characters and the sense that, armed with 
artefacts from their experience, they will remember there night of troubled safety 
for a long time to come. 
 
There are potential issues with this model. Despite nostalgia’s potency and ability 
to shield virtuous experiences for future use, it is not a virtuous emotion itself. As 
such, one might wonder whether it is susceptible to both deliberate and accidental 
vicious use. For example, the advertising industry has a long history of using 
nostalgia to sell products by capitalising on contemporary issues that threaten an 
individual’s feeling of identity or security (Unger et al, 1991; Holak and Haylena, 
1998; Wildschut et al, 2006) and by appealing to, particularly, moments of cultural 
history which invoke collective nostalgia (Baker and Kennedy, 1994). These need 
not be worthwhile or life affirming experiences, they are simply experiences that 
have been commodified and attached to one product or another regardless of their 
potential to enhance one’s life. Nostalgia might also shield destructive aspects of 
one’s life from scrutiny. The trappings of an unhealthy or abusive relationship may 
well be removed from view when reflecting on and wistfully wishing for positive 
aspects of that relationship, even to the point that nostalgia paves the way for 
unadvisedly re-entering it. 
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Even in these negative scenarios, however, there is something to be said in defence 
of nostalgia. Firstly, other studies demonstrated that it is not as open to manipulation 
as one might think. They have not only pointed to the creative difficulties of 
successfully capturing nostalgia in advertising campaigns but have also indicated 
that nostalgic advertising cannot be built upon complete fabrication. There must be 
something genuinely positive to reflect upon from the past. For example, nostalgic 
cleaning adverts are highly unsuccessful as cleaning simply was harder in the past 
(Unger et al., 1991). What is more, although nostalgia can increase positive 
response to a brand, because of the ‘bitter’ element of loss in nostalgia it can also 
lead to a decrease in brand awareness (Muehling and Sprott, 2004) and can even 
cause an increase in levels of self-reflection when the viewer personally rather than 
culturally identifies with the nostalgia (Muehling and Pascal, 2012). Nostalgia, 
despite its potential for fantasy, is thus resistant to complete lies and, when entered 
into by the epistemically virtuous person, can be conducive to moments of clarity 
as to one’s own life and identity. In addition to this, succumbing to the issues of 
nostalgia due to one’s current state of mind and needs is an experience which can 
be reflected on and analysed but which is a difficulty faced by any would-be virtue. 
We saw this in the Christmas space of the last chapter via the figure of MacGreedy’s 
mother in ‘Christmas Crackers’. As such, this is not an issue for nostalgia itself, and 
it should not be cast aside because of it, but is one for any virtue theory to explain 
more broadly: how can one overcome the difficulties inherent in such emotions as 
nostalgia in order to reap the rewards? The answer is, in many ways, highly 
Aristotelian: search for and embrace all the virtues at once to allow them to give 
guidance and support to one another through trickier waters, identify one’s virtuous 
friends so that they might hold one accountable for one’s behaviour in recognition 
of your mutual search for being-with-worth, and accept that practical wisdom in 
these matters may not be arrived at through sheer reasoning but must involve 
experience and testimony from others. 
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The Epistemic Value of Literature 
 
The above analysis of the emotion of nostalgia has demonstrated that an 
experiential and lived epistemology aimed at experiences of being-with-worth 
does not deny the traditional epistemic project its claims and concerns – such 
as scepticism concerning emotions founded upon a potential fantasy – but it 
does indicate that epistemic activity so conceived is apt to overlook or down-
play positive elements of such experiences through fear of losing touch with 
the search for objective truth. What I attempted to indicate was that assenting 
to the account provided in the first chapter of this thesis concerning the 
possibility of an alternative conception of what is valuable in epistemic life, 
alongside the childlike virtues and potential others, allows a much more 
nuanced interaction with emotions such as nostalgia to the potential benefit of 
our experience of existence. What I will do now is provide a similar overview 
and deconstruction of another issue, one that is even closer to the heart of my 
own epistemic life: the epistemic value of literature. This seems fitting given 
that it was literary examples and a study of literature which provided this thesis 
with its understanding of the virtues and, as was suggested in the introduction, 
it was experiencing the collapse of a perceived binary between epistemology 
and literature that stimulated the current shape of this thesis. 
 
One could be forgiven for reading the analytically-inclined philosophy of 
literature as an area of study hostile to the claim that literature has epistemic 
value. For every attempt to explain literature’s ability to offer a “special insight 
that cannot be put into words” (John, 2001: p. 329) or “emotional renditions of 
subjective human experience” (Swirski, 2007: p. 9), there is a denunciation of 
the attempt to derive knowledge from literature as either a mystical or 
misplaced endeavour which offers little more than “slight, obvious realities” 
(Stolnitz, 2004: p. 322) and “generalities about human nature of a numbingly 
banal kind” (Lamarque, 2006: p. 129). Even in what should be the most obvious 
case of knowledge transmission via literature, non-fiction, there are those who 
remain sceptical and claim that for all its promises to lead us to a justified 
belief, this is trumped by its aesthetic status and the invitation to believe is not 
one we can simply accept (Matravers, 2016). Of course, the field of 
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epistemology has its sceptics and its debates about, for example, the 
knowledge-providing potential of testimony, but the lay of the land in the 
philosophy of literature feels different. If one reads through collections of 
essays like John and Lopes’ Philosophy of Literature: Contemporary and 
Classic Readings (2004) or my own and Selleri’s Literary Studies and the 
Philosophy of Literature (2016), one cannot help but feel that the default 
position taken up by pro-epistemic-value proponents over the past 30 years is 
a nervous and defensive one, perhaps taken ever since Plato infamously 
condemned poets and their craft in Republic, and that scholars from literary 
studies often cast a sceptical or even condescending eye on the technicality of 
the attempts to prove literature’s epistemic worth. These inquiries kill their 
object in their attempt to defend it from an accusation that they perceive as 
holding no weight. One need only read a speech-act theory account of fiction 
making, such as Garcia-Carpintero’s (2013; 2016), to get a sense of how 
sublimely detailed and compelling but also how detached from the form and 
essence of its source material such analyses can become. It is no wonder that 
literary academics like Catherine Belsey (2016) maintain such scepticism over 
whether their discipline and the philosophy of literature really have anything 
to say to each other about the epistemic import of their mutual object of study. 
 
The situation is perhaps not quite as dire as the above depiction suggests, and 
ultimately almost all of the academic writing in these fields is highly 
sympathetic to literature. Scholars commonly take interacting with literature to 
be a good and undeniably life-enhancing experience. They also accept that we 
are affected and changed by literature in interesting and profound ways, and 
there is a lot of positive movement in the field concerning literature’s ability to 
develop our cognitive capabilities. It is undoubtedly the case that reading 
literature improves our literacy if for no other reason than practise makes 
perfect. Yet, like most skills, literacy still requires a certain type of interaction 
and guidance to become proficient rather than merely able and so, the sceptical 
argument might go, literature is not teaching us the skill, it is the training 
ground for it. The same goes for those who would claim that literature makes 
us better people on either a moral or spiritual level. The requirement that one 
reads in a deep or spiritual fashion, for example, implies a practice beyond the 
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immediate text. Additionally, there is a further challenge here, infamously laid 
down by Greg Currie (2013), to provide hard, empirical evidence that literature 
does indeed bring about the changes its proponents claim it does rather than 
simply assenting to the ‘common sense’ view or shared intuition. As such, for 
all of the positives underlying and emerging from the field concerning the 
cognitive value of literature, literature – as an object and as a practice – still 
does not stand in good stead amongst those embarking on “epistemology 
proper”. This can be understood in more detail when we look to Lamarque’s 
understanding of literature’s opacity and the literary “game”. 
 
In his book The Opacity of Narrative (2014), which draws together many of 
his previous philosophical works on literature, Peter Lamarque defines a game 
as a series of rules and accepted practices which allow for the performance of 
an activity to fall under an umbrella term. Lamarque, like MacIntyre in chapter 
one, turns to the example of chess to help explain his understanding of games, 
rules and practices. A person can only be considered as playing chess if they 
are following the rules and practices conventionally understood to be part of 
chess. If they begin to break those rules by, say, moving their knight four 
squares forward, they have ceased to play chess and must take the move back 
or accept sanctions in order to re-enter the game. Rules can, of course, be 
broken while allowing one still to be playing the “game” if, for example, 
breaking the rules is considered a standard practice. Take the game of water 
polo. Due to most of the player’s body being submerged and out of sight of the 
referee, it is considered standard practice to kick, pinch, pull, and so on, even 
if these things are against the rules. You may get caught, you may not, but you 
are still playing water polo as these activities are deemed to be part of the 
practice even if they are outside the rules.  
 
Literature, as a game, may have very few (if any) clear rules, as chess and water 
polo do, but, according to Lamarque, it is still an activity-based practice. 
Indeed, it is necessary to consider it as such because it does not have many 
rules. Without communally accepted dictates as to what literature should look 
like and what constitutes a literary object there is a corresponding lack of 
attributes that could bind literary objects together. However, there is still a 
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community of practitioners who can determine when one is or is not at least 
attempting to ‘do’ literature and play the literary game. Lamarque argues that 
a key part of this is found in literature’s “opacity”, namely, the essential 
connection that the form of a literary work has to its content and that quality of 
literature that necessitates that one looks at the work rather than through it onto 
the world. Authors, he continues, write in a way that capitalises on this 
connection and create works which draw attention to their own opacity and to 
how the form should be shaping the content and imaginative response of the 
reader. In addition, readers are drawn to literature because of its opacity and 
enjoy gazing at it – like any other work of art – and feeling how their 
imagination is being directed in its activity by the form of the work.  
 
Literature’s definitional opacity stands in stark contrast to philosophical 
epistemology however, which on Lamarque’s account has the search for truth 
as its key criterion of an epistemically responsible activity. Where literature 
deliberately creates opacity, philosophy has developed a transparent form to 
help it achieve its goal. It searches for “the standard kind of truth with a time-
honoured connection to knowledge”, namely, “to say of what is that it is, and 
to say of what is not that it is not” (2014: p. 127). Literature may have its own 
kinds of “poetic truth” such as ‘ringing true’, sincerity, clarity, being true to 
oneself, being true to human nature, and so on. However, none of these are part 
of the same search as philosophical, historical or scientific paradigms, and any 
claims to truth that they have are hollow because of literature’s opacity. The 
very thing a work of literature is meant to do, be opaque, causes it to be “a poor 
relation in the battle for ideas […] [it] cannot compete for the high-ground of 
truth to which human cognition aspires.” (p. 127)  
 
What Lamarque is expressing here is something which many philosophers of 
literature have struggled with and, as alluded to, many literary theorists have 
shunned philosophers for not doing; in whatever account is being given of the 
value of literature the “literary constraint” must be satisfied. In essence, a 
satisfactory account of the epistemic value of literature must identify such 
value not via the translation or reading of literature in some other form – most 
commonly, by rendering the work into clear propositions or reading the text as 
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an extended, philosophical thought experiment – but in the literary features of 
the text and in what makes literature different from other forms of human 
creation and expression. However, if the very “game” of literature is one which 
involves opaque techniques which necessarily disassociate it from a 
philosophical search for truth, knowledge, justified belief, and so on, then any 
account is doomed to failure. The experiences I expressed in my introduction 
are seemingly mapped onto this; literature broke the rules of philosophy by 
deliberately placing pictures in the glass, and philosophy did not do justice to 
literature as it strove to look through it rather than at it. 
 
As with nostalgia, there appears to be an underlying issue of compatibility due 
to the conception of philosophical epistemology prioritizing the demand to 
chase objective truth, allowing a constant war to be fought with literature’s 
ability, if not implicit promise, to deceive, and imaginative literature’s explicit 
attempt to create non-existent entities and realms. When considering truth, 
certainty and knowledge – particularly of the propositional kind – literature 
simply undermines itself due to what are understood to be the paradigmatic 
literary and philosophical “games”. In other words, what defines literary and 
philosophical epistemology as activities renders them incompatible. There are 
a lot of issues that could be tackled here but I want to appeal to the work laid 
out in the previous chapters to make two points about literature, epistemology 
and this divide. Firstly, whether a reader achieves truth, knowledge, 
understanding, justified belief, or another ideal of a traditional epistemological 
goal (whether traditionally defined or not) has been shown to be a central 
practice, and not just a side issue, for at least one practice of literature – 
children’s literature. Secondly, the opacity of literature does not place literature 
on ‘low-ground’ when it comes to epistemic activity but, when taking into 
account a lived conception of epistemology, places it on at least an equal 
footing with traditional philosophy. 
 
*** 
 
John Gibson directly asks: “what aspect of literary works do we point toward 
that justifies treating them as players in the pursuit of knowledge? What do we 
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find in works of literature that even entitles us to think that they wish to be read 
for knowledge?” (2009: p. 467) The answer, given what I have discussed in 
chapter two, is that the literature and at least some of its communities of 
practice said and demonstrated that they cared, and this is of the utmost 
importance. For, as Lamarque’s analysis gestures towards, literature doesn’t 
care about anything, authors and readers care and they, ultimately, determine 
what the practice and activity of literature is about. 
 
As was demonstrated in the last chapter, overt moralising and teaching was not 
uncommon leading up to and even during the Golden Age of children’s 
literature. The fact that there was such an interest in conveying morals and 
information should, by itself, be enough to indicate that not only did a large 
portion of the literary community at the time consider themselves to be playing 
the game of literature whilst passing on truth, but that they would not consider 
their works a complete success – even as literature – unless this truth was 
passed on to at least the child reader. The enjoyment of the reader was growing 
in focus and importance, but the child believing the moral of the story was not 
a by-product of success, it was still necessary to it. For all the intended aesthetic 
pleasure and enjoyment in the world, the predominant sentiment remained, in 
words already cited, that “a story without a moral is like a nut without a kernel, 
not worth the cracking.” 
 
Even putting aside any overt and obvious moralising as being at odds with the 
literary game, there can be no doubt that the texts of chapter two had a focus 
on epistemological concepts and end goals, and this was embedded in the way 
the stories were told. Their authors and their readership – both child and 
mediating adult – cared about how children learned and what they learned. 
They were highly concerned as to whether children arrived at the truth of the 
matter after their literary experience. They depicted knowledge and knowing 
in very specific ways and they made it abundantly clear that there were certain 
ways of going about getting to truth that were better and more responsible than 
others. They wanted children to experience the text in such a way that they took 
something epistemologically valuable with them; they created their literary 
shadows for this exact purpose. They also wanted what the child took from it 
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to, like Scrooge’s Christmas’ experience, “haunt their houses pleasantly” 
(Dickens, 2003: p.44) and, as already stated, become bound up in “memory’s 
mystic band”. Even more than that, they desired to get them to a better state of 
being and to be living a more worthwhile life through the learning that their 
texts provided. The authors also had one eye on adults, hence the concept of 
the childlike. They also cared about how grown-ups interacted with knowledge 
and truth and how they justified their understanding of the world. They wanted 
to model for adults what to educate their children in and how to do it, and they 
modelled play, wonder and intellectual humility for the sake of learning, 
knowing and understanding, not just because they were part of enjoyable 
aesthetic experiences. 
 
Indeed, MacDonald did not just stop at depicting and inciting the childlike’s 
epistemic life, he also extended the childlike to the realm of reading. He says 
as much in ‘The Fantastic Imagination’ when he declares that he is writing for 
those who read “in a right-minded fashion” (MacDonald, 1976: p. 5) As one 
might expect by now, the ideal reader read to find something of epistemic value 
in literature. Rebecca Ankeny has constructed a clear and compelling theory of 
what it is to be this 'true reader' based mainly upon MacDonald's novel Mary 
Marston. She argues that the childlike reader (or, in her terms, the ‘true reader’) 
is one who reads the texts “so as to understand them appropriately and 
experience them fully, and who allows those texts to change the way he or she 
interacts with the world” (1996: p. 228). This ideal reader, according to 
Ankeny's reading, also displays an ability to have their own being revealed to 
themselves through literature and a drive to re-read in order to understand what 
they have experienced. The reader experiences being “under the enchantment 
of […] literary joy” but works to arrive at a stage where the work can “touch 
her heart” and “understand what she has heard” (p. 232). We may also look to 
how the narrator ends 'The Wise Woman' to see the kind of thing Ankeny has 
been discussing: “I could tell you a great deal more […] but I have already told 
more than is good for those who read but with their foreheads, and enough for 
those whom it has made look a little solemn, and sigh as they close the book.” 
(p. 303) This is not a sad solemn sigh, however, it is the solemn sigh of a reader 
who does not just “read with their forehead” and take the obvious, literal 
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interpretation of events (the kind likely to dismiss the book as just a fairy-tale), 
but the solemn sigh of one who recognises the lessons and thoughts that are 
worth pondering in the story and one who has allowed the events to affect them, 
to 'touch their heart', and to inspire them to work at understanding what they 
have heard. In contrast to the true/childlike reader Mary, the good reader 
Godfrey, although more intellectual, remains an inferior reader for he is not 
really open to new experiences, he only reads in order to confirm the theories 
he already has (Ankeny, 1996: p. 233) and “he does not listen with his heart, 
coming as a humble pupil” (p. 236). Once again, we see the ideal, childlike 
figure displaying the virtues of intellectual humility and open-mindedness in a 
way that others do not. This time, their humility has allowed them access to 
what is hidden from those who arrogantly dismiss stories as mere fairy tale, or 
those who cling to what they think they already know with a closed mind. 
 
Indeed, this care for learning, truth, knowledge, and so on, is perhaps more 
typical than the turn towards the aesthetic dimension of literature advocated by 
so many philosophers and literary theorists. To take Hirsch’s argument 
somewhat out of context, these texts were written as literature before there was 
a need to defend literature as a subject with its own special and appropriate 
methods. This modern defence of literature as a discipline is what has led to 
giving the word literature “a predominantly aesthetic flavour […] In order to 
narrow the word in this way, we were hurled into endless attempts to define 
literature to suit its special claims as a form of art” (2004: p. 50). Before this, 
the understanding of the literary “game” was much broader. Indeed, that there 
is something to be learned from literature, and expecting this to be part of the 
literary game, is something I have experienced anecdotal evidence for even 
today. As I have written elsewhere (Gaydon, 2015), I have now run versions of 
The Philosophy Foundation’s ‘What is a story?’ session (Worley, 2014: pp. 99-
104) when teaching philosophy to 8 to 11-year olds many times in diverse types 
of school around the country. To my great surprise, each time the children 
expressed the belief that a story needed a moral, message, or meaning. They 
intuitively decided that something was not really a story if it did not have one. 
Many of them surrendered this as a necessary criterion for a story as the session 
went on, but their desire for a story to have a meaning that did not originate 
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within them was retained. They are part of the literary community and they 
desire truth and meaning, and there are many authors ready and willing to give 
it to them and to do so opaquely. Much of the previous chapter could be used 
to demonstrate this, but I want to briefly return to Kingsley’s narrator in The 
Water Babies in relation to the philosophical question of testimony in order to 
demonstrate it once more. 
 
The narrator of The Water Babies is a wellspring of knowledge and advice 
throughout the text. He bestows upon the reader: nuggets of cultural 
knowledge, such as the fact that “brave boys” will agree that you cannot be 
swished over the face (p. 23); advice on the world and physical upkeep, like 
how three o’clock on a midsummer morning is the most pleasant of times and 
staying out all night will spoil the nerves (p. 9);  images for the reader to keep 
with them for future interactions, such as lawyers having teeth like sharks (p. 
23); an explanation of what to do and expect when one is exhausted with life 
and down-and-out (p. 32); the maxim that readers really should know their 
Bewick (p. 78); what phrases to learn and live by in the future, for example, 
‘Victrix causa diis placuit, sed victa puellis’ (p. 186);6 and a great deal more 
that the narrator thinks Tom ignorant of and that the reader really ought to know 
(p. 38). There is also an abundance of moral lessons; thirty-seven or thirty-nine 
apparently (p. 213). I will not search for all of them (if they all exist) but suffice 
it to say they are depicted as being of the utmost importance given that the 
reader is told they can only go “home” to the most beautiful and indescribable 
of places (p. 141) once they learn, understand, and believe certain things about 
goodness, morality, and the world. To take just one example, we are given an 
extensive instance of intellectual arrogance and fragility to help us see and 
understand that: “wise men know it is their business to examine what is, and 
not to settle what is not.” (p. 48)  
 
                                                          
6 “The victorious cause pleased the gods, but the vanquished cause pleased the girls.” An 
adjusted version of a famous line from Lucan’s Pharsalia which has been adopted as something 
of a motto by those who seek to lost causes stoically. The original line is: “The victorious cause 
pleased the gods, but the vanquished cause pleased Cato.” In The Water Babies, Kingsley leaves 
the phrase untranslated and its meaning is thus only accessible for one who is at the relevantly 
learned stage in life and capable of reflecting on it correctly. 
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However, all of this appears to simply be telling, in the same way that any 
person or non-literary document could simply recount facts. Where is the 
opacity? It is in the personality of the narrator. The voice of the narrator is 
undoubtedly an opaque feature given that it is the voice of the text; if anything, 
the voice of the narrator is the glass. Not only this, in The Water Babies, the 
voice draws attention to itself and to the fact that a story is being told and so 
creates a metafictional awareness of the status of the work as a deliberately 
constructed tale. 
 
By issuing propositions, such as the above, the author, via the narrator, is at 
least creating the possibility for both speaker and hearer testimony. Jennifer 
Lackey (2006) defines the former as a speaker testifying to a fact regardless of 
the needs of their potential audience, which, given that the author is only 
working with an implied audience at best, seems apt. Charles Kingsley may 
have presumed to know something about the spiritual need and educational 
lack of a potential audience when he penned the narrator’s words, but he could 
not be sure that any intended individual would ever read the book, he did not 
know what state a future audience would be in, and he could not be sure that 
his readership would treat a narrative voice as a legitimate source of such 
testimony, but this does not negate the fact that the author has potentially 
testified via the narrator. Hearer testimony, however, is where the hearer 
reasonably takes the speaker’s act of communication as conveying information 
in virtue of the act alone; it is not necessary that the speaker intended to convey 
the information. Given that the reader is working with a fictional narrator and 
an implied author this too seems apt. The reader only needs to believe that 
behind the text stands an author attempting to convey information via their 
communicative act: creating a fiction. The key question here appears to be, can 
a reader reasonably believe that a narrator has testified? Is it reasonable to think 
that the narrative act is one intended to convey information? Many accounts 
would have you think not, especially those in the long history initiated by Plato 
and most commonly attributed to Kendal Walton of counting fiction as mere 
make-believe, but the account provided in chapter two would suggest 
otherwise. Further, that there is a whole community of practice in children’s 
literature should give one pause to think that we may well be being told 
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something – what that something is might not be as clear as the propositions 
appear to be, but we are being told and, as with any telling, there is what 
Edward Hinchman (2005) calls an invitation to trust. Telling simply is an 
invitation to trust, and, when it comes to literature, this invitation can be 
accepted or denied based upon how certain qualities are embedded in the 
literature.  
 
The childlike reader does not deny or provide their trust outright – as a virtuous 
epistemic agent should not – but they are willing to treat the text as a mode of 
telling and look at the text in its opacity to try to determine what is  being told 
and what can be learned about the narrator in order to garner whether they will 
accept the invitation to trust and take on board their testimony. Kingsley’s text 
deliberately draws attention to all the difficulties inherent in telling and 
trusting, both in the real world and the text itself. Behind all of the gobbets of 
knowledge stands an interactive and vocal narrator who delivers an experience 
akin to the turbulence of life when it comes to others’ testimony. Indeed, I 
would go so far as to say that the whole text could be read as one long exercise 
in helping the reader (re)consider whom they should trust and what routes they 
should take to truth, but to do so playfully, humbly and with an open mind. 
 
The developing sense of trust in the narrator does not primarily come from the 
apparent affection found in him repeating “my dear little boy”, his sympathy 
with Tom’s terrible climb to Vendale, or his attempt to create a space which 
welcomes questions by modeling them. It comes primarily from the narrator’s 
personality, enthusiasm and vibrant nature, as discussed in the previous 
chapter. As I wrote, some critics take the voice of the narrator to be its 
weakness, whereas I read its high-energy, flawed humanity as endearing and 
trustworthy; it is this “voice of wonder and assurance” (Lerer, 2008: p. 176). 
Despite these qualities, the narrator remains chaotic and even paradoxical, and 
The Water Babies and its principle voice have been seen as severely fragmented 
in their presentation of facts and knowledge and, “like Mother Carey’s 
creations, Kingsley’s story is one that seems to be making itself up as it goes 
along.” (Alderson, 2013: p. xxxv) Indeed, Cunningham also believes that 
Kingsley recognizes this in himself in The Water Babies and “the finale’s 
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throwaway tone indicates that even Kingsley can’t muster much confidence in 
his own resolutions.” (1985: p. 145) For example, the zealousness with which 
the narrator seems to want to make a point about the wonder of nature causes 
them to over-reach spectacularly in some places and the playfulness in fact 
seems to make it worse by making it seem silly and just nonsense – even for a 
child. We could make similar points about the supposed “one true, orthodox, 
rational, philosophical, logical, irrefragable, nominalistic, realistic, inductive, 
deductive, seductive, productive, salutary, comfortable and on-all-accounts-to-
be-received doctrine [...] that your soul makes your body, just as a snail makes 
its shell” (Kingsley, 1994: p. 56), and the initial reasons for not throwing things 
at efts (p. 213). Indeed, Darton (1982) senses nothing but a patronizing tone in 
these kinds of lessons and their lack of reasoned argument. Even if we do not 
agree with this, how can we trust anything that comes from a narrator who 
proclaims solemn earnestness and truth to us one instant before pulling the rug 
from beneath us and telling us we are not to believe a word they say the next, 
no matter how human and endearing their voice is? 
 
Let us take the most obvious issue we may have with the narrator's reliability 
first: the fact that he ultimately maintains that he is not serious but is relating a 
fairy tale that is “all fun and pretense; and you are not to believe one word of 
it, even if it is true” (Kingsley, 1994: p. 51; 214). This can be set firmly in 
contrast with those times the narrator assures us that some of the stories we are 
being told are “quite true” (p. 63) or that they are speaking “in serious, solemn 
earnest” (p. 139). For example, the narrator tells us that the story given by the 
last gairfowl, “strange as it may seem, it is every word of it true” (p. 160). 
Interestingly, this combination of truth and fantasy is precisely what goes on in 
Kingsley’s telling of the story – we are being told an embellished story by a 
fantastical creature, but the story is not too far from the truth of the extinction 
of the gairfowl (or Great Auk). Indeed, Alfred Newton in his Dictionary of 
Birds “praises the happy exercise of poetic fancy with which Charles Kingsley 
was enabled to introduce the chief facts of the Gare-fowl’s extinction” (cited 
Alderson, 2013: p. 226). It is not easy to denounce either the claims to truth or 
the claims to being “all fun and pretense”. Are we thus left with an unreliable 
narrator and a text which we must, by default, shelve as educationally 
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worthless? No, and it is the reasons why not that are The Water Babies’ true 
educational message and that dulls the sharpness of the didacticism 
commentators have thus far found unpalatable in the text. 
 
This turbulence and paradox of thought in relation to the truth and testimony 
reflects the choices that the reader will at some point have to make in the world. 
Any search for truth in life is going to be based upon navigating the waters 
between truths, lies, and any number of combinations or interweaving of the 
two. Not only this but they are going to come from a variety of sources and at 
some point, if one is to begin believing in any deep sense, an evaluation will 
have to be made as to which sources to begin and continue with. The text 
appears to be telling, and demonstrating opaquely, to the reader that they will 
have to find their way out of the maze of testimony and experience as to what 
is true and false in the world. That muddle and the requirement that at some 
point they will have to draw their own conclusions and take responsibility for 
doing so, is something the narrator is attempting to leave the reader with. The 
narrator may well occasionally try to point out a lesson or moral to be found in 
a story or nature but they often retract their interference after they've given it 
with such claims to falsity as already seen or of the kind that everyone knows 
their own business best (p. 214). Indeed, even though the narrator may be a 
kind soul genuinely trying to impart something they believe to the reader, there 
are lessons that they recognize that we, like Tom, can only learn for ourselves 
“by sound and sharp experience, as many another foolish person has to do” (p. 
59). This foolishness is not too harsh a criticism, however, for, in being human, 
we all entertain it at times and its upshot, when done in moderation rather than 
as a rule, does seem to be a deeper understanding of certain things. Indeed, the 
reader is explicitly told in relation to why Tom could not recognize the water 
babies when he saw them that this is something "if you will read this nine times 
over, and then think for yourself, you will find out why. It is not good for little 
boys to be told everything, and never to be forced to use their own wits.” (p. 
116) Mrs Bedonebyasyoudid when questioned by Tom on why people want to 
know about the backstairs – a metaphor for the route to truth – also responds: 
"That I shall not tell you. I never put things into little folks’ heads which are 
but too likely to come there of themselves.” (p. 209) 
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The narrator does attempt to temper this autonomous learning with some 
warnings as to what counts as responsible learning, but these are not 
particularly prescriptive. They seem only to ask for openness and humility. For 
example, the narrator, in one of his more fantastical moments, argues for the 
existence of fairies. He presents the argument and then removes himself 
somewhat: “You don’t see the logic in that? Perhaps not.” The narrator does 
not appear to judge you for not seeing the logic, in fact in terms of common 
sense we may think this argument flimsy and we should not see the logic and 
the narrator allows for this too, he only asks that if you do not then “please not 
to see the logic of a great many arguments exactly like it, which you will hear 
before your beard is grey.” (p. 40) The plea is not that we should believe exactly 
what he is saying or that he is giving the reader something necessarily true or 
correct, but that there are certain things that may trigger a certain change in our 
logic and we should assess their validity rather than dismiss them outright. To 
do so is to become somewhat conceited in what you think you know. It is to 
believe you have found a shortcut through the presentation of argument to the 
truth, to have found the back stairs to the truth. This belief is apt to create 
intellectual closed-mindedness. The narrator clearly does not discount all logic 
and reason in making this point – although he might and we perhaps should 
evaluate whether that is a possible end of his point – and he still maintains a 
certain rigor in arriving at the truth, but the scenery of the route and nature of 
the journey is for you to decide. If you come to understanding and revelation 
through a fairy tale then so be it. Let your own feeling guide you – if yours is 
a “sad and solemn” reaction to a story, even if it is one where men devolve to 
apes and so cannot be true because they still have hippopotamus majors (p. 96), 
or a “sad and awed” reaction to a painting that you do not understand (p. 19), 
then take that and see if you have a reason for feeling so rather than discounting 
it on the basis that it may, by other logics, be false. Indeed, it is the emotional 
reactions to these things that will keep you grounded to the truths we 
experience and hold life-impact at a much more intuitive level. When we turn 
from them and walk through the world we are, like Tom’s inability to see the 
way to the Other-End-of-Nowhere when he is not looking into Mother Carey’s 
eyes, apt to forget. We need immediacy a lot of the time, and if not immediacy, 
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then a conduit – in Tom’s case the dog, in our case whatever object of 
inspiration or emotion might reveal these things to us. Indeed, if there is no 
inconsistency to the thinking and no harmful impact upon others, then who are 
we to take these revelations or conduits away from another, particularly in the 
formative years of childhood? And once again the narrator defers on this front, 
for just as he expects the wise and sensible to not interfere unjustly in the 
learning of others, so he does not expect everyone to like and listen to his story; 
after all, “it takes all sorts, they say, to make a world” (p. 53). 
 
Perhaps the best thing we can do then is to cast a few lessons out there, show 
our passion for those lessons unabashedly and with as many types of logic as 
possible, show the fact that we care about those we are testifying to and want 
them to do well, but then withdraw into the admission that ultimately they will 
have to make up their own mind as to who and what they believe. The form of 
the text then is not the clumsy authority and paradoxical didacticism critics of 
Kingsley believed it to be; it was a passionate recounting of a mix of facts and 
fantasy which reflect the turbulent nature of epistemic life and force decisions 
upon the listener as to who and what to trust. The text unabashedly embraces 
this through the metafictional voice of the narrator and so whilst playing the 
literary game also plays the epistemological one, drawing the reader into both. 
 
*** 
 
As with nostalgia, what has been shown is that putting aside the scepticism of 
the traditional approach to the issue at hand can reveal how and why we take 
literature to have epistemic worth as literature. Namely, because the 
community of literature – those who shape its practice – have in the past and 
still do look to literature for truth, knowledge, understanding and epistemic 
experiences. Contemporary academic contentions that the literary activity does 
not look to knowledge but looks only to aesthetics is, like traditional 
epistemology, an unduly narrowed view claiming universality. In the above 
case I focused primarily on how one might turn to a narrator for information 
and go through the process of gauging their trust. The very opacity of that 
narrator means that they are a figure who can and cannot be worthy of trust. In 
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the above instance and, I have no doubt, in other texts, the narrator is intended 
not only to be an enjoyable voice but to be assessed in this way by the reader. 
This very assessment suggests there is a mode of communication going on in 
the author-text-relationship that has a deliberate epistemological bent.  
 
What does all of this say in general about the epistemic value of literature and 
why does literature’s opacity not mean that it must reside on a lower rung of 
the search for knowledge and truth? What philosophers like Lamarque 
emphasise is that a literary work should transmit propositional knowledge if it 
is to have epistemic vale, but the example of The Water Babies illustrates how 
it is not really the content of the knowledge that is transmitted. Instead, it 
opaquely emphasises the lived experience of being an epistemic agent and this 
is a much more sophisticated impact with life-long potential and certainly 
cannot be denounced as lesser in the search for epistemic goods. These texts 
give us lived experiences of epistemic concepts that can powerfully impact 
upon the way we live our epistemic lives and search for being-with-worth. 
What literature can do for many people – including myself – is make issues 
live; it is the opposite of that type of abstract philosophical epistemology which 
“looks death into everything”. Literature makes epistemology exciting, risky, 
relevant, immediate and it brings its concepts to life in a way that is intended 
to be, in many cases and particularly in children’s literature, informative and 
educative.  
 
The most powerful example of this that I experienced whilst writing this thesis 
was reading Louise O’Neill’s 2014 work of teenage dystopian fiction Only 
Ever Yours; a dark and coarse story about a future world where baby girls are 
no longer born naturally but are bred and trained in schools only for the sake 
of pleasing men. The stakes are high in these schools as failing to come top of 
the class means a future as a concubine or a celibate and derided teacher for 
future girls. The book is a tour-de-force of social commentary, but it was the 
interactions between the women forced into a desperate struggle with one 
another that struck me the most. If I try to reduce what I learned to propositional 
form it comes out as, in Stolnitz and Lamarque’s term, numbingly banal and a 
slight, obvious reality: words can hurt. Yet no matter how obvious this 
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statement might seem, no matter how many times this truth has come up in 
discussion, philosophical reading, or life, I cannot remember a time when I 
have had such a harrowing experience of being-which-resists-doubt that words 
can hurt. The reason I was able to do this was precisely because of the way in 
which the characters were drawn and their words were shaped, and it was only 
by looking at the text that I could experience this. Additionally, even if it turns 
out that there was no speaker testimony, I certainly experienced hearer 
testimony as to this message. I experienced a telling and invitation to trust that 
this experience was worth having and that this was the truth of the matter and, 
for whatever reason, I believed. On a lived epistemology and with childlike 
virtues in mind, that is permissible and it is part of the epistemic worth of 
literature.  
 
The opacity of texts is not just about aesthetic experience, it is often also about 
directing the reader towards a certain kind of epistemic life and in this sense 
literature can open up ‘other’ dimensions of epistemic thinking, particularly the 
dimension that focuses on lived experience of our epistemic concepts in order 
to put it alongside – and, for some of these authors – triumph over traditional 
scientific paradigms. For, as Nietzsche says, “art is more powerful than 
knowledge because it desires life” (cited Levine, 2002: p. 1). This is the 
epistemic value of, at least, a legitimate part of the activity of literature. 
 
To be able to treat a text and its narrator as part of a testimonial relationship, to 
be able to respond to the experience that a text may well know something that 
I do not without worrying about how ridiculous that sounds, to embrace the 
fact that literary fiction is “a form of lying which is never entirely safe from the 
charge of telling the truth” (Wood, 2009: p. 64), are humble and playful acts 
which have the capability of leading to experiences of profound epistemic 
value. Undoubtedly, such a project is risky and comes with issues. Opacity is, 
by definition, not transparent. The glass needs to be looked at carefully rather 
than fleetingly, we must be wary of what Lamarque terms the aestheticizing of 
life (2014: p. 30). There are undoubtedly a number of problems with the text 
as testimony and communication model (Dixon and Bortolussi, 2001; Garcia-
Carpintero, 2016). However, as with nostalgia, these can be tempered with 
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other virtues and practices, and to stand in fear of engaging in the literary 
process for epistemology’s sake because of them is to neglect the lived side of 
epistemology and to forget that, ultimately, knowledge deserves a story. 
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Chapter Four: A Virtuous Education 
 
I take education to be the epitome of applied epistemology and its very existence in 
a mass form is predicated upon a widespread understanding that knowledge and 
learning are of such importance that a substantial portion of one’s early life, if not 
one’s entire life, should be dedicated to their pursuit. Its goals and methods are often 
contested in the fiercest possible fashion as people recognize its potential to shape 
the lives and character of those in its care and it involves the creation of spaces 
dedicated to transforming the minds and experiences of those involved. There are 
few who cannot be drawn into a passionate discussion about why and how children 
should be educated because education is bound up with realising our deepest ideals. 
Indeed, as I said at the start of this thesis, I now see myself as, first and foremost, a 
teacher and have dedicated my professional life to facilitating the creation of the 
ideal that this thesis has helped me give form to: a virtuous education. It is this 
understanding of education as building spaces and relationships which support 
ideals that also makes it inherently political and, as Matthew Lipman, the founder 
of the P4C method, maintains, education is often a battled ground because it “more 
than any other social institution, is the manufacturer of the society of the future, and 
virtually every social group or faction therefore aspires to control the school for its 
own ends.” (2003: p. 9) This chapter is an effort to articulate where and how I want 
to enter this battlefield. 
 
Before continuing, it is important to note that this was not a project where I read 
and studied educational theory, practised and reflected on certain aspects of it, 
honed a clear and consistent set of goals before deliberately using the classroom to 
see if they were achievable and implementable. It was a much messier process than 
that. When I undertook this thesis, when I began my teaching, and even as my 
passion for teaching grew, I did not expect to be writing this chapter. I have not 
studied for a PGCE and I began teaching, like many postgraduate students, with 
only the smallest amount of formal training (1 hour to be exact). My teaching 
philosophy and practice, as well as my studying for this thesis, have shaped one 
another in a constant symbiosis that is still ongoing. As such, I cannot claim that 
my observations can form a rigorous empirical and experimental basis for 
generalised conclusions about the nature and methods of teaching. However, if 
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education is to succeed in the aims outlined below it must, as my understanding of 
lived epistemology does for epistemic experiences, “seek out and give more 
credence to the stories of students and teachers about the phenomena of teaching.” 
(Noddings, 2011: p. 417) This is the vein in which I place the below account. It is 
the story of a single teacher, and I can only echo Robert Roberts’ words in his 
attempt to analyse intellectual humility in education: “Even in the absence of 
controlled empirical support, I think my suggestions will have enough plausibility 
to warrant giving them a try in the daily world of living, learning and teaching.” 
(2016: p. 184) 
 
 
The Story So Far 
 
Central to understanding my educational approach is my definition of virtuous 
activity and the virtues as activities and acquired human qualities the possession 
and exercise of which enable us to directly or indirectly achieve experiences of the 
internal good, namely, being-with-worth. Upon my conception then, a virtuous 
education is one dedicated to creating immediate and future experiences of being-
with-worth. 
 
I have argued that several things can facilitate and develop this in meaningful ways. 
Firstly, embracing the living, lived and experiential dimensions of epistemology in 
order to mitigate against traditional epistemology’s tendency to “look death into 
everything”, to disembody the human subject, and to disenfranchise certain voices. 
My educational philosophy is thus bound up with the attempt to create spaces 
where, as I expressed in chapter one, I meet you rather than spaces where our 
intellects meet nowhere. It is also focused on understanding and helping students to 
articulate how they are experiencing those goals which they are told are the 
epistemological ends of education (knowledge, truth, understanding, and, in my 
case, being-with-worth) as well as legitimising their voice and experiences within 
the tapestry of meaning which will inevitably arise from such an attempt. It is also 
focused on, to revive Lamarque’s terminology, looking at the tapestry and its 
constitutive stories as much as looking through them and onto the world in an 
attempt to witness an objective ‘truth’. Indeed, the first steps towards legitimising 
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the other may well come from weaving them into the tapestry but the second step 
must come from acknowledging the tapestry’s opacity. 
 
Secondly, my educational model is based around cultivating and modelling, at least, 
the three main childlike virtues which I extensively characterised as having the 
tendency to create and prolong experiences of being-with-worth. They have this 
tendency through providing learners with a sense of the world as full of potential, 
their own agency and creative power, and investing our experiences of epistemic 
life with vivacity and excitement. Epistemic activity is thus an exciting search rather 
than a desperate escape from lack. These three core virtues are: 
 
1. Playfulness as the disposition to identify existing rules and structures, 
challenge them or create new ones, and to operate within the new paradigm.  
2. A capacity for wonder as an openness to and search for experiences of 
motivating incompleteness. Cultivating this capacity facilitates 
experiencing the world as brimming with the potential to surprise and drive 
us to inquiry. 
3. Intellectual humility and open-mindedness as the ability to engage deeply 
and carefully with the fallibility of one’s own views and remaining open to 
alternative explanations of and routes to understanding and knowing the 
world as presented by others and by the world itself. 
 
Discussing nostalgia and the epistemic value of literature helped exemplify how 
one can model these virtues and engage in an open and positive response to even 
previously derided emotions or unusual claims to where epistemic worth and 
validity, and learning experiences, might arise. The discussion also highlighted how 
there is an underlying need to be sensitive to the workings of other virtues in the 
space to help guide and keep virtuous activity on the correct path. For example, 
trust, friendship and phronesis (wisdom in and sensitivity to practical 
considerations, particularly concerning implementation of the virtues). 
 
Thirdly, the models of the childlike teacher and spaces must also be carried over 
into this chapter. The childlike teacher appears to be one who: engages in the playful 
and creative process in good faith; challenges and invites the learner to take an 
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active role in meaning making and narrative tasks without forcing them to; plays 
the role of “fairy” and attempts to make the world wondrous and strange; genuinely 
acts as humble co-explorer with the learner; and embraces their role with vivacity, 
emotion and their humanity on display. Those childlike spaces that are apt to 
facilitate the above virtues and the proposed end goal of being-with-worth are those 
that are simultaneously safe and shadowy, that destabilise without scaring, and that 
follow the childlike teacher in their queering of the world, inviting and motivating 
participation without forcing it, and leaving room to be “hit rather hard”. 
 
This model of education emerged from my studies of alternative epistemologies, 
the philosophy of literature, and nineteenth-century children’s literature. However, 
alongside these inquiries, I not only taught but began reading and studying 
education. I now want to place the model as it has so far been conceived within two 
contemporary trends in the philosophy of education in order to give it context and 
to develop it further. 
 
 
Intellectual Virtue and Education 
 
As Jason Baehr (2016) succinctly but compellingly maps out, discussions of how 
education might be orientated towards and built around intellectual virtue has a long 
a tradition in Western philosophy and it is currently experiencing a welcome 
resurgence alongside the rising profile of virtue epistemology. The first chapter of 
this thesis gestured towards how my understanding of a lived epistemology might 
be understood in relation to the revival of virtue epistemology, and I now want to 
explore where my educational project does and does not overlap with the current 
field of educating for intellectual virtues. 
 
I have undoubtedly been inspired in numerous ways by the works of Baehr. Not 
only is he leading in the field of virtue epistemology, but he has sought to realise 
many of his theoretical points about intellectual virtue in a thoroughly practical 
manner by helping found the Intellectual Virtues Academy of Long Beach 
California. The Academy’s mission statement is to offer an education based upon 
135 
 
an intellectual virtues model and “to equip their students to engage the world with 
curiosity and thoughtfulness, to know themselves and to live well.”7  
 
On this practical note, Baehr (2013) gives a compelling account of how an 
education orientated towards intellectual virtues can give us a better framework in 
which to: (a) understand the nature of lifelong learning due to its ability to root 
learning in the qualities of the person and their motivations or psychology, (b) find 
a balance between academic rigour and student-centred education, and (c) do justice 
to the intuitions of vocational teachers and those student who experience moments 
of inspiration and intrinsic reward through education. Overall, he maintains that “a 
good educational aim, when properly pursued, will give teachers and students a 
lively sense and better understanding of the value of education.” (2013: p. 255) This 
is something which an intellectual virtues approach can do due to the virtues’ status 
as “thick concepts”: “they are, on the one hand, richly detailed and descriptive” 
(2015: p. 26) and they are “strongly evaluative – they pick out something attractive, 
compelling, and action-guiding.” (2015: p. 27) It is my hope that my own depiction 
of the virtues in the previous chapters and the motivation for them, as well as the 
figure of the childlike learner, has managed to attain this status of a thick concept 
in a way that can fulfil precisely those roles Baehr lays out. 
 
Baehr (2013; 2015) also offers several conditions and guidelines for embedding and 
achieving a virtues-based education which I have attempted to realise in my own 
practice where possible. Firstly, he maintains that teachers must help and reflect 
with students on what they take the end goals of education to be and to continually 
revisit with students what the significance and value of what is being taught and 
discussed is. Secondly, the virtues themselves must also be visited early and often 
in any subject which seeks to teach them and be discussed in depth. Next, self-
reflection, self-assessment and teacher-assessment should be modelled around the 
virtues. Perhaps most importantly, teachers must focus on the social dimensions of 
the classroom and seek to establish trusting and caring relationships with the 
students, as it is only in that kind of environment that change and growth can readily 
                                                          
7 
https://www.academylongbeach.org/apps/pages/index.jsp?uREC_ID=500671&type=d&pREC_ID=
1047503  
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occur. Penultimately, there must also be a concerted effort to put forward a united 
teaching community within the school which clearly embraces the intellectual 
virtues model. Baehr rightly identifies that if such an education is to truly be 
embarked upon it must figure prominently in how the school conceives of itself and 
how it presents itself to the world: 
 
it will bear upon the school’s official mission, hiring and support 
of faculty, development and review of curricula, public relations 
and fund-raising campaigns, the stump speeches of top 
administrators, admissions standards, recruitment efforts, the 
speakers and other outside voices that are invited to campus, and 
so on. (Baehr, 2013: p. 257) 
 
Although taking the word of a school’s website is not the most rigorous way of 
measuring such a thing, if we take The Academy as being held to its own standard 
of honesty, then this is something it appears to be doing excellently and all these 
measures will help orientate the school, staff and students to the necessary mindset. 
Finally, alongside giving students frequent opportunities to practise and repeat the 
virtues and their characteristic actions, and being formally and informally assessed 
for them, the students must see the intellectual virtues modelled by teachers and 
other school leaders if they are to be motivated to internalise them beyond the 
school’s boundaries. All of this will help formulate those positive patterns of 
behaviour, thinking and interaction that, Baehr (2015: p. 12) articulates as the end 
goal of an intellectually virtuous education. 
 
As Kidd (2016) notes, there are those who maintain a healthy scepticism in relation 
to such a virtues-based education due to the unwieldy nature and accounts of the 
virtues. For instance, The Academy currently has nine master virtues, Baehr’s 
(2016) edited collection on the intellectual virtues in education touches upon seven 
more merely in the titles of the papers, and Roberts and Wood (2007) work through 
at least eleven intellectual vices whilst trying to negatively define the virtue of 
intellectual humility. How is anyone meant to pick between the virtues and can any 
complete and workable account ever be given? There is no obvious answer, and the 
difficulty or perceived, but unproven, impossibility of the project should be no 
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reason to cease the attempt if it is a worthwhile one, believed in; that would certainly 
not be the intellectually brave or tenacious thing to do in this situation. Hopefully 
my argument is not an intellectually stubborn or blind one in this instance, but 
instead of concerning myself with the issue of those areas where grey abounds and 
so pessimism ensues, I will focus on two ideas that seem to perforate the 
contemporary literature and give some hope for stability. The first is that whatever 
account of a virtuous education we give, as Baehr argued, the virtues must be 
modelled by the teacher. This does not need any more explanation here but is 
undoubtedly fundamental to my own and almost every educational model even 
outside of intellectual virtue. The second is that intellectual humility seems to have 
secured for itself a place amongst the virtues. 
 
Humility has been conceived in a variety of ways in contemporary literature on 
intellectual virtues. For example, as a state where one is so comfortable in one’s 
own skin and has such a strong sense of self-worth that one can freely acknowledge 
one’s limitations and mistakes without fear of other people’s judgement or the need 
to control their vision of oneself (Baehr, 2015: p. 79); as “a well-regulated or 
calibrated confidence that is integral to a broader structure of regulative activities 
that is constitutive of a good and flourishing life” (Kidd, 2016: p. 56); or as a lack 
of vices such as “snobbishness, vanity, domination, hyper-autonomy, 
pretentiousness, self-righteousness, arrogance, haughtiness, envy, conceit, and 
possibly others” (Roberts, 2016: 185; see also Roberts and Wood, 2007). In all 
events, whatever the subtle differences of these accounts, they all give humility a 
central role and, as Whitcomb et al. (2017) discuss, they certainly depict it as a far-
cry for those historic accounts of humility as a vice of underestimating or 
deliberately feigning a low estimation of oneself, psychological models which see 
it as a forgetting of the self and a turn towards others, and paradigms of Christian 
self-sacrifice and subservience. What appears to unite them is an active 
participation in recognising and shaping a complete and honest understanding of 
oneself and the other in order to create a legitimate and educational relationship for 
the betterment of oneself. As English (2016) argues, when engaging humility, the 
other is recognized and legitimized as one I can learn from and be affected by. 
Humility, however, stops there and it is left to other virtues to motivate me to 
actually learn from them and to provide a mirrored disposition to recognize when 
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and in what way I can teach and affect the other in a positive fashion. Education 
then, according to Kidd (2016), can contribute to the cultivation of intellectual 
humility by informing, inspiring and inducting students into the disposition and 
equip them with necessary tools to recognize their “confidence conditions” and to 
honestly and rigorously regulate their self-appraisal, their attitudes or beliefs, and 
their ambitions. What it must also do, however, is find ways to motivate one to then 
act upon recognised deficiencies in knowledge, and, ideally, create a community of 
mutual support in this humble but active learning. 
 
Intellectual open-mindedness, as it does in my account, often accompanies 
discussions of humility. Where they appear together, open-mindedness tends to take 
a secondary role in discussion, but it does have a literature of its own. Riggs (2016) 
excellently surveys this and notes that it is paradigmatically characterised as “the 
ability and willingness of one person to consider fully and conscientiously the 
viewpoint of someone else with whom they initially disagree, in other words, to 
take seriously the possibility they are wrong.” (p. 22) As such, it continues the 
theme of humility which is the correct recognition of one’s own epistemic standing 
to the other. The thematic combination of humility and open-mindedness under the 
trend of seeing intellectual humility as central to an intellectual virtues account of 
education is undoubtedly a tradition my educational embraces and builds upon. 
Where it strongly emphasizes something different to this tradition, however (apart 
from the larger, structural point made below) is that it is not just humility and open-
mindedness in relation to the other and to alternative structures of understanding 
that are necessary, but also humility and open-mindedness to the experiences the 
world has to offer which neatly brings us on to a discussion of the capacity for 
wonder on an intellectual virtues account. 
 
Wonder as an emotion does not have the same status as humility in the 
contemporary literature on intellectual virtues and education, which tends to focus, 
instead, on curiosity (Ritchhart, 2002; Baehr, 2015; Porter, 2016). This is possibly 
because wonder is associated more with a childish, naïve and romanticised emotion 
than one of serious intellectual heft; understandably so given how I derived my own 
account of it. Unfortunately, it retained this vein in some of the more prominent 
defences of it in education last century (Heubner, 1959; Carson, 1965; Parsons: 
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1969). However, just as wonder has been attached to childishness, so curiosity has 
been historically attached to the problem I alluded to in my discussion of virtue 
epistemology in chapter one: that the curious person is not sensitive to when they 
should not know. For example, in his discussion of epistemic restraint Manson 
(2012) analyses how curiosity has often ignored the virtues of not knowing and of 
faith and has been interpreted as a symbol of intellectual pride or the inability to 
control oneself; they have unadvisedly surrendered themselves completely to their 
will to know. Greco-Roman writers also felt that curiosity is, more often than not, 
tied to detestable rather than worthy objects (Gray, 2005) and Enlightenment 
philosophy often warned against curiosity’s insatiability (Gelfert, 2013). Curiosity, 
after all, is what killed the cat. However, whilst it is advisable that one recognises 
that both curiosity and wonder have the potential to fall into vice if they are not 
used correctly, this should not come as a surprise and should do little more than 
reaffirm the place of a virtue akin to phronesis as an overarching ability to mediate 
and correctly implement the virtues. Both curiosity and wonder are virtues at the 
core and their core is highly similar: a propensity and motivation to explore the 
world and seek to understand it, usually following a positive note of surprise or 
delight at something’s strangeness. Where wonder still takes precedence on my 
account, however, is in the implied strength of surprise and the ripple effect it has 
on one’s view of the world in general. Where I still experience curiosity as referring 
to a response of “how interesting” – perhaps in the tone one might read Alice’s 
utterance “curioser and curioser” (Caroll, 1969: 23) – wonder comes with an almost 
overwhelming sense of “oh my goodness!” which borders, but does not tip over 
into, amazement or awe. In an experience of wonder, it is as if neither oneself nor 
the object of wonder can contain the vivacity of the emotion and so it spills out from 
the experience to enliven everything else around it. Perhaps curiosity is the natural 
toning down of wonder that happens as one becomes used to the world, but then, to 
make a parallel to a tired but sweet adage, like aiming for the stars but still hitting 
the moon, I am happy to promote and aim for wonder but settle for hitting curiosity. 
 
What should be noted as a potential addition to or incorporation into the virtue of 
wonder, however, is Watson’s (2016) understanding of inquisitiveness. Watson 
characterises the virtue of inquisitiveness as being “characteristically motivated to 
engage sincerely in good questioning” (p. 43), that is, to care about and seek 
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improvement of one’s epistemic standing in relation to the matter at hand. I am not 
convinced by her case that inquisitiveness can be distinctly separated from curiosity 
or, in my case, wonder, by stating that inquisitiveness necessitates questioning 
oneself and others in order to further inquiry where curiosity and wonder do not. It 
appears to me that either they all do or they all do not. However, what is important 
is that she draws out that for these to become fully-fledged virtues in relation to 
epistemic improvement, they cannot be revelled in as emotions but must be acted 
upon and motivate inquiry. 
 
Of my three central virtues, only playfulness now remains to discuss in this context. 
Play has a long history in educational theory and social anthropology, much too 
long to fully recount and cite here.8 However, I have rarely seen playfulness 
depicted as an intellectual virtue in contemporary literature. My intuition is that this 
is because of play’s tendency to be discussed as an activity that is good in-itself or 
taken up non-instrumentally or, at the very least, for the sake of fun. For example, 
Betrand Russell responded negatively to the Montessori school of education’s claim 
that children should not be allowed to turn their educational apparatus into things 
they are not – such as trains – for fear of causing ‘disordered imagination’ (2010: 
p. 76). He felt that this not only did the intellect of the child a disservice, but it 
denied play its fantastical and enjoyable status, subjected play to fetishized notions 
of analytic truth and knowledge, and even had the potential to bring about laziness 
through quashing the will to power that play healthily expresses. Putting aside this 
final claim, a contemporary reader might similarly baulk at John Dewey’s claim in 
Democracy and Education that playful activity is necessary but should be 
subordinated to skills learned for later usefulness and education, “that is, intellectual 
results and the forming of a socialised disposition.” (1930: p. 231) Yet, whilst I 
sympathise with those who seek to protect play as an activity that is conducted for-
play’s sake or merely for enjoyment, I am highly sceptical of such positions as far 
too limited in their understanding of play. In any case, these concerns should not 
stop a thorough inquiry into and account of playfulness as an epistemic virtue, or 
play as an epistemically virtuous activity, from being pursued.  
                                                          
8 Bateson and Martin (2013: pp. 7-9) provide an excellent and brief summary of notable thinkers 
on play in education and development.  
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A virtuous account of play is precisely what I sought to provide in the previous 
chapters and I find no reason to qualify or move away from the definition already 
provided. I have put my name to slightly different definitions of both play and 
playfulness elsewhere (Fisher and Gaydon, 2019) but I do not think those 
definitions trouble this account too much, they only serve to emphasise even more 
the issue I have with defining play non-instrumentally. However, what should be 
noted here is that the practice of play and playfulness can be distinguished from 
what I want to term the virtue of playfulness here. In our paper, Fisher and I discuss 
how our exploration of the practice of play and playfulness in The Dark Would (an 
exploratory learning space and approach discussed below) led us to an 
understanding that: (a) play can extend to almost all forms of activity insofar as 
very few activities are bound by necessary rules and must thus involve some form 
of created and maintained system by which one is playing, (b) play can be forced 
just as conformity to rules can be forced, (c) that play can be solitary and even 
selfish for legitimate reasons, and (d) that play does not have to be fun, it can be 
difficult, tiresome and risky. However, much of this is not incorporated into the 
virtue of play as I conceive it here which should be mediated by, once again, such 
a thing as phronesis which will recognise the appropriate structures for play within 
the search for being-with-worth. Although it is not definitive of the practice, freely-
chosen play is almost always preferable to forced play in its virtuous form, as is 
making sure that one does not rule out either communal or solitary play or neglect 
the fun and potential seriousness of play 
 
*** 
 
Thus far I have placed my developing educational philosophy and practice in the 
context of an intellectual virtues approach to education, drawn out some of the 
valuable advice I believe Baehr has to offer about how to realise my educational 
end goal, and situated my three key virtues in relation to other accounts of those 
virtues in the field in order to clarify their education and virtues-based embodiment 
further. However, I now want to highlight where I depart more vigorously from the 
intellectual virtues approach of Baehr so that I might scaffold a move towards 
another large trend in the philosophy of education which underpins my approach. 
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In defining virtuous activity, Linda Zagzebski (1996) lays down two conditions 
which many virtue epistemologists have followed with varying qualifications since: 
the motivational component and the success component. The former necessitates 
that to have a virtue, a person must have “a persistent tendency to be moved by a 
motive of a certain kind” (p. 132). The latter stipulates that “a person does not have 
a virtue unless she is reliable at bringing about the end that is the aim of the 
motivational component of the virtue” (p. 132). However, Baehr (2015) develops a 
different three-tier structure of a virtue. Namely, that an intellectual virtue requires: 
(a) an account of what makes it distinct from other virtues, (b) the motivation to 
enact the virtue, and (c) appropriate sensitivity to and judgement about when the 
virtue should be exercised. What they share, however, is the motivation condition 
– that one be motivated to enact that virtue and, as Zagzebski makes immediately 
clear and what Baehr goes on to state, that one hold a motivation of a certain type. 
For Baehr and others, the ideal here is to be motivated to enact the virtue because 
“one desires to reach the truth or acquire a deeper understanding” (2015: p. 22) or 
from a love of distinctly epistemic good and goals. It is this, Baehr argues, that keep 
the intellectual virtues distinct from the moral virtues. Baehr’s motivation for 
keeping them distinct is clear insofar as he wants to stay away from the tricky 
territory that has previously been associated with character or moral education. He 
recounts how such models have repeatedly faced charges of heavy-handed state 
intervention, paternalism, indoctrination, a lack of enthusiastic backing or 
commitment, and, for whatever reason, wide-spread failure. However, as practical 
a move as this might be for pitching an educational model, it is not a move I make 
because there can be no doubt that as much as one might wish to separate oneself 
from representing an intellectualy virtuous education as separate from a moral 
education, it cannot be. Any account of the virtuous – whether intellectual or not – 
will necessarily say something about the good human life and we should avoid 
perpetuating what Clare Jarmy (2017) has termed “the myth of the neutral school.” 
Baehr might attempt to hide behind statements about intellectual goals and goods, 
but they are not goods in themselves insofar as they play a role in the good life. 
Baehr occasionally gestures towards the virtues remaining anchored in human 
flourishing but – like so many of the intellectual virtue theorists already mentioned 
– this concept is left largely nebulous and unexplored except via an inconclusive 
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historical account of the concept. Although my conception of the good life being 
rooted in experiences of being-with-worth may still be open to criticisms of 
vagueness and intuitionism, it is at least more concrete than what Baehr and other 
intellectual virtue theorists appear to be working with. As I put forward in the 
introduction to this chapter, education is, at times, a political, ideological and moral 
battleground, and intellectual virtue theorists need to begin picking sides and 
articulating more forcefully and completely what anchors their understanding of the 
good life and motivation.  
 
I also wish to return to my understanding of a lived epistemology to distinguish 
myself further from a dominant trend in the intellectual virtues movement. My 
account of a lived epistemology attempted to escape “looking death” into 
epistemological concepts by appealing to individual experiences and narrative 
accounts of how they are lived and experienced in not just their cerebral form but 
their embodied one. My lived epistemology is about recognising what Louis Reid 
beautifully called “the indivisible unity of the make-up of the complex human 
person” (1986: p. 126) which extends not only to our mind but to our bodies. It asks 
for a personal account of how epistemic concepts and virtues permeate and shape 
us even at the level of physical sensation. In this sense, my teaching is very much 
tied to the use of embodied practices to explore theoretical concepts, such as a 
method created at The University of Warwick known as ‘Open-Space Learning’ 
(Monk, et al., 2011; IATL, 2015) or developing mindfulness and meditation 
practices in education which seek to reintroduce the student’s body to their mind in 
a holistic exploration. However, intellectually virtuous accounts, at least as they are 
currently discussed in relation to education, seem to be leaning back towards the 
death of those very virtues in their depiction and discussion of them. Perhaps these 
practitioners are bringing their ideas to life in the classroom not just in the minds of 
their students but in their bodies and physical understanding of themselves as well. 
My inclination, however, is that the spirit of the field is still too weighted toward a 
traditional and deathly conception of its practice.  
 
The general inability or unwillingness to reject or endorse the more revolutionary 
potential of the intellectual virtues movement, to take a firmer stance on the good 
life, or to embrace what the intellectual virtues look like beyond the cerebral is what 
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has led me to call these epistemic rather than intellectual virtues in the earlier 
sections of this thesis and to separate myself from the field. As I have argued, 
epistemology can be a lived and radical practice and it is distinct from what appears 
to be the purely intellectual and, relatively, safe activity above. However, the 
second trend which I see my educational philosophy as a part of is anything but 
safe. 
 
  
Education as Emancipation 
 
Hopefully, what has become visible in the account I have been putting together in 
this thesis is an understanding that at the heart of experiencing being-with-worth 
and one’s life as worthwhile is an awareness that: one’s experiences are legitimised 
and considered equally alongside those of the other members of your community; 
one has the power to identify and change the rules which governs one’s life; and, 
the world is experienced as a place of potential. Much of this sentiment has been 
instilled in me by my own experiences of teaching and learning and has been 
developed somewhat haphazardly through my practice, as evidenced in brief below. 
However, it has also been heavily influenced by reading the educational theorists I 
wish to do due diligence to now. It should be noted that I have not yet undergone 
an attempt to bring myself in line with their broader theories and corpus of work to 
measure where my understanding of an emancipated education might differ from 
theirs. I intend to do so in future work and fully recognise the value of doing so, but 
I do not see it as a current lack or problem. The very freedom expressed within their 
texts is the reason that I feel legitimised in taking from them somewhat isolated 
sentiments in order to create a model of emancipatory learning which is rooted in 
their words and yet in my understanding and context. To return to the tapestry 
metaphor, I have plucked threads from each of these thinkers’ patterns to create an 
entwined, multi-coloured ball of my own to be thrown around and played with in 
my classroom and, like the old man from ‘The Golden Key’, to cast shadows with. 
 
My first deep moments of inspiration came from reading Jacques Ranciere’s The 
Ignorant Schoolmaster (1991). Ranciere rallies against the myth that the world must 
be divided into the knowing and the ignorant and that never can the developing 
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catch the developed. The knowing teacher, the developed expert and master, is 
precisely the one who has thrown a veil of ignorance over everything by insisting 
that they have recognised the distance between the taught material and the person 
being instructed. They are thus the ones who have created the gap by suggesting 
that they are in control of and aware of the start and end points and, because they 
hold the tools to dismantle it, the student’s state of lack. Everything in this student-
teacher relationship has been manufactured by the expert to exist in the form it does, 
including depicting the inferior intelligence and the superior one, and they force the 
student to submit to “a hierarchical world of intelligence” (p. 8).  
 
Contrarily, a liberated and emancipated pedagogy is based upon “the method of 
equality” and the understanding that “one could learn by oneself and without a 
master explicator when one wanted to, propelled by one’s own desire or by the 
constraint of the situation.” (p. 12) There remains a master in the story which 
Ranciere recounts in his text, Jacatot, who issues the order to pass the course to the 
students. Jacatot, however, teaches without expertise in the subject the students 
wish to learn and must teach by stepping aside and allowing the student’s 
intelligence to meet and wrestle with the book he has provided. This lies behind 
Ranciere’s famous dictum that: “one can teach what one doesn’t know if the student 
is emancipated, that is to say, if he is obliged to use his own intelligence […] The 
ignorant person will learn by himself what the master doesn’t know if the master 
believes he can and obliges him to realise his capacity.” (p. 15) What this is 
supposed to reveal is that every human being can be made aware and capable of 
using their own dignity, their own intelligence, for the ends which they see fit. What 
the emancipatory educator must do is reveal intelligence to itself. They must bring 
the student to the realisation that they have an intelligence that is of the same and 
equal nature as everyone else’s and that it is theirs to direct. They must then help 
them find a direction and motivation for it. This, in possibly the most childlike 
description in his work, “is what opens the way to all adventures in the land of 
knowledge. It is a matter of daring to be adventurous, and not whether one learns 
more or less well or more or less quickly.” (p. 27)  
 
Ultimately, there is only one dictum in Ranciere’s philosophy of education and that 
is to “learn how to be equal men in an unequal society” (p. 133). The use of “man” 
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here is saddening in its irony of course, but it indicates what work there is still to 
do in achieving the legitimisation of voice and the emancipation of the classroom 
and reminded me that if I wanted to achieve the humility of the emancipatory 
teacher, one who motivates by revealing the student’s dignity and capabilities to 
them, then filling the world with potential and allowing the students’ intelligence 
to pick the direction, that I must be sensitive to my own prejudices and, where 
Ranciere attempts to remove expertise, perhaps remove even more of myself as I 
discuss below in relation to the ‘absent’ facilitator. 
 
I took further inspiration from someone who also marks out Ranciere as a pivotal 
figure: bell hooks and her work Teaching to Transgress (1994). hooks argues that 
education should go well beyond the sharing of information and extend to caring 
for the wellbeing and personal growth of the students. An essential component of 
her teaching practice is that one should teach in a manner “that respects and cares 
for the souls of our students” (p. 13). This appeal to the ‘soul’ might sound religious 
or ethereal but even in a secular context it powerfully captures a sense of well-being 
beyond the physical and the pleasurable. For me, this attachment to the ‘soul’ of the 
student is reflected in my concern as a teacher for the student’s sense of being-with-
worth. To care for it is to attempt to help them locate their most honest and intimate 
self (or selves) and to help them navigate an understanding of the world which 
brings not only a peaceful relationship between that self and the world but one 
which reaffirms the worthwhile nature of their existence and its potentiality. This, 
as I read hooks, was what struck me as my secular conception of the ‘soul’. This 
conception can help replace the idea that the soul is to be understood in relation to 
and to be guidance by obedience to the divine; a point I said I would return to after 
exploring it in chapter two.  
 
For hooks, and for me, this tending to the soul of the student requires them to be 
liberated from the boundaries and oppression of standardised, ritualistic, formal, 
test-driven education and involves paying attention to their peculiar voice through 
dialogue. This paying attention to the voice – particularly, in my instance, through 
lived accounts of the very epistemic concepts that constitute the traditional goal of 
education – is the simplest and most effective method we have for crossing the 
boundaries and tearing down the barriers that keep the student and the teacher 
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locked in place and which keep separated those who, as it stands, merely exist 
within a classroom. As such, hooks sees it as a fundamental responsibility of the 
teacher to acknowledge the power they have in the classroom to silence and 
legitimise and to make sure they wield this power to liberate each student and not 
impose a judgement upon the classroom as to which voices have more or less 
legitimacy. They must also stay engaged with the classroom space and recognise 
its fluidity and its transitions, and to make sure these are continued in order to 
remind themselves and their students that “learning is a place where paradise can 
be created. The classroom, with all its limitations, remains a location of possibility.” 
(p. 207) 
 
I then discovered Noam Chomsky’s On Anarchism (2014). I was compelled to read 
more upon seeing Chomsky’s claim that at the heart of his understanding of 
anarchism was the idea that freedom was the vital and concrete possibility for every 
human being to realise their full power and potential (p. 2). Of course, this merely 
rang true with what I had already started to believe about an emancipatory 
education, but he further describes his understanding of anarchy as being based on 
a single, powerful precept: that the burden of proof for any exercise of authority is 
on the person exercising it and “if they can’t justify it then it’s illegitimate and 
should be dismantled.” (p. 33) This revolutionised the role I saw play and 
playfulness taking on in my philosophy and practice. Playfulness was no longer just 
about creating a state of freedom and power for the student, it was also the very tool 
with which they could challenge or overthrow me, my philosophy and the space 
they were in. It forced me to see that in defining playfulness as a virtue and inviting 
it into the classroom I had introduced the very element that could destabilise me. 
The emancipatory teacher should not be afraid of this, however, but should embrace 
Chomsky’s understanding of anarchism and should always be in a classroom which 
contains the potential for their removal should their authority no longer be 
justifiable. If they are running the classroom in a legitimate way, playful activity 
should never need to subvert the teacher in this way; a moment beautifully and 
powerfully realised for me in a lesson where the students were attaching sticky 
notes to those things which limited their power in some way and I ended up covered 
in them; the end-result of a series of serious, risky and truthful acts conducted in a 
spirit also filled with collegiality, laughter and good-will. 
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This building in of structures to undermine one’s teaching practice and authority is 
a concept which is alien to even the most liberal classrooms I have visited or read 
about, and I am yet to conceive of it in fully practical terms, but playfulness had 
concretised its importance in my thinking, and this was only enhanced upon reading 
Raoul Vaneigem’s The Revolution of Everyday Life (2012). Vaneigem identifies 
play as a potential practise of revolutionary freedom that can be found in everyday 
life if we are willing to give ourselves over to it and let it permeate even the most 
commonplace of our activities. Indeed, this playing, if it can be extended to our 
social roles, is the means by which we can be reconciled with ourselves. Those 
social roles are, in Vaneigem’s terms, “nuclei of alienation embedded in the flesh 
of lived experience.” (p. 110) One cannot help but call Sartre’s waiter to mind here, 
separated as he was from his being-for-itself by playing the role of the waiter too 
precisely (1969: p. 59). It is here that play collapses itself, where it becomes a game 
so serious and entrenched that it is over. One is no longer playful if one forgets one 
is playing, and it is only by calling to mind and becoming aware of play again that 
one can re-find the game and one’s free, dignified, emancipated self. This must be 
remembered in the classroom, for the death of playfulness occurs in the classroom 
when it is forgotten that the role of teacher and student are, like the waiter, these 
“nuclei of alienation”. We can become ‘lost in play’ when engaging with the game 
of education, and this is a worthwhile experience in many ways, but the experience 
of becoming lost should never be complete. It is like the boundary between the 
dream that one is just aware of being a dream and the one that there no realising it 
is a dream; we must endeavour to remain in the former. For Vaneigem, it is only 
through giving oneself over to the passion for play that the current, alienating 
organization of life can be destroyed and a new society constructed based upon real 
participation and genuine self-fulfilment (p. 231), or, in this case, a participatory 
and emancipated classroom where the roles of teacher and student are held before 
the class as enacted roles with the potential for instability if authority is deemed to 
be illegitimate. In his study Vaneigem is achieving something deeply Freireian in 
his analysis of play as he has located one beginning for a pedagogy of liberation: 
“By studying our lack of freedom we can learn how to become free. This is the 
dialectic of the liberatory class.” (Freire and Shor, 1987: p. 14) As I have defined 
it, the virtue of playfulness begins with the disposition to identify the adaptable 
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rules around oneself. The first step to playful freedom is thus to find where it does 
not exist and that is very often in the roles of student and teacher. 
 
The capacity for wonder also holds potential for emancipated learning insofar as it 
links to the Rancierian conception of finding motivation within the learner. If a 
teacher can create chances for and scaffold these moments of wonder, they can find 
with the learner those objects which instil in them a passion to inquire into the 
nature of the world. However, even more than that, Genevieve Lloyd (2015) argues 
that, despite wonder’s potential for stupefaction because of the boundary it shares 
with awe, the hardening of thought that comes with ceasing to wonder puts us “at 
the mercy of received opinions” and dupes us into “mouthing prevailing platitudes 
that come to be regarded as obvious truths” (p. 80). Indeed, she goes on, “when we 
find ourselves wondering at our collective stupidity [in doing so], that can itself in 
turn be the beginnings of new-found wisdom.” (p. 80) As such, not only does 
wonder itself reinvest the world with potential and place us in a self-motivated – 
and thus emancipated – relationship with the world, if this wonder is turned upon 
ourselves we can come to be free of those very things that bind and stupefy us. 
 
Humility and open-mindedness also have their role to play in this model of 
emancipated learning insofar as they lead one to free oneself from precisely the 
knowledge hierarchies suggested by Ranciere, and allow the emancipatory teacher 
to create the balanced and dialogic classroom of hooks. Indeed, in The Ignorant 
Schoolmaster, Ranciere attempts to embody this very attempt in the form of his 
work by telling the story of Jacotot. Storytelling, according to Ranciere, is a symbol 
of equality as it is the placing before the student of the story and nothing else. It is 
to acknowledge the epistemic power and legitimacy of the student and their 
interpretation. We must not assume that we have anything more to give them except 
the implicit suggestion that the story being provided – or, in childlike terms, the 
shadows that are created – are ones that are worth their time contemplating. As 
Ranciere asks, why would one take the voice of the lecturing teacher over the book 
or story itself when the former dissipates but the latter is inscribed forever? (p. 5) 
The book, the story, or the shadow, remain open to interpretation and reuse, the 
master’s voice attempts to resist this and, in doing so, attempts to dominate and 
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cage the learner rather than free them. The childlike, humble, emancipating teacher 
must fight this at all costs. 
 
 
Emancipating via facilitating 
 
In my own practice, how to enact this emancipated model of education and teaching 
was learned and borne out in my work as a philosophy facilitator for the charity The 
Philosophy Foundation, and I have come to see facilitation as a cornerstone of 
emancipatory practice. ‘Facilitation’ has commonly come to stand for a particular 
style or method of teaching whereby the teacher attempts to bring students to an 
understanding of the topic at hand through the use of active questioning and tasks 
rather than simply the provision of methods and answers. Brockbank and McGill 
(2007) discuss how facilitation can sometimes be depicted and interpreted as a form 
of teaching where the teacher encourages the class to contribute to discussion but 
ultimately tells them what to learn, how to learn it, and how it will be assessed. In 
this sense, the teacher may well achieve an increase in student engagement simply 
through allowing and encouraging students to answer broad questions or engage in 
activities, but control of the knowledge, module, and outcomes still firmly reside 
with the tutor.  This model is inadequate. Whilst it may promote discussion, learners 
will still tend to be isolated and estranged from each other as they attempt to access 
the teacher’s subject knowledge rather than truly and deeply engage with each other 
or even the tutor as a person: “The seminar teacher may be skilful in questioning 
and stimulating discussion, but while primarily taking the role of expert or implicit 
banker, cannot enable dialogue. Students may remain passive and disempowered 
by the yawning chasm between teacher knowledge and their ignorance.” 
(Brockbank and McGill, 2007: p. 212) Facilitation should, instead, seek to allow 
students to share and engage with one another’s thoughts in as free a space as 
possible and where I might meet you rather than our intellects meet at a space of 
nothingness created and bound by the omnipotent teacher. 
 
What occurs in an emancipated facilitation method instead then is that the teacher 
recognises their immediacy and power in the room and seek to remove themselves 
as much as possible. In Philosophy Foundation sessions this, as Ranciere indicated 
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to be fruitful, might first be achieved by presenting a story, puzzle or question in a 
way that allows it to speak for itself before opening it up for discussion, a discussion 
which the teacher tries to remove themselves from as much as possible, except to 
keep discussion going or to invite more voices into the tapestry being created. In 
these kinds of spaces, argues Maggi Savin-Baden (2008), learning trajectories and 
stages are not pre-set by a tutor but defined-as-they-are-created by the group. These 
spaces, she continues, often occur “in the process of role transition, such as shifting 
from the role of a lecturer to the role of a facilitator of learning” (p. 20) where the 
tutor surrenders power and control of the direction of learning and allows students 
to manage the knowledge for themselves. Andrew Day applies the same ideas to 
his facilitation of primary school maths and philosophy lessons: “The lesson needs 
to be powered by the children’s curiosity, not an externally imposed target. At 
certain decisive points you will direct the class’s attention towards something – but 
not decide it for them” (2014: p. 14). Within secondary schools, David Birch (2014) 
also argues that facilitation of learning and enquiries, where speaking and listening 
are promoted by the teacher rather than the receiving of knowledge, develops 
relationships in the above fashion: “Children spend little class time speaking and 
listening to one another, yet the best (and worst) thing about school is the 
opportunity to make friends and discover new people […] Schools harp on about 
respect and the necessity of boundaries without also promoting the pleasures of 
togetherness” (p. 1). Listening, speaking, and thinking about one’s own and other’s 
ideas is at the heart of facilitation and, on the above conception, an emancipated 
education. 
 
However, Brockbank and McGill argue that this does not entail that facilitation 
means abandoning one’s own expertise and authority. Indeed, they claim that 
“facilitators in higher education also need to be subject specialists, having a firm 
grasp of the content part of the teaching session” (2007: p. 216). They give their 
own advice on how to walk this line in their book Facilitating Reflective Learning 
in Higher Education, especially chapters 10 and 11, but where we can distinguish 
their approach from other types of facilitation – it certainly seems as though they 
are retaining the mantle of the expert rallied against by Freire – is in their acceptance 
of Socratic questioning. They deem this to be “a powerful way of highlighting errors 
without pointing them out” (2007: p. 222). It appears that for Brockbank and McGill 
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it is acceptable for a facilitator to feign ignorance on a topic in order to allow space 
for the students to explore ideas and use questions to guide students towards 
answers – as Socrates is often interpreted as doing to the slave he questions in 
Plato’s Meno. However, the ability to be an expert and a facilitator, and the 
legitimacy of such feigned ignorance and Socratic irony, have been challenged – 
necessarily so in my eyes if one is to maintain an emancipated education. In relation 
to the tension between expertise and facilitation, Olyer’s (2015) empirical study 
into expert teachers’ contributions to the quality of arguments in classroom 
dialogues revealed that whilst the facilitators’ familiarity with the arguments 
surrounding a topic helped them identify important and interesting contributions – 
whether this be in line with or directly addressing current literature – one of the 
three facilitators studied “thought that this familiarity with the underpinning topics 
led him to manipulate the discussion in ways he later regretted” (p. 203). Indeed, 
depending on the weight you give his intended outcomes, we might also listen to 
Racière’s similar argument that an emancipated form of learning is only hindered 
by expertise:  
 
Is a highly skilled, very learned master necessary to perform this 
[the demanding of speech in order to manifest a student’s 
intelligence and the verification of a student’s attention when 
doing so]? On the contrary, the learned master’s science makes it 
very difficult for him not to spoil the method. He knows the 
response, and his questions lead the student to it naturally (1991: 
p. 29). 
 
Rancière also rejects the method of Socratic irony as perhaps being a path to 
learning facts but not as a path to allowing for an emancipated student. The slave 
in the Meno, he argues, demonstrates knowledge but also demonstrates his 
powerlessness insofar as his supposedly autonomous answers rely on Socrates’ 
knowledge and ability to ask the correct questions. Peter Worley (2011b) further 
rejects Socratic irony as part of facilitation when it is in this ‘feigned ignorance’ 
form: “It seems disingenuous and designed to trap an opponent - perhaps not what 
you should be doing with your pupils.” Both see the facilitator, instead, as needing 
to engage in a genuine disavowal of a claim to knowledge: “If a teacher says ‘I 
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don’t know’ [and is genuine], this motivates students to seek the information the 
teacher doesn’t know”. Of course, continues Worley, you should not say ‘I don’t 
know’ when you do, but rather you adopt a position of defeasibility and openly 
recognise that what you think you know is open to being wrong or to correction. It 
is this surrendering of one’s own certainty and a recognition that although labelled 
as tutor and student and with varying levels of experience both are “voyagers of the 
mind: an intellectual subject participating in the power common to intellectual 
beings” (Ranciere, 1991: p. 33) that Rancière sees as key to an emancipatory 
pedagogy and lying at the heart of a facilitation approach to teaching. 
 
How ‘present’ the facilitator should be continues to be a troubling issue though. 
Should they, like MacDonald’s childlike teacher, be a fully-present co-learner, or 
should they, recognising they are necessarily bound by power attempt to remove 
themselves as much as possible? Interwoven into this thesis are opinions from those 
working at all levels of education, but one thing that does seem to change as the age 
and maturity of the students goes up is the possibility for the tutor to become 
‘present’ in the session. For example, in talking about higher education, Brockbank 
and McGill’s model of facilitation allows for the interjection of the tutor both as a 
“flexible resource to be utilized by the group” (2007: p. 210) and as a participant 
who can share their feelings and thoughts with the group –  so long as they have 
surrendered their expertise (feigned or otherwise). However, Worley, working more 
in primary and secondary schools, describes how the facilitator should be like 
Princess Ariadne. Ariadne provides Theseus with tools to navigate his own way out 
of the minotaur’s labyrinth and, for Worley, she is crucially not there when he has 
to use them. Whilst providing tools and information to help children navigate 
discussions and enquiries in the classroom is key, good facilitation on Worley’s 
model, is about the extent to which you are not present as much as it is about your 
effective presence, and the art of facilitation resides in being both present and 
hidden. One reason for this is that by re-entering the space as a participant you often 
run the risk of taking control of the session and the knowledge again, particularly 
with younger children as they continue to adapt to challenging your ideas as an 
adult and tutor. 
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In terms of practical advice on this, Day (2014) and Birch (2014) both highlight the 
importance of showing patience when facilitating a class, the creation of a space 
where students feel free and safe to speak, as well as asking questions of students 
that encourage them to give and elaborate on their reasons for holding an answer. 
Restructuring the classroom into a horseshoe or circle to allow for discussion and 
collaboration recurs in the literature, as does the simple technique of repeating the 
central question if a group goes off task. Day also suggests looking out for key 
moments when facilitating: 
 
What you should be looking for is moments where a [student] is 
fascinated, frustrated or foxed. Instead of trying to end or avoid 
this state by steering [students] to an answer, you should be trying 
to exploit it, by getting the [student] to reveal what is bugging her 
or asking her to suggest solutions and test them out. (2014: p. 10) 
 
Worley’s The If Machine (2011a) and Once Upon an If (2014) contain a host of 
facilitation techniques. Worley (2012) contains examples of how to be absent when 
facilitating even to the point of not asking questions, and his ‘Question X’ (Worley, 
2013) is a simple yet effective way of conceiving of questioning which 
fundamentally changed my classroom practice and those I have since taught it to. 
We might even turn back to Ranciere and, although his text is not brimming with 
practical advice, look to his indication that “the student must always respond to a 
three-part question: what do you see? What do you think about it? What do you 
make of it?” (1991: p. 23) Why not try running an inquiry on a subject you know 
nothing about armed with little more than these three questions? You will at least 
discover a lot about yourself and your class. 
 
What is potentially most important, however, is the mindset one holds when asking 
these questions and the environment that has been created. This has been called the 
“Open Question Mindset” by Worley (2015): that one must genuinely care about 
revealing what is in a student’s mind rather than operating by asking a question to 
search through a student’s mind for the answer you are looking for. Schein (2013) 
instead calls it “humble inquiry” and describes it as “the fine art of drawing 
someone out, of asking questions to which you do not already know the answer, of 
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building a relationship based on curiosity and interest in the other person.” (Schein, 
2013: p. 2) Hogan (2015) highlights the importance of creating “venturesome 
learning environments” where it is considered safe to venture thoughts without fear 
of belittlement and there is “a shared expectation that such contributions will be 
freely and purposefully ventured.” (p. 134) 
 
In all events, emancipated facilitation leads to the removal – as far as is possible – 
of the hierarchies of educational authority and it leaves a space of inquiry led by the 
students, their own, negotiated interests and even newly negotiated rules for how 
discussions and inquiry should be carried out. It is also predicated upon the sharing 
of ideas, of hooks’ dialogue, and it is a space where all kinds of expression are 
welcome as the repressive force of grades fall away. Although the space will, of 
course, never be entirely free, just as life will not, the facilitated classroom and 
teacher-as-facilitator model is a promising first step on the road to the emancipated 
one. 
 
 
Spaces and Sessions for a Virtuous Education 
 
I now want to provide six examples of my own practice from the past few years to 
indicate how I have attempted to bring about spaces of learning which serve as 
vehicles for the educational philosophy discussed in this chapter. As mentioned at 
the start of this chapter, it is difficult to draw generalised lessons from them as my 
teaching has not yet formed a steady practice and I would not wish to mislead 
anyone by making broad claims on what essentially amounts to anecdote. However, 
it is important to include some examples and reflections not only because doing so 
constitutes the defended form of sharing personal narratives and experience, but it 
also does justice to my experience of the PhD process. As this thesis and my 
professional development have progressed, the success of the endeavour has been 
measured in my own mind not just by the gaining of a doctorate based upon the 
quality of this document, but in terms of how it has allowed me to find my vocation 
and begin to realise its ideals. The ideas, sessions and resources suggested here are 
thus a large part of what I deem to be most worthwhile and constative of my ongoing 
journey towards success in the life-goal revealed to me by the process. As such, 
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alongside reading this as a thesis, I hope I can invite you to follow the links and 
look at the appendices in order to critically reflect on the examples not just in terms 
of an academic thesis, but in the following light: do these sessions and ideas sound 
to you as though they plausibly allow for an increasing sense of or ability to achieve 
emancipation, the childlike virtues, or, most importantly, being-with-worth? 
 
1. The Dark Would 
 
I was sceptical of what I would get out of The Dark Would [....] I 
was unprepared for the path ahead. The Dark Would has renewed 
my passion for teaching - or rather, exploring with students. My 
year of teacher training gave me a toolkit and a map covered in 
warnings. “Do not enter.” “Here be dragons.” “This way to level 
7.”. Two days in The Dark Would gave me a backpack with 
survival essentials and a map covered in doodles. “Uncharted.” 
“Goblins (friendly?).” “Last sighting of unicorn.” The Dark 
Would event, 2015, participant feedback 
 
Undoubtedly, the largest project I have been engaged in during my time at Warwick 
is ‘The Dark Would’. A collaborative project with three other members of 
Warwick’s Institute for Advanced Teaching and Learning, The Dark Would sought 
to create a transdisciplinary space and explore transformative and playful 
experiences in Higher Education.  A wealth of material on The Dark Would, 
including its various iterations, its forebears and heritage, it aims, and so on, can be 
found online (Clarke, et al, 2017a). The Dark Would team also created a ‘Playbox’ 
(Clarke, et al., 2017b) with sessions and ideas based around how one can be more 
playful in one’s teaching. As already mentioned, Rebecca Fisher and I are also 
publishing on the playfulness of The Dark Would project. However, I wish to draw 
out a few central tenets of the project briefly here to help understand how some of 
the features of The Dark Would spaces might help others create learning 
experiences aimed at facilitating wonder and the kind of emancipating or subversive 
play I have argued for in this thesis: 
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• Emerge. Entering a Dark Would space was always designed to be in an 
unusual and emergent fashion, such as pulling back curtains or crawling 
through tunnels. This aided immeasurably with creating the sense of 
surprise necessary if one is to experience wonder and to facilitate the 
participant’s ability to remove themselves from the world they had come 
from and engage fully with the space. 
• A blank canvas. Although The Dark Would spaces are filled with an array 
of objects, in its untouched form these objects are resting as potential tools 
for creativity. This was modelled on Yi-Fu Tuan’s claim that “what begins 
as an undifferentiated space becomes place as we get to know it better and 
endow it with value” (1977: p. 6). Although it is tempting to signal 
permission to play by having some pages already drawn upon or Lego 
models already made, playful and creative spaces like this should present as 
space ready to become place through the activity of the participants. In 
Savin-Baden’s language quoted above, these spaces should be defined-as-
they-are-created. 
• No authority in the space. Whatever the temptation to go inside one’s own 
space, unless there is a real need to do so, try to avoid it. You have curated 
the space and if participants are aware of that and your presence then you 
will present as an authority and change the dynamics. There is no discursive 
facilitation to be done and you should not need to facilitate interaction with 
space if it is created in an ambiguous but permissive enough way that the 
participant feels safe and motivated to do so. 
• Costumes. The ability to change identity through costumes, make-up and so 
on is invaluable for play as it allows participants to create a buffer between 
their identity outside the space and that within it. As such, they are given 
further implicit permission to do things they would not normally do as they 
are no longer wholly themselves. However, having prompts to reflect upon 
their old or new identity within the space creates that tension between the 
safe (the buffer of the costume) and self-reflection (being faced with what 
putting the costume on means) that was found in the Christmas space of 
chapter two. 
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• Do and Do Not. Some of the most playful moments came from the 
presentation of contradictory rules which forced participants into making a 
free choice just to see what would happen. For example, hanging tags that 
had “Do not touch” or “Do not draw” on one side and “Touch” and “Draw” 
on the other. There is no definite rule and they cannot appeal to implicit 
rules for explicit, contradictory ones exist. They must choose which rule 
they thus want to play by. 
• Hand over the space to someone else. By early-2015 we recognised that, as 
a team, we had started to allow rules for the space to concretize simply 
through repeated practise and declining creativity and, as such, our own 
wonder at the spaces we were creating was waning. During the 2015 two-
day event we created an iteration of the space for the first day but then 
handed the space over to a team of unknown students and set-designers for 
the second day. This helped us reconceive of the space and what its playful 
possibilities were. 
• “I wanted to break everything.” Not everyone responded positively to the 
space. For example, one student created an anti-Dark Would as their devised 
piece of assessment, one staff member tweeted during the 2015 event that 
he wanted to immediately smash and break everything in the space, and 
another called it “middle-class, wishy-washy rubbish” during feedback. As 
with the discussion of MacGreedy and his mother in chapter two, people 
entering such spaces do so with their own concerns and when such a space 
stimulates self-reflection and threatens/invites the possibility of disrupting 
boundaries, what the result will be is unknown and can only be facilitated 
as supportively as possible. As was also mentioned in chapter two, this 
could also be perceived as a privileged space for those who exist in 
institutions with the money for such projects amongst those with enough 
time for cosy, naval-gazing, idleness and regressive tendencies. Perhaps, 
and this is a charge that has certainly stuck with me and one that warrants 
further reflection I have not had the chance for yet. I can only offer an 
intuitive response based upon the previous point: carefully consider who 
one hands the space over to next. 
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2. Playing with traditional spaces9 
| 
| 
All eyes fall on me 
I'm called upon to answer a question 
"But I didn't put my hand up." 
| 
| 
Six 
Fifteen 
Undergrad 
Tutor 
| 
| 
We're all occasionally stumped. 
| 
 
 
It was something akin to the above that participants in Warwick’s Learning and 
Development Centre's Social Sciences' Teaching and Learning Showcase, 
'Reflecting on Innovative Practice', arrived to: a familiar environment broken up by 
suspended, mobile-like stories and other stimuli laid out to prompt reflection on 
innovative teaching. 
 
S0.19 is a standard small, tiered lecture theatre (Figure 9). It has a whiteboard, 
computer and projection technology at the front, its walls are adorned with ‘no 
food', ‘no smoking', and ‘lecture capture' signs, and the rows of desks perfectly 
fulfil their dual purpose of aiding note-taking and creating a buffer between student 
and lecturer. The desks are also slightly slanted towards the student, presumably in 
an attempt to dissuade them from bringing in banned food and drink by forcing 
                                                          
9 Following from Gaydon, 2016 
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them to hold their paper or laptop in place in order to take notes, thus leaving no 
free hand to do the same with contraband. 
 
 
Figure 9: Layout of room S0.19, Warwick’s Social Sciences Building 
 
For this event, however, in the spirit of innovation, I decided I would attempt to 
disrupt the all-too-familiar space in order to create a playful and subversive feel 
which could be used to stimulate discussion around innovation. Alongside the 
aforementioned mobiles and desks covered in stimuli, Blu-Tacked down to avoid 
sliding, I also created a distinct path through the room with waist-high masking tape 
in an attempt to shepherd participants past the material before they could find the 
safety of their seats. My fellow organisers and I had thought to ourselves that the 
group would have to acknowledge the pedagogically-relevant material that lay 
around them as they would not be able to take their seat without engaging with it 
and would thus be invited to see a familiar space afresh. Little did we know that the 
layout of the room and building were tougher opponents than we had thought. 
 
Having an event in Warwick’s Social Sciences building necessitates breaking the 
rules and bringing food into the room unless you want to block a busy corridor 
bustling with students. As such, participants grabbed some food and hurried into 
the room. However, because they were awkwardly balancing an enticing and full 
plate alongside bags and coats many of them quickly ducked under the tape to find 
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a seat. Gone was the illusion of a pathway and new space; remaining was S0.19 
with some inconvenient bits of tape and paper in odd places. Perhaps more people 
would have gone back to read the stimuli had the slanted desks not required them 
to remain seated to stop their food from ending up on the floor and the tape not now 
made the return journey look arduous. 
 
Irony abounded. I had attempted to subvert the traditional rules of the space and 
create others to facilitate a different style of interaction and prompt innovative 
thought only to be thwarted by the very things that were supposed to aid focussed 
learning in the first place: slanted desks and guiding tape. Worst of all, I, frustrated, 
chastised the group (hopefully without too harsh a tone) for ignoring the pieces and 
new dynamic that we had set up. As if I had a right to admonish their ignoring our 
new rules when we had been so cavalier with the old space's rules or as if the 
participants' breaking the ‘taped' rules was somehow worse than the organisers 
ignoring the rules of the space as it originally was or attempting to enforce our will 
under the guise of play. 
 
However, all of this was fertile ground for reflection, both practical and theoretical. 
What strikes me as I re-read what I have written above is the word "shepherd". 
Although I felt I was guiding people in an interesting and stimulating direction 
and inviting them to engage freely, what I actually ended up doing was attempting 
to control the room and the participants in quite a heavy-handed fashion. Some 
control may well be needed in teaching contexts, but, in this instance, I retained too 
much control and, like the desks, attempted to force engagement and learning where 
I should have, instead, invited it. Attempts to disrupt familiar and regular teaching 
spaces can be even more difficult than creating new ones and one must tread 
carefully and hold the attempt to strike a balance between controlling, guiding, and 
inviting firmly in one’s mind. 
 
 
3. Embodied Experience 
 
Space was also a key factor in my co-convened module and project ‘Sport, 
Philosophy and Practice’. As can be seen from the websites and outputs (Gaydon, 
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et al. 2016), this module and event involved, alongside traditional seminars, 
curating a ‘gymnasium’ space for students to explore and interact with materials, a 
field trip to a gym and martial arts class, a “phenomenological walk” to the sporting 
sites on campus, and a variety of physical activities. All of this was designed to 
enhance student experience of embodied knowledge and lived epistemology. The 
concepts discussed as part of the module – play, beauty, competition and so on – 
were all deliberately experienced first-hand and reflected on as experiences. The 
students were engaged in, for example, reading Stephen Conor’s (2011) discussion 
of the experience of sports kit and asked to attempt to articulate their own 
experiences of the objects. Similarly, they were given extracts from Damon 
Young’s How to Think About Exercise (2014) which attempted to give a 
phenomenological account of swimming before attempting to articulate to each 
other similar accounts of their own sporting practices. The module sought to stress 
how academic study could be combined with these holistic understandings and that 
their physical, co-curricular existence was not distinct from their cerebral, course-
based one. In some instances, it was highly successful in this and in others it was 
not. What separated success from failure, as obvious as it sounds, was those 
instances where the ‘training wheels’ of the kind of account we were looking for 
were in place – namely, the aforementioned passages from Conor and Young. 
Expressing one’s experience of these concepts can be an incredibly hard and 
frustrating thing to do and it requires much in the way of scaffolding and facilitated 
questioning to help students achieve. The trickiest thing, of course, is getting 
enough scaffolding to help without creating so much that they are ‘copying’ and 
relinquishing their freedom of expression to the rules of the examples. 
 
 
4. Wonder Workshop 
 
During my teaching on the module ‘Applied Imagination’ which sought to explore 
definitions and experiences of the imagination from a variety of different 
perspectives, I taught a week that focused solely upon wonder. I attempted not only 
to introduce students to a theoretical understanding of wonder and how it relates to 
the imagination, but also to go beyond an academic or philosophical consideration 
of wonder and create a specific pedagogic intervention that allowed space for 
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students to engage with a more emancipated form of learning and to develop the 
epistemic virtue of the capacity to wonder – if not directly experience it. See 
Appendix B for a lesson plan. 
  
In relation to achieving moments of wonder, the everyday must be subverted in 
order to awaken the necessary sense of surprise in the student and for the objects 
around them to come into focus rather than simply be part of the mundane and 
unobserved background. This was aided by the fact that the module was held inside 
a drama studio space rather than a standard classroom. In terms of session design, 
however, it contained an immediate, student-focused, reflective task that has 
participants on their feet and interacting with a board; not the traditional start to a 
lesson. Additionally, students were asked to engage in dramatic tasks (such as the 
tableau), sit in a comfortable and school-like setting to listen to a picture book 
before colouring with wax crayons, presented with packs of images and quotations 
to make their own theories, and so on. The fact that such changes to the learning 
environment and instances of unconventional teaching methods happen throughout 
the session kept this sense of possible surprise and unfamiliarity active. 
 
In addition to the possibility for surprise, students must also feel safe enough to 
engage with the experience. Much of this work was done in the opening week of 
the module – which, incidentally, was a team-building activity followed by a visit 
to The Dark Would. However, the safety in this session comes from the relief 
brought by the creation of a physically and emotionally comforting environment 
with pillows, lighting and so on, during the reading of a childlike and playful Dr 
Seuss text and, hopefully, my own demeanour during teaching. 
 
Wonder is found in different places for us all and reveals something telling about 
our relationship to particular objects in the world. It cannot be predicted. As such, 
there must be a variety of materials in the classroom in order to maximise the 
potential for creating wonder and the space must be student-focused. In other 
words, the teacher/creator of the space may make an educated guess based on 
previous experience or research as to what will elicit wonder from students and 
where the potential for wonder lies within the theme of the session, but they should 
not impose these in a forceful way and the potential prompts should be spread 
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amongst a broad array of other material with openings for the students to also 
provide their own. For example, this session opens with a collection of the student’s 
own wonders and wonderings and returns to use these as the basis for the tableau 
task, the questions asked about the homework reading are very much about the 
student’s own experiences and creations in relation to the texts, and the theory 
building packs contain a mixture of pictures, quotes, and things which I feel may 
bear no direct relevance but which the students may be inspired by or find a 
relationship with.  
 
There is no doubt that the ability to experience wonder is heightened by a ‘childlike’ 
mindset and so links to childhood can greatly aid the bringing about of such 
experiences. However, they need to be made in a way that does not risk their 
collapsing into childishness. If they do, then the tasks may be scoffed at or the 
memories of them cast aside as enjoyable but otherwise quaint and frivolous. As 
such, in this context, whilst the tableau task can be playful and imaginative in a 
childlike fashion – and often is insofar as many of the ‘wonders’ and ‘wonderings’ 
are questions that have gone unanswered since childhood or are symbols that have 
retained a childhood potency of the kind discussed in chapter three – it is closely 
followed with a discussion as to purpose. The ‘storytime’ and colouring alongside 
Oh, the thinks you can think, which is the task with the most potential to be 
misconstrued in this fashion, is embedded into the next task by including the images 
in their developing theories and some of the images in the theory building task were 
deliberately chosen to potentially draw out this link to childhood so that the 
‘childlike’ nature of some of what has happened during the session may be reflected 
upon. 
 
Surrounding these moments of wonder are also invitations to critically consider the 
experience and objects of wonder. In other words, to begin wondering and to 
capitalise on at least some experiences of wonder as learning and exploratory 
opportunities rather than merely surprising instances of pleasure and amazement. 
The session contains many moments for reflecting on what exactly is going on. Not 
least of all during the theory building task where students can, in a sustained 
fashion, discuss and critically analyse unseen, stimulating, but accessible material. 
In this sense, this safe, childlike space can also contain the critical element that was 
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discussed earlier in the thesis in relation to the Christmas space in MacDonald and 
Ewing’s stories.  
 
Vital to then creating a developed and resurfacing capacity for wonder is a careful 
balance between understanding the accessibility and regularity of wonder and its 
triggers, being able to identify and capitalise on moments of wonder as 
opportunities for learning, as well as being able to experience these moments in an 
unanalysed or unaware sense to the point that the pleasure is not ruined. As can be 
seen from the lesson plan, this session attempts to avoid favouring any of these but 
switches between them to create a more true-to-life, cyclical pattern of experience, 
recognition, and reflection that lays the foundations for a more ingrained capacity 
for wonder and critical reflection. 
 
Much of this session has also built into it the student-centred and self-guided 
learning that Rancière felt necessary for emancipatory learning; the student’s own 
wonders and wonderings are included from the start, used to ground later tasks, 
discussed by the group, and so on. However, as discussed earlier in the chapter, 
even more fundamental for Rancière was the recasting of the relationship between 
teacher and student as it was and is often understood in education – the former being 
the intelligent master and keeper of knowledge and the latter the ignorant initiate – 
to one which embodied the recognition that there is an equality of intelligence and 
capacity between the two. It may appear that within this session there are moments 
where I have created a bolstering of the former rather than brought about the later. 
For example, in sending out my notes after the session I perhaps run the risk of 
inciting the students to think “he had the answers all along” and viewing me as a 
Socratic ironist as opposed to Rancièrian interlocutor, or I could be seen as taking 
the position of an ‘adult’ storyteller whilst the class adopt the position of ‘children’ 
on the carpet in front of me during the reading of Dr Seuss. Perhaps I have retained 
a larger part of the authorship of the session, set targets and boundaries (however 
linked to virtues and virtuous activity they may be) and so have limited the freedom 
of the students and hindered their recognition of themselves as intellectual equals. 
The response to this can only be that I accompany my questioning of students and 
my correspondence with them with a continual undercurrent of genuine interest in 
their ideas, encouragement to challenge my conceptions, and a firmly held belief 
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that whilst I have some knowledge to give and I am always forthcoming with it 
when it is relevant, that I know nothing beyond exactly what I am giving them and 
what they discover and present is of equal validity to whatever I may think. My 
drawing attention to my teaching methods by sending my students my lesson plans 
with the prompt to consider and analyse how I teach and why I might teach that 
way after the above session is my response to such strong scepticism. 
 
 
5. Flipping metaphors 
 
A technique that has emerged from several sessions that I have run is the idea of 
‘flipping’ metaphors. This has worked for sessions on teaching and learning, 
representations of death in picture books, models of sports coaching, and more. The 
basic idea is predicated upon taking whatever the central concept of the session is 
and asking students to complete sentences such as: “Death is…”, “A teacher is…”, 
“Coaching is…”, and so on. I then ask students to separate out which of their 
suggestions are metaphors – an interesting discussion in itself. I then usually 
introduce students to the work of Lakoff and Johnson here and their exploration of 
metaphors that underpin our everyday practice, such as “argument is war”, and their 
understanding of metaphor as “imaginative rationality” (1980: p. 134). I then 
continue with the idea that metaphors can ripple through and underpin our 
behaviour. As such, I ask them to return to their metaphors to map out the 
implications of at least one of their metaphors. For example, if they choose “A 
teacher is a fairy” they would have to articulate what this means for how a teacher 
must act, how a student must act, what a school is like, and so on. Already the 
students are heavily engaged in their own creative and playful activity and taking it 
in directions which they find stimulating. However, the most playful part of the 
session follows when I ask them to “flip it”. In other words, think of a metaphor 
which stands in opposition to the one they have just been working with (“A teacher 
is an ogre”) and cash out the new metaphor before comparing the implications of 
the new one with the old one. This playful technique appears simple, but not only 
does it lead to playful and novel results, it has the potential to destabilise the 
meaning and image of the central concept of the session. Where students were 
probably working with quite familiar conceptions in the first part of the session, 
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they now must revisit and rethink from an entirely new angle what that thing might 
mean. For Lakoff and Johnson, this was like the transformation of “argument is 
war” to “argument is a dance”. In this session, playful practice comes from the 
developing ability to see constrictions even in the most basic tenets of language and 
become emancipated from them. 
 
 
6. Confidence Conditions – 1 to 5 
 
As was discussed above by Kidd (2016), one way to achieve intellectual humility 
is to draw the student’s critical attention to the conditions which underpin their 
confidence in their own beliefs, arguments and abilities. However, this can be 
difficult to maintain alongside discussion for students and to keep track of in real 
time as a teacher. External symbols help all participants and my most frequently 
used one is taken from an experience I had with my father after accompanying him 
to his weekly quiz league to fill in for a missing player. 
 
The best way to accumulate points in their matches is simply to answer the 
questions given to you. Two points are awarded for answering your own question. 
However, if a player thinks they cannot answer their own question they may select 
another player on their team to pass it to. One point is awarded for answering 
another team member’s question for them. No conferring is allowed whilst 
answering your own question, nor is it allowed when deciding who to pass your 
question to or while that team member tries to answer the question. As such, in 
order to signal to a player how confident you feel in answering their question you 
hold up a number of fingers. One finger indicates something along the lines of: “I 
have a vague hunch.” Five fingers signals: “I am absolutely certain.” 
 
As such, every now and then in my secondary school lessons I “sense check” the 
class or a particular speaker when they make a claim and ask them to hold up their 
confidence rating in what they are saying and explain it. This has created an 
increasing amount of humility in classes where I have manged to implement this 
consistently (four fingers) and has helped reduce the tendency of classroom debates 
to rest upon students simply stating opposing intuitions (five fingers).  
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A humble aside 
 
After telling my fiancée about this practice, she looked at me and with a straight 
face and said that from now on I should do this whenever I answered her questions 
with a statement. Unbeknownst to me I apparently sound like I am confidently 
asserting a truth even when I am hypothesising. Given intellectual humility’s role 
in this thesis, it seems only fitting that I hold my hand up now. In many ways what 
I have offered in this thesis is an account of the experiences, activities and ways of 
approaching epistemic concepts which have allowed me to experience being-with-
worth. I think there is something in the routes I have taken to these experiences 
which can facilitate others in experiencing the same (four fingers). Chapter two 
involved deriving an account of the virtues via an analysis of the Golden Age of 
children’s literature and chapter three involved an appeal to a lengthy discussion of 
narrative voice in The Water Babies. I can state with a full five fingers that my 
experience of these texts was a positive and worthwhile. However, I find literary 
criticism and the untangling of the historicity of a text, let alone a whole literary 
period, extremely difficult, and I found the large generalisations and competing 
accounts about the epistemic and other forces that were at work in the period 
incredibly frustrating. As such, as much confidence as I have in the output, I want 
to make sure I hold up a tentative three fingers for any of the historical and literary 
claims that have sounded like a confident statement of fact in what has preceded. 
Any pattern I have espoused or analysed is likely overlooking, in Dennett’s terms, 
40% noise (the remaining two fingers) which I could not grapple with successfully 
or account for given my limitations as a scholar and the amount of time and room 
available to it in this thesis. 
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Assessing a Virtuous Education 
 
Assessment is a cornerstone of education and so no discussion of education would 
be complete without a note on it. This is perhaps one the most practically radical 
and intuitively-driven conclusions this thesis contains: do not assess in anything 
remotely like the form that is currently prevalent and simply put aside standardised 
assessment as a practice. One might attempt to assess virtuous education virtuously 
via seemingly positive means such as collaborative presentation and debate, 
creative and student-devised pieces, journaling, peer assessment, and so on. Indeed, 
Cotterill identifies the hypocrisy of academics who talk about treating students as 
equals only to “adopt a teacher-pupil dynamic to assess the degree to which the 
academic feels the student has learnt what they should have” (2015: p. 404) and 
presses for a model of interactive and live discussion around whether the 
assessment criteria were met. Even here, however, for all its attempt to promote 
student engagement and power, assessment cannot escape the central issue of the 
expert-novice rhetoric. Even Ranciere did not recognise that this dynamic was still 
present in Jacatot’s command to pass the course. The very attempt to pass is to 
engage with some externally set standard, to fix it, to become enslaved and 
beholden to it, and to put one’s own sense of worth in the praise and validation of 
the expert assessor. In assessment, there is no way to keep the rules playful and 
plastic and there is no way to fully legitimise the student voice, for the assessor 
must always maintain their role as gatekeeper.  
 
On my understanding of the virtuous education, the only standard that matters is 
one’s own reflection upon the questions: Did I experience any increase in the worth 
of my life during the learning journey? Do I experience my existence as any more 
worthwhile than I did before the learning experience? If further assessment criteria 
must develop then let them do so from this alone. Let them arise in the same way 
that we might assess one’s favourite mug, the decision to wake up at 5am in order 
to experience a sunrise, paying to fly rather than take the train from London to 
Glasgow, or one’s first kiss. Let it be done immediately, in situ, and in relation to 
one’s life. Or, as I perhaps gestured towards when defending including practical 
examples of my teaching, emancipated assessment might be conceived of as a 
process of helping students to shape their own model of life’s success and 
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facilitating their reflection on how their education journey is comparing to that 
model. If so, however, it must be done in full recognition that experiences might 
shape the assessment criteria as much as the criteria must assess the experience, and 
the criteria must always be held subject to the same anarchistic model outlined as 
part of the emancipated education section above. 
 
 
The Warwick Handbook of Innovative Teaching: Practical advice and reflections on 
embedding and structuring for playful and experimental teaching 
 
As far as this thesis is concerned, innovation is the embedding of novel responses 
to a problem or set of issues, and innovative teaching is teaching which engages 
with this process. That innovation requires novelty or originality suggests that it is 
interwoven with creative and, potentially, playful processes (Bateson and Martin, 
2013). On my understanding, innovation is a form of directed and practically-
realised creativity often underpinned by playful activity. As innovative practice 
responds to particular issues, it is not to be understood in the same way as some of 
the above examples, which were more akin to free or minimally-directed play set 
upon for the sake of engaging in playfulness as a virtuous activity. However, playful 
activity is used in innovation insofar as it allows for ‘outside the box’ thinking and 
experimental activity which the innovative process needs to gain traction. On the 
other hand, one might argue that what has already been discussed is innovative 
insofar as these lessons and approaches were responses to the issue of how to create 
a virtuous education. I would maintain that even if that is the case, the above 
account has not yet achieved the status of ‘innovation’, for whilst it may constitute 
the beginnings of an educational philosophy with examples of its practical 
implementation, my practice has not yet been fully formed and disseminated in a 
way which allows it to be followed and replicated. In this sense, it has not become 
embedded in any teaching community or even in a consistent and thorough way in 
my own teaching given its still-developing and embryonic form. In teaching, ideas 
such the aforementioned ‘Open-Space Learning’ or ‘Question X’ are closer to 
innovations insofar as they are responding to a particular issue and have a clear and 
distinct philosophy, method and practice in place that is embedded in particular 
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teaching communities and packaged in a way that makes it easily transferable 
elsewhere. 
 
One might ask, why should a teaching philosophy or approach seek this type of 
status or formulation? Is it not enough that teaching be moulded around ideals and 
beliefs responding to the needs of those immediately in front of the teacher on a 
day-to-day basis? Is it not for each teacher to achieve their end goal in their own 
classroom and institution and keep it organic and alive? Does the innovative process 
not lend itself to more corporate and stale metaphors of “packaging” and 
“consumption”? For all the good that OSL, Question X, and other innovations do 
in the classroom, do they also not lead to a necessary reduction and over-
simplification of their methods and arguments? Indeed, do these negative 
connotations and innovation’s close ties to at least the rhetoric of the neoliberal, 
transactional university not put it at odds with my understanding of the virtuous life 
and the childlike learner? Perhaps, but I cannot see how these concerns can 
outweigh the potential good that can come from finding ways to articulate and 
disseminate virtuous activity as responsibly and faithfully as possible. The 
innovative process only becomes vicious when those who engage in it become 
vicious and those who practise the techniques do so for vicious ends. The attempt 
to both claim that one finds a certain method of teaching to be of the utmost value 
and virtuous and that one would not then desire to seek a way of disseminating this 
method appears to me to be profoundly contradictory. As such, I want to conclude 
this chapter with the contention that a disposition to innovate is also part of what 
constitutes the virtuous teacher, that all teaching institutions should be set up to 
facilitate innovative processes for the sake of their community, and with some 
advice on how best to structure an educational institution to allow for classroom 
innovation.  
 
My contentions here draw upon the work done during my thesis on The Warwick 
Handbook of Innovative Teaching (Gaydon, forthcoming). The Warwick Handbook 
of Innovative Teaching was proposed by me in the belief that the highest quality 
thinking around and realisation of innovation in pedagogy was ‘out there’ in the 
teaching spaces of the university, and that it was being created daily in response to 
the special demands and circumstances of students and teachers ‘in the field’. The 
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collection aimed to find those passionate, creative and dedicated individuals who 
were pushing boundaries at Warwick to achieve the goal of an excellent educational 
experience, and to locate a common stock of ideas and shared knowledge that could 
be presented to the wider teaching community for inspiration. On the understanding 
that innovation arises organically from having access to and interacting with a 
diverse collection of ideas (see below), one of the main aims of the project was to 
present insights from staff and students working in a broad spectrum of 
departments. As such, over the 2015/16 academic year, 55 members of teaching 
and support staff were interviewed, four focus groups were run with teaching staff, 
support staff, and students, 13 lessons were observed, four university teaching 
events were attended, and one event was run. This allowed me to gather information 
from over 30 different academic departments and university services. Here, I want 
to present some of the lessons and ideas that were learned from this project in order 
to understand what is necessary for cultivating not just a playful but an innovative 
disposition amongst a teaching community which, whilst not part of the childlike 
system as sketched above, does lead to the ability to extend and embed worthwhile 
practices created by the teacher. 
 
It should be acknowledged that some parts of this section draw from the handbook 
itself, but whilst I led a team of two undergraduate researchers and another member 
of staff, the project is accredited to me, the handbook was written by myself and I 
am acknowledged as its sole author in the forthcoming publication. As such, any 
passages and ideas articulated here are my own work and conclusions drawn from 
the project. 
 
 
1. Create a teaching philosophy 
 
Many of us have a vague sense of what our teaching philosophy is, but clearly 
articulating it is key when innovating as it can give direction and grounding to the 
process as well as help us clearly articulate to our students our intentions and 
reasoning – a transparency that is often needed for a trusting relationship between 
staff and students. Appendix C is the list of questions and prompts that I created for 
teachers trying to formulate their own teaching philosophy. However, as can be 
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seen there, it is important to recognise that a teaching philosophy is not a static thing 
and it is rare to be able to hold a single, entirely coherent ideal. The interpersonal 
relationships and shifting context of the classroom often make that impossible. As 
such, trying to frame a teaching philosophy in terms of generalised, immovable 
maxims can be problematic. Uncharted territory can regularly lead to goals being 
called into tension or new situations presenting problems for even the most 
fundamental of ideas and a teaching philosophy needs to be continually revisited 
throughout any innovative process. My practical prompts for teachers trying to 
innovate attempt to reflect this. Where the first section suggests an attempt to 
articulate core principles to make the teaching philosophy wieldable and 
implementable, the second suggests destabilising it where necessary. Just as you 
cannot simultaneously know the location and speed of a particle, so you cannot 
simultaneously use your teaching philosophy as an anchor and have it reflect the 
instability of central concepts and life. 
 
It must also be remembered that as teachers we innovate within departmental, 
faculty and institutional contexts and teaching philosophies must be reflected on in 
relation to the other pedagogic philosophies that exist within one’s context and 
institution if successful relationships and innovation are to happen. For example, 
when writing this handbook for teachers at Warwick, I suggested that they not only 
needed to measure their philosophies up against Warwick’s official Teaching and 
Learning Strategy but that they had to enter into discussion with those around them 
as to what the community’s unofficial and perhaps unseen philosophy was. The 
point of many of the interviews conducted during the project was to find out if there 
was a philosophy that many of the practitioners in the community were working 
from and to make these ideals visible so that alliances could be drawn and 
negotiations opened on better and more transparent terms than were currently on 
offer. For Warwick, the model of ‘student-as-producer’ (Jenainati, 2015), the 
necessity of failure, and a constructivist epistemology were particularly prevalent. 
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2. Create the right kind of community 
 
Bilton and Leary (2002) contend that that the popular image of the creative genius 
– a divergent thinker with access to an irrational understanding of the world and 
subject to spontaneous moments of insight – has led organisations to produce 
environments that stifle creativity. These organisations overlook the fact that 
creativity does not regularly stem from an individual making unprecedented and 
sudden leaps forward in isolation, but is more likely to be part of an incremental 
and collective process. As such, it is not enough for an organisation to focus upon 
providing brief hits of funding, time, space, and permission to creatively engage 
with problems or concepts. If the individual is not situated within an environment 
which contains a stable and supportive community, one which recognises that the 
necessary process is a prolonged one, then their creatively-charged state is likely to 
amount to very little. 
 
Instead, an organisation must seek to create structures and spaces for sharing ideas 
and materials between a diverse body of people where their contributions can 
unpredictably collide. Although Bilton and Leary’s paper distinguishes creativity 
from innovation in different ways to how it has been defined here, that terminology 
can be put aside and the ideas productively translated. Structures that allow for 
collaboration as well as idea collision and exchange are necessary if innovative 
teaching is to flourish for exactly the reasons their paper highlights. Innovation, like 
creativity, is often not the product of individual moments of insight and genius, but 
of communal collaboration, incremental adaptions, and the unusual moments that 
occur during such processes. 
 
What can be learned from Warwick’s teaching community? The Centre for 
Professional Education (CPE) at Warwick stands out as one of the university’s 
instances of excellent practice in this area and is directly related to teacher 
education. After speaking to the teaching fellows for secondary school initial 
teacher training and Head of Primary Teacher Education Des Hewitt,10 as well as 
                                                          
10 See Hewitt’s co-authored book Innovative Teaching and Learning in Primary Schools (2015) for 
a variety of ideas and reflective tasks useful for understanding innovation not only in primary but 
all areas of education. 
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observing one of the department’s core secondary school PGCE teaching days, it 
became clear that the ways in which CPE staff work as a team and encourage trainee 
teachers to develop their own practices through collaboration has created an 
environment that nurtures individual teaching innovations and supports the 
innovative process.  The core PGCE teaching days are designed by CPE to enable 
their trainee’s development as teachers, but they are also sources of innovation and 
model outstanding practice in terms of supporting the innovative process. Having 
regular, dedicated days and forums on which trainees can share their experiences 
of sustained practices in schools means they can communicate and discuss the 
positives and negatives of the techniques, technologies, and lesson plans they are 
using, as well as gather ideas and practices from each other. They are also actively 
encouraged to select and try new approaches in their respective schools before the 
next training day, and the trainees are offered continual support as they adjust the 
materials they encounter for their context. Interdisciplinary collaboration during 
tasks and presentations on these days also means the trainees and staff are exposed 
to a variety of discipline-specific technologies and techniques that they may 
otherwise miss. These tasks and presentations are followed with scaffolded 
reflection on generalizable concepts and skills. As such, staff and students are 
involved in the unpredictable collisions within a diverse environment, and even if 
nothing presents itself as immediately relevant, the process means their teaching 
toolkit is rapidly expanded in diverse ways. It is this toolkit that can then create 
avenues for innovation as well as develop the teacher’s ability to improvise when 
teaching. The CPE teaching fellows spoken to during the handbook project also 
highlighted that a similar process occurred within their team. They team-teach, 
support each other in using new technologies or techniques, review each other’s 
ideas and practices, and their processes for developing ideas and creating new 
lesson plans and courses involve collective endeavours. Indeed, it was highlighted 
by the team that having regular and honest team discussion is a major factor in what 
allows them to continue to innovate in their teaching. As such, an incremental 
model of innovation is not only occurring within CPE but the department has 
created environments which allow for the dissemination of a diverse range of ideas, 
and the process is supported by the kind of ethos of collaboration and mutual 
development argued for by Bilton and Leary. 
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One of the other most successful departments at Warwick for innovation in teaching 
is Classics and Ancient History. Whether it be through practical workshops on 
creating mosaics, stone carving, bronze casting, having students create their own 
lessons based upon museum objects, running a mock symposium using replicated 
vases and drinking cups, or working with professional directors and storytellers to 
help them recreate and interpret elements of the ancient world, the department have 
managed to: (a) increase active and embodied student engagement as an aid to 
subject understanding, (b) develop a sense of collegiality between staff and students 
and have the latter identify themselves as empowered researchers, and (c) address 
any misconceptions students may have that theirs is a purely text-based degree 
detached from professional development and only alive insofar as it is historically 
reported. However, in working with this department what was most notable, and I 
believe to be the foundation of their success in innovation, was the feeling of 
community amongst the teaching staff. Those interviewed were not only passionate 
about their own teaching projects but were clearly knowledgeable, enthusiastic, and 
supportive of the projects being conducted by their colleagues. Indeed, one point 
the head of the department stressed during her interview was that teaching 
innovation is regularly discussed during full staff meetings in the Classics 
department, with postgraduate and undergraduate representatives, and part of their 
departmental webpage is dedicated to the innovative projects they are engaged in. 
As such, not only do the staff receive crucial practical and emotional support when 
innovating but they are exposed to a variety of ideas and approaches which they 
can draw upon in the future. 
 
This supportive community, one which recognises the importance of the 
incremental model, should also vocally legitimise translation of ideas into new 
contexts as innovative practice. For example, Rebecca Johnson adopted the Open 
Space Learning practice of ‘Theory Building’ (IATL, 2011) for her ‘Mixed 
Methods for Health Research’ module (Johnson et al., forthcoming). In her 
interview for the project, Johnson expressed that she felt that what she did was not 
innovative due to it stemming from the innovative activity of others. However, 
whilst ‘Theory Building’ may not be Johnson’s innovation, I would maintain that 
her translation is an innovation. Translating a session run by another teacher into 
your own context involves adapting it to address different challenges, moulding it 
177 
 
to suit a new language and environment, and changing it in the face of an entirely 
different set of students. Although it may bear a family resemblance to its 
predecessor it also has distinct features because of this and these are innovative in 
their own right. It is important to see innovation in teaching as an ongoing and 
collaborative process. As Hewitt argues: “Innovation in general often takes an 
existing idea or approach and transforms it into something new. For this reason, 
innovation always builds on what came before.” (2015: p. 19) This, alongside other 
messages surrounding innovation and creativity being a process which can only 
exist within an intellectual collective, must be promoted if we are to continue to 
foster such virtuously innovative activity. I suggest that translations such as 
Johnson’s are a driving force in this as they involve the creator increasing their 
knowledge of and exposure to practices in the relevant ‘domain’ (teaching) and they 
allow ideas to be tested against multiple environments for worth and adapted where 
needed to make them more relevant to a variety of contexts.  
 
Students should also be brought into this process. As was highlighted by a large 
proportion of the interviewees during the handbook project, and is something of a 
truism in the teaching community, understanding the needs of your students is 
crucial to not only framing and “selling” innovation to them but also guiding where 
innovation needs to happen. However, responding to the individual needs of the 
student as a stimulus for innovation is not the only role they play within the 
community. They can be part of that teaching community and bring heightened 
chances for innovation with them because of it, as well as creating further 
opportunities for the above understanding of an emancipatory education. This is 
what I have termed the “student-as-teacher” model. It might occur in widening 
participation programmes where undergraduates are placed in schools or other 
learning environments where they must adopt the role of class-leader and teacher 
or, like in Warwick’s Digichamps or ‘Adopt a Classs’ (Hampton, 2016) projects, 
they create material and enhance the teaching of their own subject. In the latter case, 
the project seeks to connect undergraduate language students on their Year Abroad 
with PGCE trainee Modern Foreign Languages Teachers to enhance the latter’s 
access to cultural objects and insights for their teaching. Students are tasked with 
identifying and collecting “culturally significant artefacts in their host countries that 
could be used to enhance language teaching and learning […] and develop them 
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into learning resources.” (Hampton, 2016: p. 2) Lifting the veil on teaching 
practices and involving students in them in the above ways can also allow students 
to offer direct insights on our teaching practice. As Cathia Jenainati explains about 
her employing of a GROWTH and coaching model within undergraduate 
dissertation supervision:  
 
Self-reflection is a powerful tool for educators but it can only 
reveal to us a limited amount of information. For the past couple 
of years, I have invited students to coach me, using the GROWTH 
model, with a specific goal of understanding my own praxis and 
improving it. Although I have only been coached by two students 
so far, I have found the process invaluable, enabling, and deeply 
moving. (Jenainati, 2015: p. 166) 
 
Students should thus be welcomed to be part of the teaching and innovation 
community. 
 
Finally, innovation – particularly when it is built on playful activity – can be 
perceived as expensive and risky, and it may seem likely that one’s colleagues or 
institution will not be open to such risks. Indeed, just as there is in playful activity, 
there is the real potential for subverting the norm and current power structures, and 
that can be perceived as a direct challenge to established rules and beliefs (Hewitt, 
2015: p. 8). Formal education is potentially one of the most resistant spaces to 
change given its rigid conventions and the high stakes for the students if innovation 
goes wrong (Sharples et al., 2015: p. 8). Take, for example, the fact that some 
departments within a higher education system must conform to certain regulations 
as to what must be taught in order for a degree to be classed as a degree in that 
subject. At Warwick, students from certain subjects would often be reluctant to or 
even dissuaded from taking interdisciplinary IATL modules, such as those I taught 
on, because they could not contribute towards their formal degree and so would 
have to take them as a not-for-credit option or overload their schedule. The 
supportive network being outlined mediates some of this perception of risk by 
creating a collegial sense of “being in it together”, not just with staff but also with 
the students themselves. 
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It is thus necessary in our educational institutions to create collaborative and 
mutually supportive communities based around teaching – although inclusive of 
willing students – where they do not already exist. These communities must include 
chances for unforeseen encounters and different scenarios. Without such united 
communities it will be difficult to realise not only the virtue of innovation but the 
underpinning unity of the institution Baehr laid out as necessary for the embedding 
of new and innovative approaches to teaching, including, once fully formalised, my 
own. 
 
*** 
 
At the beginning of this chapter I outlined what my account of a virtuous education 
had built towards in the previous chapters. Namely, that a virtuous education seeks 
to create and facilitate future experiences of being-with-worth through: embracing 
the living, lived and experiential dimensions of epistemology; cultivating and 
modelling the childlike virtues of playfulness, a capacity for wonder, and 
intellectual humility and open-mindedness; and enthusiastically and genuinely 
teaching in a manner and in spaces which promote the learner taking an active, 
reflective and playful role in meaning making. This chapter has underscored many 
of these ideas, but it has also added, amongst other things, that: 
 
• A virtuous education is an emancipated education; 
• A virtuous education should fully embrace the political and ethical ideals 
that underpin it; 
• The virtuous teacher must always model the virtuous behaviour they seek 
to bring about; 
• The virtuous teacher must continually reflect with students on the end goals 
of education; 
• The virtuous teacher should care for the ‘soul’ of the students and draw 
attention to what is dignified and of equal value in them; 
• Virtuous educational spaces must be kept fluid and a realm of possibility 
for as long as possible; 
180 
 
• Virtuous educational spaces should reveal and reflect on its restrictions and 
rules as well as play with them when possible; 
• A virtuous education should reconceive of, if not eliminate, assessment; 
• A virtuous institution will maintain an “all in”, widely-interactive, mutually 
supportive, and diverse community that is structured for innovation; 
• A virtuous education should contain a strong, anarchic vein as well as the 
continual possibility of being playfully undermined by its learners. 
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Appendix A: Images Victorian Christmas Cards, from Grossman, John. 2008. 
Christmas Curiosities, New York, Stewart, Tabori & Chang 
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Appendix B: Wonder Workshop Lesson Plan 
 
Time Exercise Notes 
5 mins What do you 
wonder? What 
makes you 
wonder? 
Students will place post-it notes or use the board 
markers to write or draw their answers to these 
two questions - one question on either side of the 
board. 
15 mins Group and class 
discussion of 
responses to 
homework tasks. 
Reading and questions were: 
• ‘The Tyger’ (poem) by William Blake. 
Can you think of an animal or person that 
captures your imagination or makes you 
wonder? Can you express why? Do you 
think your explanation does the thing or 
feeling justice? 
• ‘Jabberwocky’ (poem) by Lewis Carroll. 
What do you think is going on here? 
Does the poem mean anything? Read the 
paragraph after the poem on the scanned 
copy, do you agree with Alice? 
• ‘How the Whale Became’ (short story) 
by Ted Hughes. Can you think of 
anything on earth that really baffles you? 
Can you come up with an origin story for 
it? 
• A scanned copy of the first few pages 
from Michelle LeMieux’s picture book A 
Stormy Night. Where would you go from 
here? 
• ‘Seven Wonders’ (essay) by Lewis 
Thomas. What would your seven 
wonders be? Why? 
 
198 
 
Final questions: How do you think these relate to 
this week's theme or the imagination? Which 
stimulated your imagination the most? 
10 mins Tableau In groups of 4/5. Students will select a 
wonder/wondering from the board and create a 
still tableau to represent it. They will then show 
their tableau to the rest of the class. The 
questions posed to the class will vary: What do 
you think this is? What does this make you think 
of? Which wonder do you think they picked? 
Thoughts? 
10 mins Discussion Questions for the students: Which of these pieces 
and tasks stimulated your imagination and which 
didn't? What made those more successful? 
Which then made you want to do something with 
what you were imagining and which didn't? Is 
this 'follow-through' important? Explanation to 
students of my thinking about the task in terms 
of re-presenting ideas, how the form of 
something can match or be disassociated from 
the content, and thinking about how to stimulate 
thought and imagination. 
10 mins Oh, the Thinks you 
can Think 
Students to be sat in semi-circle on floor around 
me on cushions and with soft/cuddly items and 
wax crayons and coloured paper in sight. Lights 
to be dimmed. Oh, the Thinks you can Think by 
Dr Seuss to be read to students. Students then 
select one thing they have never heard of before 
and draw it the crayons and paper. These 
drawings can be incorporated into the next task. 
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25 mins Theory building Students in groups of 4/5 to be given packs of 
laminated, A4 cards and the instruction to use all 
the cards to create an explanation of what 
wonder is which they will talk the other groups 
through. After this explanation they will give a 
single sentence that begins "From this we can see 
that wonder is...". They may lay the cards out in 
any shape, use different levels, and present them 
in any way they see fit. At the start of the task 
students will be told the 'maths wall' 
mysteriously appeared over-night in Dorset and 
a prize was offered by the local council to anyone 
who could solve it. Half-way through the time it 
will be revealed to students that it turned out it 
means nothing. 
25 mins Walk and talk Groups take each other through their theories 
and are offered the opportunity to ask questions 
about each other's creations and process. 
5 mins Individual free-
writing 
Students given 5 mins to work individually and 
free-write ideas that have arisen during the 
session. If they pause, students are prompted to 
just keep writing even if it doesn’t make sense. 
5 mins Debrief Anchor theory building to points about creating 
theories of imagination in similar ways and 
trying to build up their own ideas each week 
before coming to class so they aren’t just 
absorbing the speakers’ points but already have 
their own thoughts to measure them against. 
Also to their assessed imaginative stimulus and 
to reflect on where stimulation did/didn’t occur. 
Finish on Howard Parsons' A Philosophy of 
Wonder: "What attracts and holds the wondering 
imagination is the mystery of quality and 
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meaning, dramatically or silently challenging 
man, waiting to be unravelled. It is this lure of 
the unknown, this temptation of exploring the 
hidden labyrinth, which gives to the wonderful 
its peculiar fascination.” 
Follow-
up 
Email to students Email students with: lesson plan and explanation 
of thinking behind this, questions to take them 
further in their reflective journals, and my own 
understanding of what wonder is with references 
to secondary reading. 
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Appendix C: Teaching Philosophy Activities taken from an early draft of The 
Warwick Handbook of Innovative Teaching (forthcoming) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These are just some questions to get you started on thinking about your teaching philosophy. Try 
to articulate not only what you think but why you think that. 
 
• What is teaching and what is a teacher? 
• Why do I teach and what am I trying to achieve? 
• What is education for? 
• What is a university for and what should it be trying to achieve? 
• How do I hope students are different after: 
o Attending one of my lectures/seminars/workshops? 
o Taking one of my modules? 
o Being supervised by me? 
o Being a student in my department? 
o Completing a degree in my department? 
o Their time at the University of Warwick? 
• What kind of relationship am I hoping to achieve with my students? 
• How do/should I interact with colleagues or students who don’t share my philosophy or 
hold different values? 
• Is there a better way of doing what I’m doing and why am I not doing it if there is? 
• Have my opinions on these questions changed over time? How? Why? 
• Are there other answers to them and why don’t I agree if there are? 
 
You may want to summarise and articulate the fundamental principles of your teaching 
philosophy by looking for recurrent themes and ideas in your responses. 
 
You can test the flexibility of your teaching philosophy by looking for absolute statements in your 
answers and asking: should I always adhere to this or can I conceive of scenarios that are going 
to be problematic? Do you need to adapt or qualify your philosophy in response to this? 
 
Similarly, if you come across a significant or difficult teaching moment, note down what 
happened and what you did. Did you act in accordance with your teaching philosophy? If not, 
why not? Do you need to change your philosophy to fit with the principle you acted by or do you 
need to identify how would you could act differently if you still think your philosophy is 
applicable, achievable and best? 
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More playfully, you may take the opportunity every now and then to completely rethink 
your teaching philosophy. Adorning the glass of The Teaching Grid sits Joseph Boyes’ 
words: “To be a teacher is my greatest work of art.” Many of us will also have heard 
some derivative of the famous phrase “Teaching is not the filling of a pail, but the 
lighting of a fire” or the rhyme “Be a ‘guide on the side’ rather than a ‘sage on the 
stage’”. How about Parker Palmer’s, “I [have] learned that my gift as a teacher is to be 
able to dance with my students,”11 or L Dee Fink’s “the teacher [is] the helmsman for the 
learning experience”12? Many of these are metaphors or are informed by metaphor. 
Take a second now to write down ten different metaphors that begin “teaching is…”.  
 
Once you have done that, try to think: “if this were the metaphor I ascribed to, how 
would that mean I would teach?” Are there are positives to this different approach to 
teaching you might want to incorporate? 
 
                                                          
11 1997, Courage to Teach, New York, Wiley & Sons, p.72 
12 2013, Significant Learning Experience, San Francisco, Jossey-Bass, p.278 
